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8 APRIL 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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8 APRIL 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. ASSAILED ON BROAD INTERPRETATION OF ABM TREATY

Talks with Allies Derided

PM051639 PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Vladislav Drobkov "Commentator's Column": "Setback"]

[Text] Until recently the consultations which Washington held with its NATO partners were more reminiscent of successful arm-twisting sessions (successful for the United States, that is).

Now, judging by the initial results of the trip to Western Europe by P. Nitze and R. Perle, the situation is changing somewhat. Washington's high-ranking envoys will return essentially empty-handed. They failed to secure the West European NATO members' unconditional support for the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty formulated by the administration.

We will recall that this "interpretation," which is an attempt to distort the very essence of the treaty, is designed to justify the full-scale SDI tests planned for the next few years. And this, in turn, opens the way to the earliest implementation of the first stage of the "star wars" plan. Washington is thus striving not only to ditch the limitations imposed by the ABM treaty but also to begin the irreversible process of militarizing space. Following a series of White House conferences President Reagan has already signed a directive authorizing this adventurist venture.

Washington's initiative, undertaken at the height of the "Irangate" scandal with the clear aim of demonstrating the administration's "firmness," has seriously worried the allies. They have seen that SDI could break the last link with arms control right now. America's actions were criticized even in those NATO capitals which are usually willing to support Washington's course. And the trip by the high-ranking envoys showed that this criticism is becoming increasingly strident.

In Bonn, Nitze and Perle were told that the FRG Government supports the observance of the ABM Treaty in its original interpretation. A similar stance was taken in London, Brussels, Rome, and The Hague. In a number of places it was even stated that if the United States arbitrarily gives the ABM Treaty a "broad interpretation," its partners will be forced to reexamine the terms of their participation in the SDI program. Even at NATO Council sessions the unacceptability of these actions was pointed out to the U.S. representatives.

Thus, with rare unanimity the allies have declared their disagreement with the administration's course. But the question is whether the United States intends to head these voices of alarm.

Despite the West European setback, the administration's leading representatives--people such as Pentagon chief Weinberger--are carrying on as though the decision to switch to a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty has already been finally and irrevocably taken. Britain's THE GUARDIAN called Weinberger's actions and statements a "mockery" of the NATO consultation process. And Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has arrogantly stated that the allies have absolutely "no right to tell us what constitutes the correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty."

In this situation the main result of America's consultations with its NATO partners may simply be a further increase in tension in relations between them.

'Blatant Falsification' on Grechko Speech

PM081457 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu Borin article under the rubric "Facts Versus Lies": "Behind the Fig Leaf"]

[Text] The U.S. leadership is at present experiencing its own "time of troubles," so to speak, which is of its own making. A time when there is a particularly marked difference between what it says and what it actually does. As is well known, the Soviet and U.S. sides agreed at the Geneva summit meeting in November 1985 that they would speed things up at the talks on nuclear and space weapons. The intention was to resolve a range of issues, namely: "To prevent an arms race in space and stop the arms race on earth, limit and reduce nuclear arms, and strengthen strategic stability."

However, THE NEW YORK TIMES says, Washington is "clearly suffering from an attack of amnesia." This is confirmed by the administration's latest step -- its instructions to the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons not to consider any proposals which could prevent the United States from switching to a "broader interpretation" of the ABM Treaty.

This interpretation is required by the U.S. administration if it is to conduct tests as soon as possible for its "Star Wars" program or, to be more precise, if it is to take the arms race into space, which would inevitably undermine the ABM Treaty. [paragraph continues]

By destroying this important agreement to please the "hawks" and the military-industrial complex, the U.S. leadership will put an even greater distance between the stands taken by the U.S. and Soviet delegations at Geneva. In other words, the present extremely dangerous actions by the White House are not aimed at speeding up the process of reaching an important agreement in the strategic arms control sphere and reducing and ultimately eliminating these arms, but quite the reverse -- they are aimed at ruling out this possibility at the earliest opportunity, ensuring that strike weapons are put into space as soon as possible, and undermining strategic stability.

It should be noted that the U.S. Administration is going to a great deal of effort to justify its actions to destroy the most important international treaty agreements and pledges to the public and Congress. It is with this aim in mind that the White House has ordered the preparation of a series of so-called reports to Congress on the United States' supposed fulfillment of its pledges in accordance with arms limitation agreements and also on issues relating to other countries' fulfillment of their pledges in accordance with the same treaties and agreements. The author of these reports is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in close cooperation with the Pentagon, the Energy Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA.

The first of these reports, already being used as propaganda, is very far from suggesting any progress in the U.S. Administration's political thinking and consists of a primitive collection of thoroughly harneyed anti-Soviet fabrications. The authors of the report attempt to "parry" with highly questionable "arguments" the incompatibility of SDI's aims and tasks with the pledge made in the ABM Treaty (Article 1), namely, "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of one's country and not to provide a base for such a defense." According to them, the SDI program is "purely research" and intended to free the world of nuclear missiles entirely. They even refer to a speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko in 1972 to confirm the "lawfulness" of U.S. actions in going ahead with the "Star Wars" plans.

We are talking about blatant falsification here. In his speech A.A. Grechko said research work within the bounds of the ABM Treaty is permitted. That is, ABM systems permitted within the limitations stipulated by this treaty. This miserable attempt to alter the meaning of statements by a deceased Soviet military commander and ascribe to him the permission of work which would lead to a breach of the ABM Treaty is more than cynical.

The falsity of claims that "SDI is purely research" has essentially even been admitted, in spite of themselves, by some high-ranking U.S. figures. "The creation of strategic defense has never envisaged a rejection of nuclear strategy. In creating strategic defense the United States has no intention of giving up nuclear deterrence -- on the contrary, it wants to strengthen it." This was said by the present U.S. defense secretary. His words have basically been confirmed by the President himself: "We must turn our advantages in the laboratory into advantages in real weapons."

So, from the very outset, "scientific research" for the SDI program has been planned with the aim of creating first strike weapons and placing them in space. Nuclear first strike weapons. This is also apparent in a report by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to Congress, which provides the first official admission that the United States is conducting "experiments within the context of SDI that have the aim of exploring the possibilities of applying the concept based on the use of power released by nuclear explosion."

This kind of activity, however -- outside the test sites at which the development and testing of ABM components and systems is permitted -- is a blatant violation of Article 4 of the treaty, because the test site in Nevada where tests are being conducted in the interests of the "Star Wars" program is not actually an agreed test site for experimenting with ABM weapons.

The aforementioned report by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is therefore nothing other than a crudely fashioned propaganda fig leaf intended to conceal the United States' obvious violations of its ABM Treaty pledges. This is being done with clear intent -- to gain military superiority at all costs.

Soviet Embassy on ABM

AU10114 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 10 Mar 87 p 4

[Text] Vienna — A press statement issued yesterday by the Soviet Embassy in Vienna on the discussions concerning a reinterpretation of the ABM treaty said the problem is that the realization of the SDI program has now reached a stage where its continuation requires tests outside the laboratory. This includes space, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. To circumvent this prohibition, the U.S. Administration is starting to speak of a transition to an "expanded" interpretation of the treaty.

In this connection, at the Geneva negotiations on cosmic nuclear weapons, the United States recently proposed to the Soviet side that it agree to an "expanded" interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

The statement stressed that the nature of the treaty reinterpretation devised by the Americans consists in the premise that the ABM Treaty allegedly permits not only conducting all research but also creating, testing, and deploying the antimissile system or its components in different ways if these are based on new physical principles. Furthermore, the U.S. Administration is also aiming at a general breach of the ABM Treaty. Washington's actions show the clear effort to make the SDI program irreversible as soon as possible and to bind the hands of future U.S. Administrations for many years with regard to their possibilities to correct the position on SDI.

The Soviet Union is in favor of "observing the ABM Treaty, of consolidating the order created by this treaty, and of the traditional interpretation of all its stipulations which has been valid for all the past years."

Without renouncing the principled position on averting the arms race in space, the Soviet Union is ready, "together with the United States, to search for mutually acceptable agreements by taking into consideration the devotion of the current U.S. Administration and of the President personally to the SDI program." The Soviet proposal on consolidating the ABM Treaty system follows this direction, the statement said.

'Grossent Distortion' of Statement D

PH111145 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 87 Second Edition p 5

[A. Mozgovoy article under the rubric "Facts Versus Lies": "Washington's Subterfuges"]

[Text] And so, official Washington's line of introducing the so-called "broad interpretation" of the USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) has become an actual fact of political life. Administration spokesmen have confirmed THE NEW YORK TIMES report that President Reagan has ordered the U.S. delegation in Geneva not to examine any proposals which could prevent the United States from adopting this most "broad interpretation." Washington has sent its emissaries to allies in Europe and Asia for consultations on this question. The Department of State has been given orders to complete its analysis of the legal aspects of the ABM Treaty's "broad interpretation" by early April.

On what is the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty based? In particular, the White House is trying to present matters as if "the Russians themselves were unwilling to impose limitations on the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM systems based on new principles of physics" like laser installations, directed energy weapons, and so on. Moreover, Washington refers to Agreed Statement "D" which, it claims, "approves the testing of any ABM systems provided they are based on other principles of physics." Here we have the grossest distortion of the truth! According to [Agreed] Statement "D," [Mozgovoy uses cyrillic letter "D" which is fifth letter in Russian alphabet] the research, development [razrabotka], and testing of future [perspektivnyy] ABM means or their components are allowed in areas strictly limited by the treaty and only at stationary land-based installations (in other words, not at all in outer space!). This is far from everything. If either of the sides plans to deploy such new systems, it cannot do so without preliminary consultations with the other side and without introducing the appropriate agreed amendments to the text of the treaty.

Washington's farfetched arguments testify only to the U.S. Administration's evident unwillingness to observe the letter and the spirit of the ABM Treaty and its desire to demolish it. It was the U.S. disagreement to consolidate the ABM Treaty provisions and its manic commitment to SDI that prevented the taking of radical steps in Reykjavik toward the reduction and eventual complete liquidation of nuclear arms. SDI, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed, stood in the way of terminating the arms race and getting rid of nuclear weapons.

This is also being pointed out by numerous sober-minded U.S. figures. "At present," P. Warnke, former head of the U.S. delegation to the SALT talks, noted, "the question stands as follows: Either 'Star Wars' or arms control." Statements along similar lines have also been made by former U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance, Senators G. Hart and W. Proxmire, and eminent U.S. scientists.

Could it be, however, that this opinion is held only by those who are seen across the ocean as liberals, and if not actually as "reds," then at least as "pinkos?" No, disagreement with SDI is also expressed by figures who have always ranked among the "hawks." "The SDI program, which was designed as a 'means for getting rid of nuclear weapons,'" General A. Haig, former secretary of state in the Reagan administration, remarks, "has now become the main obstacle in the way of an unprecedented nuclear arms reduction." Former CIA Director W. Colby is even more categorical. "The attempt to create [sozdat] a strategic defense has a destabilizing nature," he wrote in THE NEW YORK TIMES. "The only way to defend our country in the event of a nuclear war is to prevent such a war. The ABM Treaty plays an important role in the successful implementation of the policy of preventing war by curbing the arms race and creating conditions necessary for progress in the cause of limiting offensive forces. This is a document of fundamental importance, which has done more than any other agreement to diminish the threat of nuclear war."

Of course, Haig and Colby dream as much as Reagan and Weinberger of establishing U.S. hegemony in the world, but not by placing the existence of the United States in greater jeopardy. After all, the course of the present U.S. Government of implementing SDI and torpedoing the ABM Treaty is a policy which will bring to the country nothing but complications and misfortune. As the Soviet leadership has declared on numerous occasions, should a full-scale implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" materialize, the USSR would find effective means to restore equilibrium.

U.S. Senate Committees Critical

LD122346 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Commentary by Political Observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Leaders of three of the most important U.S. Senate Committees-- Foreign Politics, Judicial and Armed Forces--have spoken against the Washington Administration's intention to give the so-called broad interpretation to the ABM Treaty. With the latest news commentary, at the microphone is our political observer, Aleksandr Zholkver.

[Zholkver] First of all, I will remind that attempts to ward the notorious broad interpretation of the indefinite Soviet-U.S. treaty are clearly dictated by a striving to break this very important accord, which impedes carrying the arms race over into space. This is not made a secret in the U.S. itself. The magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT writes directly: The ABM Treaty stands directly in the way of plans to create [Sozdat] space-based weapons, because their testing is prohibited. The direct violation of the treaty is considered politically unacceptable, therefore SDI supporters have taken another approach: To preserve the treaty but to give it a free interpretation. Everybody knows which SDI supporters we are talking about. First of all, it is the Pentagon bosses. At the last briefing, it was officially announced here that Weinberger has just signed a new directive, proclaiming military activity in space as having a critically important significance.

General Rankin, who took part in the briefing, called the testing in space of the anti-satellite system, ASAT, as the first and foremost step to be taken. By the way, many well-known U.S. scientists do not hide the fact that the notorious SDI is intended not so much for defense, but for attack. Speaking a couple of days ago at the congress of the American Association of Assistance for the Development of American Science, a famous physicist from Stanford University, Doctor Lynch said frankly: The most obvious role of space-based weapons consists of using them in conjunction with a first strike. No matter how monstrous such ideas are, one has to take them into account.

One also has to think about something else. For the U.S. military-industrial complex, the Star Wars program is a most profitable business. According to statistics in DEFENSE WEEK, published by the United States war industry, it is proposed to double the funds for space weapons development next year. And we talking not only about one next year. The military manufacturers want to steak out their business claims for many years ahead, including the time when another master will preside in the White House. That is why feverish attempts are made to speed up and justify SDI by any means: from the mendacious accusations of the Soviet Union for violating the ABM Treaty to attempts toward its broad interpretation.

To give the U.S. senators their due, one must say that they see the dangers connected with it, and that is namely why they speak against such plans, but whether the Washington Administration will listen to these warnings is another question.

Nunn Cited: 'Serious Error'

LD141459 Moscow TASS in English 1342 GMT 14 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 14 TASS -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

Senator Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the Reagan administration's claims on the legality of its intention to take a "broad interpretation" of the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty ran counter to the entire record of the negotiations which had preceded the signing of the document, its spirit and letter. The White House needs a new interpretation of the treaty for an unlimited deployment of strike space weapons under the Reagan "Star Wars" programme.

Addressing the Senate on Friday, S. Nunn said that after a thorough study of the record of the negotiations, treaty articles, the process of its ratification and the behaviour of the two countries, he made the following firm conclusion: The Nixon administration had made a thorough statement to the Senate during the ratification that the treaty banned the development and testing of mobile, space-based (exotic) weapons. This was how the Senate understood and approved it. This was the opinion (contrary to the U.S. State Department's allegations) held by the following U.S. administrations, including the Reagan administration, up to the year 1985.

A change in the treaty's interpretation, he went on to say, would mean that the U.S. President had signed one document with the Soviet Union and the Senate had ratified a different one. The Senate which is constitutionally responsible and a guarantor of treaties, was not even consulted. "To say that this is a woefully inadequate foundation for a major policy and legal change is a vast understatement. The (Reagan) administration is wrong in its analysis of the Senate ratification debate. It is wrong in its analysis of the record of subsequent practices... and is wrong in its analysis of the negotiating record itself," the committee chairman pointed out.

The senator warned that the present administration made a "serious error" in its position on a key issue by switching over to a "broader interpretation" of the ABM treaty.

Foreign Ministry Briefing

LD171553 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1436 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 17 Mar (TASS) -- The Soviet Union advocates that the USSR and the United States make a commitment not to back out of the ABM Treaty for 10 years while strictly observing its provisions, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Department, said today.

At a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists he noted that it would be better if, instead of pushing for a "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, contradicting the spirit and letter of it, the U.S. Administration would constructively react to the USSR proposal which envisages a clearly defined dividing line between permissible and nonpermissible work in the ABM field according to the treaty.

He said that U.S. Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, recently signed a directive which discussed the task of conducting military actions beyond the limits of the earth's atmosphere. Primary significance is attached to the development and further improvement of antisatellite systems.

An antisatellite system based on the "F-15" fighter already exists in the United States. Last year Congress passed a moratorium on tests of this system on real targets in space. The Pentagon is trying to get the moratorium repealed and envisages increasing the limits on the heights at which space targets can be hit. Moreover, the Pentagon intends to begin developing [razrabotka] a new type of antisatellite system where lasers could be used as weapons.

To justify its actions, said G. Gerasimov, the Pentagon, as usual, is resorting to an old device claiming the existence of an alleged threat from the USSR to U.S. satellites. As far back as August 1983, the USSR stopped further work on a first-generation antisatellite system, developed [razrabotannoy] as far back as the seventies. No new work is currently being done in this field.

At the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear space weapons in Geneva the Soviet delegation put forward specific proposals on banning antisatellite systems along with the elimination of existing ones. The implementation of the measures we are proposing, emphasized the USSR Foreign Ministry representative, would make it possible to come to an agreement on banning the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of antisatellite arms, which would contribute to guaranteeing the operational safety of space devices in orbit.

Sofaer Letter to Nunn Noted

LD171430 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 17 TASS -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

Abraham Sofaer, legal adviser to the U.S. State Department, who was asked by the White House to provide legal motivation for the administration to adopt a so-called "broad interpretation" of the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty, has caused displeasure of high-ranking administration officials. The reason: A letter sent by Sofaer on March 9 this year to Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

In this letter Sofaer admitted that various statements made in the process of ratification of the ABM Treaty and supporting the generally accepted strict interpretation of the treaty were not included in the secret memorandum prepared for Secretary of State George Shultz in 1985 and including the results of his "investigation into the history of conclusion of the ABM Treaty. Sofaer tried to justify this by the fact that the memorandum was compiled on the basis of the conclusions made by young and inexperienced lawyers from his state. It is precisely these conclusions that were presented to the Senate by the administration in 1985 as motivation for its "broad interpretation" of the treaty, an interpretation into which the White House is trying to fit implementation of its "Star Wars" programme.

It is this circumstance, undermining the administration's arguments in favour of the new interpretation of the treaty, that caused, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, irritation among White House and State Department officials.

Sofaer's letter and study of the materials he prepared has led Senator Nunn to draw the following conclusion, undesirable to the White House: The Nixon administration stated to the Senate in a most exhausting manner during the ratification of the ABM Treaty that it bans the development and testing of mobile systems and space-based anti-missile defence systems involving the use of "exotic" technology. The conclusion which does not suit the American warhawks.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW HITS U.S. PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SDI

Directive Seen as 'Undermining' ABM Treaty

LD112150 Moscow TASS in English 2122 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS -- TASS political observer for military problems Vladimir Bogachev writes:

On February 4 U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger signed a new political directive on U.S. military operations in space. Its full text was immediately made classified information.

The short non-classified version of the document published by the Pentagon today openly proclaims the U.S. course towards preparations for combat operations in near-earth space. According to the directive, space has been recognized as a sphere in which combat operations can be staged with the aim to ensure U.S. national security, the same as they can be staged on the ground, in the sea and in the atmosphere.

The directive made it clear that the Pentagon was going to create a potential of anti-satellite strike weapons in space which would permit to attack directly Soviet satellites. Washington is obviously aiming at undermining the letter and spirit of the treaty obligation not to hamper the functioning of the satellites which keep a look-out on the observance of agreements.

The new directive of the Pentagon reiterated in no uncertain terms the turning down by the U.S. of the goal of striving for the prevention of the arms race in space proclaimed in a joint communique after the Soviet-American summit in Geneva and demonstrated once again Washington's intention to wreck the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The ABM Treaty is the last, still effective agreement prohibiting to hamper the work of observation satellites of both sides. In the opinion of influential American specialists, the disrupting of the work of those observation systems would create a catastrophic uncertainty in U.S. military planning. Observation satellite systems promote the maintaining of strategic stability, because they do not permit the other side to deal a sudden disarming blow. It is for this reason that U.S. Congress which usually yields to the demands of the Pentagon is resisting today its plans of testing U.S. anti-satellite weapons.

Congressman George Brown said that control over anti-satellite systems served U.S. interests better than the arms race involving anti-satellite weapons.

U.S. Officials 'Refute Themselves'

LD142118 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 14 Mar 87

[Text] The United States Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has signed a directive on military operations in outer space. Analysis from our commentator Aleksandr Druzhinin. This is what he writes:

Even recently, claims were made in Washington that President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative was confined only to laboratory research. Washington leaders refute themselves now. Caspar Weinberger's directive goes beyond research and amounts to taking practical steps to turn outer space into an arena for future battles. His directive says that space is regarded as a sphere of conducting military operations the same as land, water, and the atmosphere. The picture of preparing for Star Wars painted in Caspar Weinberger's directive is elaborated in the American press, which reports that the United States expects to deploy in space the first SDI components as early as 1991.

How does Washington justify its line for space militarization? The claims are the same as the ones used to try to justify other steps for an arms buildup. This is talk about some sort of Soviet military superiority. In Caspar Weinberger's directive, the Soviet Union is alleged to be striving for military domination in space, so the United States has to hurry. The American policymakers have an amazing ability not to hear what they don't want to. The whole point is that Moscow has declared on many occasions officially that the USSR does not make any preparations to deploy arms in space. This country has repeatedly warned the United States that the shifting of the arms race to outer space carries unpredictable consequences, that arms control will then become impossible and that the arms race will be elevated to a new qualitative round that will be even more dangerous.

Back in January last year, as Mikhail Gorbachev advanced a program for total stage-by-stage elimination of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century, he offered, as the very first stage, banning the use of outer space for military purposes. The Soviet Union upheld this stand of principle in Reykjavik, too. It is pressing for keeping the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty, which bans the militarization of space and which the United States would like to wreck. But Washington stubbornly refuses to heed the voice of reason. The allegiance of the United States administration to the idea of the Star Wars — and that already blocked the path to disarmament accord in Reykjavik — still overpowers common sense.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW NOTES EASE OF COUNTERMEASURES TO SDI

LD171131 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Boris Belitskiy Commentary]

[Text] [Announcer] At his news conference in Reykjavik last autumn the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, made it plain that if the United States Administration went ahead with its Star Wars program the USSR would be forced to respond to this. And he added that this response would be asymmetric, that is, that it would not be a mirror image of the American Strategic Initiative and it would not involve much sacrifice on the Soviet Union's part. Ever since then western military experts have been coming up with all sorts of guesses as to what the Soviet leader could have had in mind, some even suggesting that he might have been bluffing. Well, a Soviet general has now spelled out some of the many options available to the USSR as countermeasures to SDI, and in "Vantage Point" Boris Belitskiy explains some of these options.

[Belitskiy] Major General Anureyev, in a lengthy magazine article, points out first of all that since the SDI battle stations are to circle the earth in fixed orbits they will actually be sitting ducks. In other words, they will be vulnerable to space-borne or ground-based weapons.

As one type of such weapons he mentions space mines, that is spacecraft carrying powerful explosive charges which can be detonated close to an orbital battle station by command from the ground. Or there is the possibility of creating a cloud of small objects in the path of the battle station. Spaceflight velocities are so great that a head-on collision with an object having a mass of a mere 30 grams would disable a battle station. Or there is the possibility of launching decoys, that is, fake missiles to precede a Soviet retaliatory strike. Such decoys should exhaust a battle station's firing capacity before the real missiles went up.

The simplest of the active measures to overwhelm SDI would be a simple increase in the number of Soviet strategic missiles to a level assuring penetration of the American spaceshield, should it be used as a cover for a first strike against the USSR.

Turning to passive countermeasures, Gen Anureyev points out that missiles can be protected by various light-reflecting coatings, which would make a laser beam bounce off them or else the coatings could be light-absorbing. Then again, the missiles could be made to spin in flight so that the laser beam couldn't remain focused on a single point long enough to cause any damage. [paragraph continues]

Not to mention the fact that missiles could also be fitted with additional cooling systems to neutralize the effect of the laser beams pointed at them.

As for the vaunted X-ray lasers the Pentagon proposes to develop, these are to be orbited just before an American first strike, orbited from nuclear submarines stationed close to the Soviet Union's borders. Such submarines, Gen Anureyev feels confident, can be detected and destroyed before the X-ray lasers pop up from them.

In his summing up the Soviet general points out that the cost of such countermeasures would amount to only a small percentage of the cost of the S/I system, but even so such an escalation of the arms race, with its extension to outer space, would be highly distasteful to the Soviet Union, which has just made a proposal that has been described all over the world as a breakthrough in efforts to achieve some measure of nuclear disarmament.

London has officially given its approval to this Soviet initiative aimed at scrapping the intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe and it is hoped that Mrs Margaret Thatcher's coming visit to Moscow at the end of this month will contribute to the success of the negotiations on this matter. At the same time, Moscow observers of the London political scene cannot but note such discordant voices as that of the British defense secretary, George Younger. Speaking before the Royal Institute of International Affairs last week he sought in every way to cast doubt on the feasibility of the disarmament measure proposed by the Soviet Union. This prompted an IZVESTIYA commentator to ask in exasperation yesterday who is actually in command in Whitehall.

It is hoped in Moscow that this matter will be sorted out in time for Mrs Thatcher's visit to enable it to produce genuinely fruitful results.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET CD DELEGATE URGES OUTER SPACE WEAPONS AGENCY

LDI71805 Moscow TASS in English 1756 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva March 17 TASS — TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev reports:

At the disarmament conference which is under way here Yuriy Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation, came up with a proposal to examine a possibility of creating a system of international control over the non-permitting of any weapons to outer space. The system would provide for the setting up of an international inspectorate with the right of access to all the objects which are to be put into orbit and deployed in outer space. Under the supervision of the inspectorate space vehicles could be launched.

The Soviet representative urged to speed up the coordination of a convention on the banning of radiological weapons. He said that it was necessary, along with it or in one package, to begin drawing up a corresponding international agreement under which states would pledge not to attack peaceful nuclear facilities.

Speaking today instead of the minister of foreign affairs of Norway who died recently, Trond Bakkevig, personal adviser to the minister, said that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes. He pointed out that in a nuclear age no one should try and ensure one's own security at the expense of others. One should quest for zones of common interests and for alternatives to the existing situation. The Norwegian representatives welcomed the results of the Reykjavik meeting and the latest developments in East-West relations, specifically, on the problem of the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and expressed hope for the early reaching of an agreement to this effect between the USSR and the U.S.

Konstantin Tellalov, head of the Bulgarian delegation, said that the Soviet proposal on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe was another manifestation of the Soviet Union's goodwill in its quest for ways and means for resolving the nuclear disarmament problem.

"The concluding of a corresponding agreement would become an event of epoch-making significance. From the political point of view it would ensure the healing of a deep wound in Europe, would consolidate trust among countries and international security".

Representatives of Bulgaria, Norway, and the GDR pointed out as well the need for stepping up the work of the conference on other items of the agenda, specifically, on the problem of stopping nuclear tests and banning nuclear weapons.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA REPLIES TO POST COLUMN ON ABM TREATY

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 February 1987 First Edition carries on page 4 two articles under the "From Different Stances" rubric. The first article, which is by WASHINGTON POST correspondent Charles Krauthammer and entitled "ABM Versus SDI," is--according to a footnote--reprinted from the 13 February issue of that newspaper; the second, which is by PRAVDA international observer Tomas Kolesnichenko, is entitled "Inverted Logic."

Krauthammer criticizes the "casuistry" of the Reagan administration's new, broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which he describes as "another depressing triumph of U.S. legalism." His conclusion is that the broad interpretation is an "unfortunate move." He believes that "the administration should have the courage of its convictions. If it wants to deploy SDI, it should drop the Jesuitical exegeses and act unambiguously within the terms of the ABM Treaty: withdraw." "A real debate could then begin," he argues.

Kolesnichenko's article reads in full as follows:

I will begin by saying that Charles Krauthammer is a very interesting example of American journalism. Here is how it is done: Preferring the oblique to the openly doctrinaire, the author "objectively" discusses the Reagan administration's approach to one of today's main international problems--the SDI program and the fate of the ABM Treaty, which forbids the development [sozdaniye], testing, or deployment of ABM systems or components.

In so doing Krauthammer not only does not distort the nature of the treaty but wittily and knowledgeably reveals the administration's attempts at "Jesuitical exegeses" of the provisions of the document in order to circumvent (like a sinner searching for a loophole in the Bible in order to get to paradise) the clear and precise articles of the treaty via the sharp practices of hired lawyers.

The paradox is that the reader, conquered by the author's logic, will most likely agree with him and trust his judgment. And then suddenly, at the very end of the article, there comes the following unexpected conclusion: If the ABM Treaty stands in the way of SDI, the administration should...drop it. That's more honest, after all. Moreover, it will then be able to conduct a "real debate" nationwide and determine what is best--the ABM Treaty or SDI. And after all, there are probably quite a few WASHINGTON POST readers who will think--and why not--that the truth...does emerge in the course of "honest debate."

But the whole trick is that in this case, while there would be debate (although how honest is another matter), the ABM Treaty would no longer exist. And that means that while the finer points are being elucidated, abstract discussion engaged in, and so forth, the organizers of SDI would have a free hand to begin creating [sozdavat] actual space weapons and to embark on a completely new phase of the arms race, with very serious consequences.

People who have studied America even a little know that political decision-making on a problem over there is as a rule preceded by the large-scale involvement of financial capital and production capacities. And there is no going back then. That is how it is with SDI--the monopolies of the military-industrial complex want to present Congress with a fait accompli and then "legitimize" the development of the "Star Wars" program.

The ABM Treaty is now the main obstacle to these militarist and, putting it plainly, aggressive plans. According to Article I the USSR and the United States have assumed a commitment of unlimited duration to limit ABM systems and to refrain from deploying ABM systems for defense of its country's territory or creating [sozdat] the basis for such a defense. Article V forbids the development [sozdaniye], testing, or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. The Agreed Statement (D), which, incidentally, Krauthammer writes about accurately and in detail, in no way supplies grounds for a "broad interpretation" of the treaty and merely confirms the strict ban on any space weapons.

It is very important to bear in mind that observance of the ABM Treaty opens up prospects for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons and guarantees the very process of disarmament, whereas its repudiation, as proposed by Krauthammer, on the contrary, brings to a halt any talks to eliminate nuclear weapons. It must be said that this is well understood in the United States. Krauthammer's article is a contribution on the part of right-wing U.S. circles to the polemic that has developed around ABM and SDI. It clearly reflects the intention of those "decisionmakers" who are moving from "trial balloons" to specific policy actions. This primarily concerns the White House and its entourage.

Recent days have brought to light a special presidential directive on national security which provides a basis for the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. According to press leaks, the directive consists of four points. First, the U.S. delegation to Geneva is ordered not to hold talks on or even discuss questions concerning limitations on defensive systems; second, the administration will by no later than 2 March wind up all consultations with Congress and the allies regarding the treaty; third, the State Department is to supply a "legal basis" for the "broad interpretation" of the treaty by the end of April; and last, but clearly the most important point, the Pentagon is instructed to submit by the end of April a list of proposed tests under the SDI program which will be possible with the administration's "new approach" to the ABM Treaty.

As you can see, the presidential directive represents a de facto withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, although the Reagan administration has no intention of

openly making this move or, more accurately, has no intention of doing so for the time being. And the reason here is that Reykjavik showed with utter clarity that the ABM Treaty is an obstacle to Washington's plans to put first-strike weapons into outer space. This made it, on the one hand, the target of the champions of "Star Wars" and, on the other, enhanced the treaty's standing even more and drew to it the attention of the whole world. Moreover, America's allies, whom it was not deemed necessary even to inform about the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, are now openly expressing their dissent at the administration's decision, although special envoys--dispatched posthaste to Europe--are twisting their arms.

Again, as was the case after Reykjavik, the U.S. President's categorical refusal to assume a commitment (together with the USSR) not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years is the focus of criticism. This refusal, as people know, thwarted very important accords in Reykjavik on a wide range of cuts in strategic offensive arms, as far as their elimination.

But while the ABM Treaty is in being there does exist the possibility of making progress in this direction. And that is precisely what the hard-liners in the United States fear. The problem is not SDI--specialists rightly consider that even its "first phase" cannot be deployed in outer space before 7-10 years have elapsed--no, this is more of a feint. The main target is the ABM Treaty itself. The point of all this hallyhoo is to torpedo it and remove the last barrier restraining the arms race from spreading into outer space.

"If it's ABM versus SDI, so much the worse for ABM" is what the White House thinks. That is what the author of the WASHINGTON POST article thinks too. The difference is merely that the former "are looking for loopholes," while the other proposes "honest debate." But it is inverted logic. Destabilizing the strategic situation, and that is what the undermining of the ABM Treaty does, runs counter to the interests of the USSR and the United States equally.

Is it not better to think hard once again before setting out on a very slippery and dangerous road? It is always worth taking a good look around when you are on the edge of a precipice.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: GENSCHER AT CONGRESS ON 'PEACEFUL SPACE EXPLORATION'

LD112334 Moscow TASS in English 2047 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] Cologne March 11 TASS — TASS correspondent Valdimir Smelov reports:

An international congress held here was devoted to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. It was attended by prominent scientists, representatives of business circles of West Germany, Britain, the USSR, France and the U.S.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, minister of foreign affairs of West Germany who addressed the congress emphasized the need for peaceful space exploration. He said that this problem could be resolved by joint efforts. Genscher did not rule out a possibility of large-scale international cooperation in space exploration in the future, including cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR, for example, in the study of Mars.

A businesslike and detailed discussion of broad opportunities connected with space exploration took place at the congress. Speakers pointed out that space was a new sphere of research and production activities. The inexhaustibility of its material and power resources opens up before humanity entirely new prospects in vitally important spheres, such as energy generation, raw material resources and the transmission of information.

Participants in the congress went on record in favour of mutually advantageous cooperation among states in space explorations and the practical use of space technology. The Soyuz-Apollo, Vega, Cospas-Sarsat and Phobos projects are vivid examples of it.

In his report on peaceful and commercial use of outer space G. Uspenskiy, representatives of the USSR State Space Committee, recalled a stage-by-stage program of practical actions aimed at peaceful space exploration on the basis of joint efforts of all the countries that had been put forward by the Soviet Union. He said that it could be implemented only in conditions of non-militarization of space and of turning down the testing and deployment of strike space weapons.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany published a statement today in connection with the Cologne congress in which it supported peaceful use of outer space. The statement said that the Social Democratic Party of Germany rejected militaristic aspirations of the U.S., primarily those connected with the SDI program.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: GREENLAND ELECTIONS IN MAY OVER U.S. RADAR

LD111120 Moscow TASS in English 1043 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] Copenhagen March 11 TASS -- Greenland's head of government Jonathan Motzfeldt has said he is going to call general elections in May in connection with a government crisis over the Pentagon's modernization of a radar at the U.S. air base in Thule.

He announced his intention following the failure of attempting to overcome disagreements in the coalition government which consists of representatives of the Siumut and Inuit Ataqatigiit parties.

The government crisis erupted after the latter party's chairman Arqaluk Lynge sharply criticized the head of government for allowing the U.S. radar to be modernized.

Greenland, which has the right of internal self-government, is part of Denmark.

There have been sharp debates in the political circles of that largest island in the world over the completion of the project to modernize the radar since modernization is merely the cover story for the construction of a practically new phased-array radar.

This new system will be able to detect and locate targets thousands of kilometers away from Greenland. It is expected that the Pentagon will use the radar as part of an array of weapons developed under the "Star Wars" program.

Moreover, the modernization scheme, many prominent American experts point out, contradicts the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems.

The prospect of becoming accomplices to the Pentagon in its intention to undercut this highly important treaty and being drawn into the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" has aroused wide-spread concern in the political quarters of both Greenland and Denmark.

The U.S. radar issue will be the central in the forthcoming elections.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

SPACE TALKS END 'WITHOUT RESULT'--Tokyo March 16 TASS--A round of consultations between Japan and the United States on issues of cooperation in building a space station has ended without result here. Japanese representatives opposed the U.S. intention to join the Pentagon to the space programme. Besides Japan, a number of Western European countries and Canada agreed to participate in the project. Legal issues caused most controversy as well. The American delegation demanded that the U.S. be given exclusive rights to the results of research and operation of the station, including the living quarters to be designed by Japan and Western Europeans. Tokyo is seeking equal rights and consideration of the interests of all countries involved in the project. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0745 GMT 16 Mar 87 LD]

DEFENSES AGAINST TACTICAL MISSILES PLANNED--The Pentagon has embarked on the development of a new large-scale militarist program--the creation [sozdaniye] of a defensive system against tactical missiles, in whose implementation the United States intends to include Japan and the West European NATO countries. This was stated in an interview with the YOMIURI SHIMBUN by D. (Kloske), Pentagon special adviser. An official White House decision will follow in the near future. However, a special directive on the aims of the plan, the organizations and individuals responsible for its implementation, and the inclusion of Japan and Washington's NATO allies in it has already been sent to the relevant Pentagon departments by W. Taft, U.S. deputy defense secretary. [Own information-TASS report: "New Program"] [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Feb 87 First Edition p 3 PM]

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CSO: 5200/1361

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET JOURNAL HITS U.S. STANCE ON SDI, REYKJAVIK MEETING

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 3-12

[Article by V. Vladimirov, Yu. Fedorov: "Strength of Policy, Not 'Policy of Strength'"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet-American top-level meeting in Reykjavik was a special kind of event. Even the short period of time which has elapsed since then has shown the need for assertiveness and forbearance in international affairs and the importance of a quest for bold, nontraditional approaches to the solution of the cardinal problems on which the fate of mankind depends.

At the same time the meeting was a kind of touchstone of the policy of the two biggest powers and a clear indicator of who's who in world politics. The Soviet Union advanced radical plans for a sharp, balanced reduction in nuclear potentials and subsequently their elimination in a short timeframe, given full observance of the principle of equivalent security. The United States, on the other hand, guided by a policy of undermining the military-strategic balance and achieving military superiority, made the cornerstone defense of the SDI--the "star wars" program--thereby graphically confirming the policy of the militarization of space, and attempted to arrogate to itself the "right" to build new types of lethal weapons of aggression, in other words, the "right" to blackmail the Soviet Union and the whole world. This position has erected the main barrier in the way of radical nuclear disarmament. The truth, taken thereby to its logical conclusion, is that SDI has barred the path to cardinal changes in all spheres of the life of human society, having shown itself to be a concentrated expression of militarism and the principal instrument of the imperial, hegemonist ambitions of U.S. ruling circles. A truly great historic opportunity--to reach the frontiers of a nuclear-free world--was lost owing to the "superman hypnosis" inherent in Washington. An in-depth and accurate analysis of what happened in Reykjavik and the reasons for what occurred has been made in M.S. Gorbachev's speeches.

The talks between the heads of the foreign policy departments of the USSR and the United States which were held approximately a month after the meeting in Vienna revealed the desire of the American side to withdraw completely from the Reykjavik frontiers. We have every right to evaluate the United States' "new" position as a mixture of old views and approaches with the concessions

to which the USSR agreed in the Icelandic capital within the framework of its proposed package. But it is, after all, a question, as the Soviet side emphasizes, not of a "package of conditions" but of a "compromise package". As a whole the United States is essentially retreating from the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik.

At the same time, however, the lessons of Reykjavik also permit other conclusions. Accords leading to nuclear disarmament are possible. The struggle for a nuclear-free world has reached new, higher frontiers, from which it is essential to continue to conduct an active peace offensive along all axes. Hopes of the achievement of mutually acceptable, fundamentally important accords have a real foundation.

"Displaying a sincere aspiration to the achievement of an accord," the CPSU Central Committee Politburo observed on 14 October 1986, "the Soviet side submitted new compromise proposals, which took fully into consideration the concern of the American side and made possible an agreement on such most important questions as a reduction in and subsequently the complete elimination of strategic offensive arms and the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Implementation of these proposals would afford an opportunity for an abrupt turnabout in the development of international relations, removal of the nuclear threat and the development of the peaceful cooperation of all members of the world community."

The world community valued highly the role which our country performed in Reykjavik. "The Soviet Union," the Japanese ASAHI, for example, wrote, "has truly made nuclear disarmament the main emphasis of its policy, and its efforts on this issue are visible to all." Such is a most important result of the practical embodiment of the principles of the new political thinking, primarily the understanding that the security of the USSR and the United States can only be mutual.

The Soviet proposals pertaining to a reduction in and subsequently elimination of offensive nuclear arms have become an organic part of a single package with questions of strengthening the terms of the ABM Treaty and prohibiting nuclear tests. Such a comprehensive approach reflects the actual interconnections which exist in the modern world.

The Soviet leadership firmly stated in Reykjavik the need for strict compliance with the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration signed in 1972 and, in addition, consolidation of the conditions created by this fundamentally important document of international law. It is a question of the USSR and the United States assuming the mutual undertaking not to avail themselves of the right to withdraw from the treaty for at least 10 years and thereby strictly comply with all its provisions. Particular mention was made of the importance of the fact that the research, development and testing conducted in this period within the "strategic defense initiative" framework not go beyond the confines of laboratories and, what is most important, not be conducted in space. The mechanism guarding strategic stability would thereby be reliably protected.

At the same time, however, political realism demands consideration of all the sides and aspects of the processes occurring on the international scene and the long-term consequences of what is occurring today in world politics, primarily in the sphere of military-political relations.

Particular significance is attached today to the interconnections between defensive and offensive strategic arms recorded in the ABM Treaty. Its preamble emphasizes as clearly as can be that "effective measures to limit ABM systems would be an appreciable factor in curbing the strategic offensive arms race and would lead to a lessening of the danger of the outbreak of a war with nuclear weapons" (1).

The U.S. Administration was unable to find within itself the political courage and realism to embark in practice on the path leading to a nuclear-free world. In response to the Soviet Union's compromise proposals dictated by a sense of general responsibility, President R. Reagan merely reiterated the well-known American propositions, whose purpose is to justify the "star wars" program and gradually devalue the ABM Treaty. "The President," the prominent politician Sen G. Hart emphasized, "let slip an exceptional opportunity to conclude an astonishing arms control agreement and as a result has boxed us into a corner for the sake of defense of a program which is theoretical in the extreme and extremely costly and which is incapable of proving its usefulness before the end of the century at least. It seems to me that history will show that this was a mistake on his part."

The White House is reiterating incessantly currently that realization of the "strategic defense initiative" will make America invulnerable and ensure reliable defense against Soviet strategic ballistic missiles. Let us even assume that such a system can be built, although the most authoritative specialists in various branches of science deny such a possibility. Not only the laws of military-political logic but also simply common sense suggest that the invulnerability and security of the United States--as of all other states--may be secured far more reliably, rapidly and cheaply by way of the elimination of strategic arms than by the deployment sometime in the future of an antimissile system whose efficiency gives rise to more than considerable doubt. "I am concerned," Sen J. Biden declared, "at the decision to let slip a real opportunity to do away with a large part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Instead, the administration is insisting on spending huge resources on the development of an untested, unproven defense system which, it is claimed, pursues the same goal--the elimination of nuclear arms."

The present leadership of the United States has declared repeatedly that without the "strategic defense initiative" peoples of all countries are condemned to remain forever "nuclear hostages". Upon his return from Reykjavik President R. Reagan said yet again that only "SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons." The results of the Soviet-American summit in October 1986 testify precisely to the reverse. They show as obviously as can be that it is adherence to the "star wars" program which is blocking movement toward mankind's genuine deliverance from the Damocles' sword of nuclear catastrophe.

After Reykjavik this cannot be denied even by the politicians of the West who can by no means be attributed to the ranks of supporters of the peace

movement. Thus A. Haig, who was U.S. Secretary of State at the start of the 1980's, observed that "the SDI program, which was conceived of as a 'means of deliverance from nuclear weapons,' has now become the main obstacle in the way of an unprecedented reduction in nuclear arms." And the Japanese newspaper MAINICHI reasonably inquires: "It will be interesting to see whether the Americans can now repeat their previous assertions that 'it was SDI which forced the USSR to approach the negotiations seriously'. After all, the negotiations in Reykjavik showed that as long as Reagan cherishes and promotes with the fervor of a religious fanatic his strategic defense initiative, reaching agreement not only in respect of intermediate-range missiles but also strategic arms will be impossible."

The supporters of the "strategic defense initiative" are unwilling to take the path prompted by a sense of responsibility and common sense. They are attempting to acquire security by designing some "wonder weapon," orienting themselves, as before, toward military strength (space-based now) as the alpha and omega of policy. Thus they are endeavoring to conserve obsolete military-political tenets which are fundamentally contrary to the realities of the era. History, however, has shown repeatedly and very convincingly that nostalgic aspirations and the political doctrines based on them cannot provide an adequate response to the challenges of the present and the future.

At the start of 1986 Pentagon boss C. Weinberger proclaimed: "We must emphatically expand the number of contested directions. We must develop profoundly conceived strategies using the areas in which the United States has a natural and confirmed advantage. Where possible, we must adopt strategic concepts which would lead to Soviet investments in defense proving outdated. We must create programs to which an effective Soviet response will prove far more costly than the expenditure on our programs" (2).

Such concepts and, to a large extent all modern American strategic thinking, also are based on the illusory premise concerning the alleged scientific and technological lag of the Soviet Union behind the United States. In reality, however, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, "there is nothing that the United States could make that we could not. But we are opposed to such an option, we are opposed to the absurd American arms logic. For us a ban on space-based strike arms is not a problem of fear of being left behind but one of responsibility" (3).

Incidentally, a more sober view is taking shape in the United States itself also--not least on the basis of an analysis of the results of Reykjavik. Thus the influential NEW YORK TIMES writes: "The administration's position is dictated by the chase after the illusion of possible superiority, it is provocative and damaging America itself since it is leading to an acceleration of the arms race, the cost and danger of which can be compared merely with its futility."

Against this background the position of some West European leaders on nuclear disarmament issues is all the more puzzling. When, following the Reykjavik meeting, there finally emerged a real opportunity for delivering the continent from missiles, some capitals suddenly began to talk about the need to maintain the "American nuclear weapons" and "nuclear umbrella" in Europe and to defend

their "privileges" of nuclear status zealously and intimidate themselves and their transatlantic partner with the "East's overwhelming superiority" in conventional arms. They are not stopping short even of accusing the Reagan administration of negotiating with the USSR "over the heads of the allies" on problems of decisive importance for the latter. And according to the reports of the London correspondent of THE WASHINGTON POST, H. Kohl and M. Thatcher "are apprehensive about the foreign policy consequences of the top-level meeting" inasmuch as "the notion of a world without nuclear weapons which originated in Reykjavik would in 10 years be more in keeping with the position of political opponents than with the policy of their conservative governments."

Some political leaders are evidently not yet ready to think in the categories of a nuclear-free Europe--and precisely at a moment when a turning point in the continent's movement in this direction has clearly come to light.

It is appropriate to recall in this connection M.S. Gorbachev's words addressed to Europe: "Europeans can only preserve their home and make it better and safer collectively, abiding by the prudent rules of international communication and cooperation." Such a reminder would appear particularly pertinent now if it is considered that the majority of Europeans, defending the continent's vital interests, are, following Reykjavik, multiplying their efforts to achieve Europe's genuine security and its complete deliverance from nuclear weapons.

More than any other continent, densely populated, arms-saturated Europe is vulnerable in the event of any armed conflict, nuclear all the more so. The socialist countries strove persistently to ensure that the final document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament specify and enshrine the principles of the nonuse or threat of force. Soviet diplomacy has long-standing traditions and tremendous experience of work in this field. They go back to the historic period of the struggle for the formulation and signing of a convention on the definition of aggression in the first half of the 1930's and even further--to the first acts of diplomacy and actions of the young Soviet state.

The meeting which has begun in Vienna is intended, utilizing the results of the Stockholm Conference, to pave the way toward the next stage, at which it will be a question of a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. A solution of this complex, but vitally important problem could be based on the substantial foundation of the proposals and initiatives advanced earlier. The most essential of these is the proposal of the Warsaw Pact participants addressed to the NATO states, which formulates a comprehensive program of major reductions in armed forces and arms in Europe--from the Atlantic to the Ural range.

An innovative approach is necessary also in the search for new forms of cooperation and the international division of labor in Europe. There is no doubt that the international political situation on the continent depends more than lastly on the intensity and depth of cooperation in such spheres as economics, science, technology and environmental protection. New impetus, new methods and new initiatives are needed here.

Engaged in a dynamic reconstruction of the economy and the all-around acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development, the Soviet Union actively aspires to the more efficient use of the mutual complementariness of the economies of the countries of East and West and the freeing of economic relations from any kind of artificial restriction.

Opportunities for constructive solutions are being afforded in each sphere of international relations in Europe. This applies also to the question of human rights and basic liberties. The well-known results of the meeting of human rights experts in Bern demonstrated graphically who in reality is opposed to all-European cooperation in the protection and affirmation of human rights. The United States did not stop short at counterposing itself to all the other Bern conferees and blocked the adoption of the final document providing for an appreciable advance along the path of interaction and cooperation. Despite this, the Soviet Union declared its readiness to be guided in practice on humanitarian issues by the draft of this document.

In addition, on 5 November 1986, at the opening of the Vienna meeting, the USSR submitted a proposal concerning the convening of a representative conference of participants in the All-European Conference on a whole complex of issues, including contacts between people and questions of information, culture and education, and proposed that it be held in Moscow. It was thereby demonstrated convincingly that the Soviet Union regards as an indivisible whole the democratization of interstate relations and social life in each country. This is new evidence of the profoundest democratism and humanism of the Soviet socialist social system.

Entering upon the 70th anniversary of the Great October--a major event in the history of our country and the entire revolutionary movement--we must be prepared to ensure that such a significant date imparts, as the report at the ceremonial meeting devoted to the 69th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution on 6 November 1986 emphasized, new intensity to the most acute ideological and political struggle being conducted in the world concerning the fate of world development, confront anew the arguments "for" and "against" socialism and, what is more--there can be no doubt--that at the center of attention be not only what our country has already achieved but also how it is solving its problems currently.

Our Leninist foreign policy expresses the vital interests, goals and humanitarian ideals of Soviet society and the Soviet people. Its significance, influence and authority on the international scene will depend to a decisive extent on our successes in communist building and on how the concept of acceleration of the economic and social development of the socialist state is realized. Shock labor is the surest guarantee of a strengthening of the international positions of the socialist motherland and a consolidation of peace in the world.

Speaking at the Kremlin reception on 7 November 1986, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized: "Now, after Reykjavik, a new situation has come about in international relations. There is no turning back. And the way ahead lies only through new political thinking and through recognition of the realities of the

current diversity of a contradictory and integral world demanding respect for each people's choice and their right to independence and their own voice in world affairs. It is from these positions, the positions of our 27th congress, that we are acting and will continue to act in international affairs. Fear in the face of war must be removed from life forever in order that the insanity of militarism be cast aside.... The birth of our revolution and our state was inspired by the great ideas of social justice, progress and peace. We will continue to act in the name of this."

FOOTNOTES

1. "The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collection of Documents," Moscow, 1977, pp 111-112.

2. "Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1987 Budget, FY 1988 Authorization Request and FY 1987-1991 Defense Programs," February 5, 1986, Washington, p 86.

3. PRAVDA, 9 April 1986.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1986.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S GENERAL CHERVOV SETS OUT SOVIET POSITION

Accuses U.S. of 'Evading' Main Issue

AU121227 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 10 Mar 87 p 4

[Article by Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, dispatched through NOVOSTI: "The United States Is Evading the Main Issue"]

[Text] The seventh round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms ended on 6 March. In the second half of January the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) published the document "Proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Seventh Round of the Talks on Nuclear and Space Arms." The document sets out, according to the American interpretation, the countries' common approach on the subjects of the talks. Here Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, gives the Soviet position regarding the content of the ACDA document:

Judging from the ACDA document, the American side at the seventh round of the talks on nuclear and space arms retreated to a marked extent from what was achieved at Reykjavik. The USSR's proposals put forward at Reykjavik are presented in this document in a distorted form. I will cite the facts.

The American document makes an attempt to contrast the package of Soviet proposals made at the seventh round of the talks on nuclear and space arms to the Soviet proposals at the Geneva summit meeting in November 1985. This is done in such a way to make the mutual understanding achieved at Reykjavik as if of no importance.

At the Geneva meeting and both before and after it, that is, from the first day of the talks on nuclear and space arms to the present day, the Soviet proposals on strategic offensive arms were not examined in the context of solving the problem of outer space. The Soviet side has always declared, and is declaring now that space must remain peaceful, that there must be no weapons there, either Soviet or American, and that only in such a case is a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms possible.

It is strange that the U.S. officials at ACDA do not know about this Soviet position. They do not even know that at the Geneva meeting the two sides made differing interpretations of the concept of "a 50 percent reduction": The United States saw it as a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms only, while the Soviet Union saw it as a 50 percent reduction of all strategic arms reaching the territory of the other side. In omitting this "detail," they turn everything upside down.

The explanation is simple: It is not to their advantage to speak about the Soviet proposals at Reykjavik at all, because the U.S. side is now returning to its positions prior to Reykjavik. Hence the attempts to conceal from the public everything achieved at Reykjavik and to give a "noble" gloss to the U.S. position at the seventh round of talks.

The USSR considers the Reykjavik summit a watershed event. It culminates one stage of our disarmament struggle and marks the beginning of the next one. The Soviet proposals made at Reykjavik are still in force. Now there can be no retreat from Reykjavik, whatever the opposition from extreme right-wing circles in the United States.

Now the U.S. side, judging from the ACDA document, has hardened its position on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The United States would like, with the Soviet Union's agreement, to develop and test everything needed for deploying a wide-scale antimissile defense system with space-based components over a fixed (10-year) period. When this work is completed, and if the possibility opens up of implementing SDI, then they will start deploying the space antimissile defense system. However, within this period, according to Washington's idea, the sides must make deep cuts in their ballistic missiles, down to a level of 4,500 warheads according to the U.S. "50-percent version." Accordingly, SDI will only have to be built to combat 4,500 warheads, which already makes the building of the space antimissile defense system easier and creates confidence in the system's reliability.

It must be clear that the USSR will not disarm unilaterally in order to please the United States. Here there is no place for compromises.

Now the question stands like this: Will a movement start toward a real reduction in nuclear arms, or will a new stage in the arms race begin, connected with the implementation of the U.S. "Star Wars" program? In America the forces of the extreme right are pushing the President to make a speedier start on deploying a land-based antimissile defense system based on existing technology, without waiting for the development of the components for a space-based antimissile defense system. Caspar Weinberger, when speaking recently at the National Press Club in Washington, stated directly that the Pentagon intends to start deploying space weapons within the framework of the SDI program according to the degree of their readiness. Again, the U.S. President himself, in his speech of 12 January (on the eve of the seventh round of talks), declared his support for the soonest possible implementation of the SDI program. Evidently this is why publications like the ACDA document are appearing which obscure the main issue, namely whether space is to remain peaceful, or whether it is to become a sphere for deploying dangerous weapons. The attitude of the sides to this question is the criterion for assessing the sincerity of their intentions regarding the elimination of the nuclear threat on earth. The positive solution of this issue is of interest to all countries, both great and small, and they clearly have to be more deeply involved in the disarmament process.

VOYENNNY VESTNIK cited

LD021800 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 2 Feb 87

[Text] Today the latest issue of the VOYENNNY VESTNIK of the NOVOSTI press agency comes out. Colonel General Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, commenting in it on the stance of the U.S. delegation at the seventh round of the talks in Geneva, notes that the United

States is hushing up the package of major, unprecedented commissions from the USSR. It is not advantageous for them to talk about the Soviet proposals at Reykjavik, since they are hiding behind pre-Reykjavik stances.

The U.S. secretary of defense has already called for the phased implementation of SDI right now. In doing this he is trying to force Congress and subsequent administrations to submit to its unstoppable momentum. In the first stage of SDI, preference is given to land-based nuclear antimissile missiles, whose aim is to eliminate the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the enemy immediately after they are launched. APN's VOYENNNYY VESTNIK observer notes that the brief acceleration phase of these rockets will force the Pentagon to site the antimissile missiles close to the territory of nuclear powers, against the USSR along its perimeter, against China, Japan, Japan, or South Korea, against France and Britain in Europe [as heard]. It cannot be ruled out that somewhere, for example on FRG territory, locations will be selected for launchpads for antimissile missiles. It is possible that equipping them will soon become the same reality as the giant sized vessel for launching antimissile missiles designed for SDI, whose construction is being prepared, concludes APN's VOYENNNYY VESTNIK observers.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW, PARIS ON ARMACOST USSR VISIT, MEETING WITH VORONTSOV

TASS Report

LD161110 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1050 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 16 Mar (TASS) -- In accordance with a preliminary accord, a routine Soviet-U.S. exchange of opinions on a broad range of regional issues began today at the USSR Foreign Ministry. Taking part in the discussions on the Soviet side is Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, Igor Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister, and other senior workers at the USSR Foreign Ministry. The U.S. delegation is led by Michael Armacost, U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs.

AFP Report

AU171412 Paris AFP in English 1408 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, March 17 (AFP) -- Talks between Soviet officials and visiting U.S. Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost have been "very useful, even if it is too early to highlight their results," Soviet foreign affairs spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said here Tuesday.

Mr. Armacost arrived Saturday for a long-arranged visit that has taken on new significance as preparations are made for next month's visit to Moscow by Secretary of State George Shultz.

The U.S. official met Tuesday afternoon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and held a working meeting Monday with Yuliy Vorontsov, the first deputy foreign minister and chief Soviet negotiator at the Geneva arms talks.

Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, who was also at the meeting, said during a news conference Tuesday that "a wide range of questions linked to regional problems were raised during the stay."

Mr. Rogachev said Asian topics had been at the centre of Monday's talks, but when asked about Afghanistan the minister would only repeat a statement made by the U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez that Pakistan and Afghanistan could come to an agreement in the next round of talks.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI IN PRAVDA: 'NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD POSSIBLE'

PM051629 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 87 Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Italian Foreign Minister G. Andreotti by N. Prozhogin: "A Nuclear-Free World Is Possible" -- place and date of interview not given]

[Text] [Prozhogin] Mr Foreign Minister, what is your impression of your conversation with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Andreotti] I have great confidence in the present Soviet policy, in particular in the connection which General Secretary Gorbachev is making between what he describes as profound internal restructuring and the international policy of seeking every possible avenue of strengthening peace and international security.

This is a special moment for mankind. For the first time, the question of not just halting the arms race but significantly reducing existing arms is being discussed. In the endeavor to build a system of good-neighborly relations and peace, attempts are being made to gear the broad public to the efforts undertaken by governments. Italy was very well represented at the Moscow forum. In addition to theater and movie "stars" it was represented in particular by Bank of Italy Governor Ciampi, major banker and former minister Ossola, and Confederation of Industry President Lucchini.... We took this meeting very seriously, indeed, the whole world took it very seriously.

During my meeting with the general secretary, I had my view confirmed that great potential exists for achieving positive results in East-West dialogue and the dialogue between the USSR and the United States.

The general secretary listened with interest to my account of how, during our recent visit to Washington, we spent 2 days in Congress with senators and representatives of both parties persuading them that a line must be drawn between domestic problems and the need not to weaken the president at a time when it is necessary that he continue the dialogue with Mr Gorbachev. It would be dangerous to lose 2 years, or possibly more, since the new president will need some time to "settle in." I noted with satisfaction that Mr Gorbachev shares my apprehension on this account and is ready to negotiate with the U.S. President in office now.

[Prozhogin] The Moscow forum participants expressed themselves in favor of new political thinking in line with the demands of the present age. What is your opinion on this score?

[Andreotti] On the one hand, we must not fall prey to arrogance in considering ourselves to be better than our fathers and grandfathers who did not always succeed in preserving peace. The point is that the situation in the world has changed. The present implements of destruction force us to work much harder than in the past in forestalling war and building the edifice of peace. The peoples have a great yearning for peace. The key to achieving it lies in the elimination of distrust. Peace can be strengthened through overcoming the distrust that has for many years poisoned the international atmosphere. It is not a question of some kind of blind trust, but of trust built on reason.

[Prozhogin] Do you believe that a nuclear-free world is possible?

[Andreotti] Yes, I do. We have reached a point where the threat that the world might be destroyed ceases to be a theoretical threat and becomes a practical threat. Added to this must be the danger of a miscalculation where one side believes that the other side has launched a nuclear war as a result of which an irreversible situation beyond statesmen's control might arise.

Then there is the accident at Chernobyl. Chernobyl has helped us to appreciate the danger of nuclear weapons. It made people think: If an accident which can happen anywhere, at any nuclear installation, can have such serious and far-reaching consequences, what is the potential danger inherent in the radioactive arsenals of nuclear weapons, which cannot be ensured against accidents either and which present a threat to the lives of the civilian population even in the absence of war?

It may be a coincidence, but the problem of nuclear disarmament has now ceased to be what it used to be — propaganda or a partial political question. Nuclear disarmament has become the common cause of peoples, and this problem must be resolved.

True, it is being said that a great discrepancy exists in the levels of conventional arms and that if nuclear weapons are eliminated, the equilibrium will be disrupted. However, we must not take the view that if the correlation in the sphere of conventional arms is not changed, nuclear disarmament should be ruled out. The course to be followed is just the opposite: Since nuclear disarmament is absolutely necessary, an agreement on the reduction of conventional arms must be achieved.

[Prozhogin] Do you not think that West European countries should play a more active role in the solution of disarmament problems?

[Andreotti] Our concept of security coincides with the concept of security of the United States and Canada. Consequently, they cannot be considered in isolation.

Difficulties may arise with Britain and France since they, as distinct from other West European countries, are nuclear powers. But I believe that when an opportunity to conclude a major agreement on nuclear weapons really presents itself, it will not be possible to reject it.

[Prozhogin] Does this mean that you believe that the present position of Britain and France will change?

[Andreotti] Yes, I do. But I repeat that the question of reducing conventional arms will have to be solved at the same time.

[Prozhogin] You are, of course, familiar with the relevant proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries?

[Andreotti] Of course. They exist and I hope that they will be studied with a view to achieving progress and establishing mutual verification [kontrol]. There is much more openness [otkrytost] in this question now than there used to be when verification was regarded as espionage, as interference in the internal affairs of other countries. These misgivings are now a matter of the past; one reason for this being that satellites and other most modern technical means make it possible to carry out verification even if someone should be opposed to it.

[Prozhogin] You have spoken out more than once in favor of strict observance of the ABM Treaty...

[Andreotti] Yes, I consider this necessary. It is important not to swim against the current, and the current is carrying us toward disarmament. We believe that it is necessary to go forward rather than backward to forestall the proliferation of arms.

We attach great importance to the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. It is not possible to sit down at the negotiating table to discuss arms reduction and at the same time to seek opportunities for an arms buildup. This applies to both the USSR and the United States.

In this context, I am hoping that the Soviet Union will make yet another bold gesture with regard to short-range missiles, of which it has considerably more than the West Europeans. Here another bold step by the general secretary is needed, and as Reykjavik has shown, he does not lack boldness. Such a step would strengthen the position of those who argue in favor of observance of the ABM Treaty.

[Prozhogin] There also is another important aspect to the ABM Treaty. It is connected with the problem of the nonmilitarization of space. What is your view of the "broad" interpretation of this treaty advocated by the U.S. Administration?

[Andreotti] The European countries have expressed serious concern at this less narrow interpretation. However, I believe that if new arguments, for instance, psychological arguments, were found in favor of saying: "No, this is not the right way," then, I think, even in the United States, in Congress, and even in the administration itself people will come forward who will oppose the new interpretation of the treaty.

Recently, when I visited London with Italian Prime Minister Craxi, Mrs Thatcher spoke out openly in this spirit at a news conference, and so did Craxi. Indeed, even in NATO when we are discussing this question we always argue that the interpretation of the treaty must remain unchanged, since this is a political rather than a legal problem.

[Prozhogin] In conclusion, Mr Foreign Minister, what can you say about the state and prospects of relations between our two countries?

[Andreotti] First of all, I would like to make one important point -- there are no forces in our parliament which are against good relations with the Soviet Union. Recently, Soviet ministers have visited Italy and vice versa. The visit of Senate President Fanfani has just ended. My present visit also confirms that Italian-Soviet contacts have become a tradition. Economic circles, too, are showing great interest in the expansion of ties with your country. Cultural exchanges also are being extended. Thus, both at governmental and at public level there is evidence of a great desire to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Italy, of course, belongs to one alliance, and the USSR to another. If we were identical, what credit could we claim for advancing hand in hand?

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CSO: 5200/1363

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

USSR: VORONTSOV MEETS PACT AMBASSADORS--Moscow March 13 TASS--Head of the USSR delegation at the talks on nuclear and space arms, first USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov met today with ambassadors of the Warsaw Treaty member countries. There was a thorough exchange of opinions about the state of affairs at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva after the Soviet Union submitted the proposal for a separate agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. The participants in the meeting also discussed questions related to the work of the conference on disarmament. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1635 GMT 13 Mar 87 LD]

VORONTSOV MEETS MITTERRAND, RAIMOND--Paris March 10 TASS--President Francois Mitterrand of France received here today Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, who heads the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms. Yuliy Vorontsov also had meetings and conversations with Jean-Bernard Raimond, minister of foreign affairs of France; Roland Dumas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Commission of the National Assembly; a number of senators and other French officials. Yakov Ryabov, ambassador of the USSR to France, took part in the meetings. French leaders received explanations concerning the recent proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for the elimination of the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe and were informed about the course of Soviet-American talks in Geneva. The sides also had an exchange of views on a number of international problems on which the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and France hold regular consultations. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT 10 Mar 87 LD]

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SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: RESPONSE TO WHITE HOUSE REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE

U.S. Violation Recalled

PM191325 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent report: "Dashing Wave of Criticism"]

[Text] Washington, 18 February--On Tuesday the White House sent Congress a special report asserting that the United States is observing the commitments it made in accordance with accords in the field of arms control.

This report, prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in close cooperation with the U.S. Department of State, the Pentagon, and the CIA is a blatant attempt to dash the wave of criticism on the Capitol caused by the Reagan administration's recent decision to abandon the observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty and by the White House's plans to embark on tests under the "Star Wars" program in contravention of the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

An accompanying letter from President Reagan specially stipulates that the report "does not discuss" questions connected with the fulfillment of the SALT I interim agreement and the SALT II Treaty inasmuch as these "agreements are in the past." But many legislators believe otherwise. Bills have already been submitted to both houses of the U.S. Congress envisaging the United States' return to the observance of the numerical ceilings on nuclear weapon delivery vehicles set by the SALT II Treaty which the Reagan administration provocatively violated 28 November last year when the 131st B-52 strategic bomber equipped with cruise missiles was commissioned.

"In declaring his desire for 'real progress' in the arms control field," the Public Committee for National Security Organization noted recently, "the U.S. President has gone a very long way in destroying what has been achieved in this field over the past 2 decades." Having trampled on the SALT II Treaty, the U.S. administration is now aiming at the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems, which remains a cornerstone of arms control. The White House is now discussing in earnest the question of reorienting the entire "Star Wars" program in line with the so-called "broad interpretation" of this agreement. As the Committee for National Security's report stresses, "Reagan's interpretation of the ABM Treaty is incompatible with its spirit or letter."

'Attempt To Influence' Congress

LD111157 Moscow TASS in English 1132 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 11 TASS--TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

President Reagan Tuesday sent to Congress a report accusing the Soviet Union of violating virtually all Soviet-U.S. arms control agreements.

It was an obvious attempt to influence those in Congress who stand for progress at the talks in Geneva and for U.S. compliance with the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty and demand that the United States resume abidance by the SALT-2 Treaty.

Significantly, the report was sent to Congress just as the Soviet Union made another important and constructive proposal for an early agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe.

The U.S. Administration's response has been plenty of words, including a declaration of readiness to sign the agreement.

Its practical actions, however, have aimed to suggest to the people, as demonstrated by the President's report, that one "cannot do business" with the Soviet Union.

An assertion to this effect was made by Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in his broadcast remarks on the report the day it was released.

The report was also needed to distract attention from the causes of the actual and systematic treaty violations by the United States.

It is Washington that has buried the SALT-2 Treaty, by ostentatiously refusing to observe it, so that to be [as received] able to continue fuelling the nuclear arms race.

It is no other than the U.S. Administration that has proclaimed an intention to adopt, and has already effectively adopted, a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty so that to clear the path to the deployment of partially space-based ABM defenses and thus extend the arms race into outer space.

The report did not say one word about that. It put the blame for "noncompliance with the ABM Treaty" instead on the Soviet Union.

The president held the Soviet Union responsible for treaty violations in every field of arms control he touched upon in his report.

The USSR had observed a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for one and a half years but was still unblushingly declared in the report a violator of the Soviet-U.S. 1974 treaty on the elimination of underground

nuclear weapon tests and even the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater.

The report did not mention the fact that it is the United States that has been stubbornly reluctant to help bring nuclear tests to an end and kept testing to develop new weapon systems.

The far-fetched charges against the Soviet Union have been debunked by the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, and influential public organization.

It said in a special paper that the Soviet Union had meticulously complied with all treaties and agreements and that the Reagan administration had needed the charges it had made to slow down arms control negotiations and draw attention from the hard facts of its burial of the SALT-2 Treaty, its undercutting of the ABM Treaty and its unwillingness to stop nuclear testing.

The paper said that while spurring on the arms race, the U.S. Administration was also waging a campaign to misinform the American people.

'No Hard Facts'

LD112023 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT 11 Mar 87

["Institutionalized Lies--News Analysis"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS--by TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The lightness with which people in the U.S. Administration have been lying of late is baffling--today some government officials think that lying is simply part of their jobs--[punctuation as received]

This description of the substance of the current U.S. Administration's policy in connection with "Irangate" provided by THE WASHINGTON POST equally applies to the authors of President Reagan's report to Congress on arms control matters.

It isn't clear if the White House incumbent had the time least to leaf through that, so to say, document which was sent to the Congress of the United States with his signature. Had he a chance to ponder over the conclusiveness, logicality and elementary decency of what is said in it? For the matter at hand is the way the treaties and agreements concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union are complied with.

One can hardly consider the analysis of a set of inventions and falsifications appearing in the report to be something serious. The more so since it is oversaturated with such expressions as a "likely" violation, a "probable" violation, "ambiguous" activities, and so forth. This plainly demonstrates that the authors of another lie have no hard facts at their disposal.

However, one cannot help feeling shocked with the cynicism of such "accusations" against the U.S.S.R., as the report's "continuing concerns" that the Soviet Union may be preparing a national anti-ballistic missile defense of its territory.

With the United States it's not that it "may be preparing": For four years now it has been working to develop such a system under an officially adopted program and threatening to end any moment its compliance with the ABM Treaty that prohibits such actions.

Isn't it pharisaical to say that the U.S. renunciation of the SALT interim agreement and SALT-2 does not mean that Soviet violations (mythical, no doubt) have lost their significance?

And as to such "insightful conclusions" that during its moratorium on nuclear tests the Soviet Union undoubtedly preserved its nuclear test ranges intact, aren't they simply laughable?

Does that mean that the 18-month Soviet moratorium in the duration of which the United States conducted 26 nuclear tests explosions should have included the destruction by the Soviet Union of its test ranges?

The White House has more than once found itself in embarrassing situations with all of its "findings" about alleged violations of treaties and agreements by the Soviet Union. Let us recall only two recent facts, the U.S. representative to the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission established officially to monitor the observance of the concluded agreements confirmed in Congress that the U.S.S.R. was complying with its commitments.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in its report to Congress on the military posture of the United States cited assessments made by intelligence agencies indicating that the Soviet Union fully complied with its commitments.

It is appropriate to ask at this point: Why all these heaps of lies?

There are several objectives here, one must think. First, it is to belittle the importance of the Soviet peace initiatives and at the same time to whitewash the peace-endangering plans and actions of the American leadership; second, to shift the responsibility for one's own actions to undermine the existing treaties and agreements on the U.S.S.R.; thirdly, to disguise or even justify the renunciation of the accords that keep Washington's hands tied; and finally, to head off any constructive Soviet-American agreements that would curb the arms race and improve the international situation.

It should not be forgotten that the lie is a symptom of a serious ailment and that not only lies, but also such a policy in general are intolerable.

'Ill-Intentioned Provocation'

PM121427 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Fabrications Called a 'Report'"]

[Text] Washington, 11 Mar — It has already become traditional in Washington that whenever a ray of hope shines through in resolving key problems of USSR-U.S. relations, it is at once followed by a provocation calculated to poison the atmosphere. The Presidential report "On Soviet Nonobservance of Arms Control Agreements," sent to the U.S. Congress today, can only be called an ill-intentioned provocation.

Although sealed by the President's signature, that report is a disgraceful propaganda concoction imbued from start to finish — witness the title alone! — with gross slander against the Soviet Union. The compilers of the forgery balk at nothing — neither at the blatant lack of proof nor at the requirements of elementary decency. Everything is adjusted to fit a fabricated postulate, according to which the USSR is said not to fulfill its adopted pledges.

Our country is accused of violating essentially all arms control treaties, including SALT I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty, the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons in three environments, the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons, the 1925 Geneva protocol on chemical weapons....

All the "accusations" without exception rest on the words "perhaps," "possibly," "potentially possible," "probable." In a number of instances it is acknowledged that "there is no confirmation" or "there is insufficient evidence to fully evaluate Soviet observance of pledges." Such reservations do not embarrass political saboteurs. Without a twinge of conscience they substitute for the lack of facts forced expressions of "alarm" and "concern" or simply slander, which is sometimes ridiculously primitive. The authors, for example, consider as one of the "indicators" of Soviet "insincerity" the fact that the Soviet Union... "carried out a nuclear explosion soon after it announced its intention to do so." Of course, they breathe not a word about the fact that the United States refused to join the Soviet moratorium, throwing down an arrogant challenge to public demands.

Equally clumsy are the attempts to slander the USSR's devotion to strict observance of the SALT II and ABM Treaties even though, as is known, the United States itself has already buried the first of them and is now stealing up on the second, which hampers plans for the militarization of space. "The USSR has repeatedly violated SALT II and undertaken other actions incompatible with the treaty's provisions... We have seen no reduction in the rate of buildup of Soviet strategic forces. We are concerned at the Soviet military threat... We feel profound concern at Soviet nonobservance of the ABM Treaty..." — such slanderous declarations pepper the whole report or, at any rate, its "unclassified version" disseminated by the White House. You can imagine what its "classified version" is crammed with!

These lies are being exposed even in the United States itself. Last month, in particular, arms control experts from Stanford University in their detailed report convincingly refuted Washington's arguments, arriving at the conclusion that the USSR's record on the fulfillment of treaty pledges "is good." [paragraph continues]

The same conclusion was also drawn by M. Gallagher, who dealt with military-political questions at the CIA for 26 years and believes that "the administration's actions are dictated by its long-standing ideological prejudices and political considerations" -- primarily by the desire to "secure support for an arms buildup by emphasizing the ubiquity of the Soviet threat."

Be that as it may, this report -- already the fifth in recent years -- gives a clear idea of the purpose of the "Soviet violations" myth created by the administration. In fact, its authors have no intention of playing hide-and-seek and write in black on white: "These Soviet actions undermine the political trust necessary for the conclusion of new treaties... They call in question the advantages of arms control in the security sphere..." Commenting on the report, one of the chief "hawks" -- Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- was still more straightforward and impudent: "The news is that there is no news. The USSR continues to deceive. For arms control to have a future, the Soviet Union must rectify its behavior."

Only a naive person could believe the "chance nature" of the coincidence in time of this latest slanderous ballyhoo with the emergence of a real opportunity to conclude a USSR-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe.

Accusations Against USSR 'Vacuous'

PM121145 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

["Our Commentary" by political observer V. Matveyev under the rubric "Facts, Events, Opinions": "The Methods Match the Objective"]

[Text] An untruth does not turn into truth by repetition. Stubbornness in fabrications which are elevated to the status of state actions inevitably raises the question of the goals pursued by such tactics.

In its latest report to the U.S. Congress on 10 March, the White House again presents a collection of vacuous claims that the Soviet Union allegedly violates its pledges under the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems. This report is a copy of the previous one, which was submitted in 1986, and is equally false.

There is, however, a substantial difference in the circumstances surrounding the publication of these two Presidential reports. During the past year, the U.S. side officially declared its refusal to observe the 1972 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) and the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II).

This is not the first breach of agreements signed by the two countries and, to judge by everything, it will not be the last. The 1972 ABM Treaty is next. It ties the hands of the pioneers of the militarization of space across the ocean. They speak openly of this. Their intention to put paid to this Soviet-U.S. agreement has generated public opposition and condemnation among all U.S. allies in West Europe.

In the United States itself, eminent politicians and other figures, unafflicted by militarist ambitions, produce unambiguous warnings regarding the serious consequences of breaking the ABM Treaty for the interests of the United States itself.

In the course of Congressional hearings on arms control at the end of January, former Secretary of Defense McNamara emphasized that "the 'U.S. strategic defensive initiative' has put the United States on the road leading to a breach of the ABM Treaty which is the foundation of the entire arms control process."

There are numerous similar voices both inside the United States and beyond its borders. The Pentagon is incapable of silencing them. It is, however, evident that it would like to at least try to mute them by groundless accusations against the USSR. Once again we have the claim that the construction of radar stations in the Krasnoyarsk region runs contrary to this treaty, even though the Soviet side has authoritatively proved that these operations are in no way designed to serve the purposes of ABM defense, but are part of the Soviet Union's program for peaceful exploration of outer space.

It is also well known that we are interested in consolidating the provisions of the ABM Treaty and have invited the U.S. side to act in this direction. The reason there was no response is not the fact that the U.S. Administration finds some individual provisions of the treaty unsuitable. It perceives this treaty as a whole as an obstacle to its militarist plans in space.

The aforementioned Presidential report to Congress also confuses the issue as regards the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. It is hinted that the USSR secretly violated this moratorium while it was in effect. One would immediately ask: And why did the U.S. side keep this--if one might use the expression--"information" secret all this time? We opened up the territory in the vicinity of our test range to U.S. scientists and specialists with the appropriate apparatus, and we are prepared to take even more significant steps for the purpose of verifying the observance of a nuclear test ban.

There is no need for any discussion on this issue with the compilers of the aforementioned report to Congress. It is evident that they were guided by anything but elementary considerations of ethics. The Biblical commandment does not seem to apply to them.

It would seem that now, when real opportunities have appeared on the horizon that an important agreement may be reached between our country and the United States on freeing Europe from medium-range missiles, Washington ought to adopt a more responsible and more considered approach toward the entire package of arms control questions. This can in no way be said about the White House's 10 March report.

U.S. Arms Control Association Cited

LD130912 Moscow TASS in English 0753 GMT 13 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 13 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Lavrentyev:

The U.S. Arms Control Association has analyzed the contents of the presidential report to Congress containing accusations levelled against the Soviet Union of its alleged violations of the arms control treaties. The main conclusion drawn from the study is that the Reagan administration continues deliberately misconstruing the state of things in that field. The seriousness of the charges made by the White House calls for serious proofs, the report says. Yet instead of that, the presidential report speculates on "possible", "probable" and "supposed" violations. This looks very much like an invention, since lies even on small matters are a source of distrust in the administration's stand as a whole.

Characteristically, there were quite enough new facts last year bearing out the Soviet Union's commitment to its obligations as regards arms control, and none to the contrary, the report says. Therefore, it is not accidental that the administration has again used hackneyed fabrications, by rewriting them from old papers. The Soviet Union is accused even of violating the SALT-2 treaty which was unilaterally broken by the United States.

The far-fetched accusations are aimed at undermining the whole process of arms control and are an attempt at camouflaging the reluctance of the White House to make progress in reducing weapons arsenals. While distorting the known facts, the report says, the administration is at the same time disregarding the fact that the Soviet Union enjoys well-deserved prestige in the international arena precisely due to the strict observance of its commitments.

CSO: 5200/1369

KARPOV PUBLISHES FIGURES ON STRATEGIC BALANCE FROM REYKYAVIK

Belgrade REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English 5 Mar 87 p 28

[Article by Viktor Karpov, Director of Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: "Together Towards Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text]

WHEN Mikhail Gorbachev formulated, in a speech delivered by him a year ago, a programme of nuclear disarmament by the year 2000, many people were hardly able to assess fully the very profound influence that this programme would exert on the overall problem of disarmament. Now, a year later, it appears that this programme of nuclear disarmament has offered real possibilities of realizing, in the shortest space of time, a comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons, a perspective of progress towards a non-nuclear world. The importance of this programme is not only in that it has outlined the perspective but that it has also offered concrete ways for the achievement of these objectives. It is precisely the programme of January 15, 1986 that made Reykjavik possible. I, as a man dealing with problems of nuclear and outer space weapons, can understand, in particular, the practical purport of the Soviet programme which forms the gist of the position of the Soviet Union in Geneva. For instance, a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive armaments, liquidation of American and Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe and refraining from the arms race in outer space.

All these questions were incorporated after Reykjavik, on the basis of what had been achieved there, into the proposals of November 7, 1986 which were submitted by the delegation of the USSR in Geneva.

If we were to give a brief characteristic of the Soviet proposals, we would say that — they are essentially realistic. They offer maximum scope in the sense of liquidation nuclear weapons, primarily offensive ones. And, as far as the position of the other side, the USA, at the negotiations on nuclear and outer space weapons is concerned, it is increasingly obvious that its intention is to raise new obstacles along the road conducive to a non-nuclear world; to discard all the positive that was achieved in Reykjavik. I leave it to your own judgement. In Reykjavik, the President of the USA agreed that he would honour the Anti-ballistic-missile treaty (ABM-treaty) for ten years.

However, soon after, the delegation of the USA declared in Geneva, that it could not make such an "unconditional" commitment, but could merely negotiate on the elaboration of joint rules for a way out of the ABM-treaty. In Reykjavik, the President agreed to the liquidation of all strategic offensive weapons during the next decade, while, in Geneva, the delegation of the USA expressed its readiness to deal with ballistic missiles only. With regard to medium-range ballistic missiles, the delegation of the USA talks about an additional deployment of medium-range missiles in a way that may reach the territory of the USSR and, in fact, rejects the Soviet proposals which provide that the remaining missiles should not pose a threat to the other side. One could give several similar examples. They actually amount to one thing — to obvious lack of readiness of the American side to search for concrete, mutually acceptable solutions.

The seventh round of negotiations can and should become decisive. The Soviet side is going to that round with clear stands providing for the practical elaboration of an agreement on all the aspects of negotiations. And what about the American side? It will soon be seen whether it will display a political will and readiness to cover its part of the road in the direction indicated by Reykjavik, and which the Soviet Union has been recommending as the path leading to the realization of the common goal-nuclear disarmament.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THE U.S.A.^{*)} (as of October 11, 1986)

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.
IBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers	1,333	1,018
These include: IBM launchers with multiple independently targetable warheads	820	530
SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers	922	672
These include: SLBM launchers with multiple independently targetable warheads	352	610
Total number of IBM and SLBM launchers	2,255	1,690
These include: IBM and SLBM launchers with multiple independently targetable warheads	1,172	1,140
Heavy bombers (HB)		
These include: HB capable of carrying cruise missiles	31	127
Total number of IBM and SLBM launchers and HB	2,400	2,208
These include: IBM and SLBM launchers with multiple independently targetable warheads and HB capable of carrying cruise missiles	1,223	1,317
Total number of warheads on strategic carriers	10,000	14,000

^{*)} These data were handed over by the General Secretary of the CPSU to the U.S. President during the Reykjavik meeting. They are now published for the first time.

SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA REJECTS ALLEGATIONS OF SALT VIOLATIONS, GIVES FIGURES

PM161819 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed article: "Facts Versus Lies: The USSR Strictly Observes Treaty Commitments in the Sphere of Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation"]

[Text] The proposal put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement on resolving the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe is a convincing example of the new political thinking and the Soviet leadership's constructive approach to nuclear disarmament. The implementation of this proposal will make it possible to rid the European continent of many hundreds of Soviet and American missiles and their nuclear warheads. The United States as of today has in Western Europe 380 missiles (108 Pershing-2 and 272 cruise missiles), while the Soviet Union, in its European territory, has 355 medium-range missiles (243 SS-20's and 112 SS-4's).

The new Soviet initiative shows once again that the USSR constantly and persistently seeks opportunities to eliminate the nuclear threat and create an all-embracing system of international security. At the same time, certain military-political circles in the West, first and foremost in the United States, although sometimes admitting verbally the importance of Soviet peace proposals, in practice continue to pile up one obstacle after another in the path to building a nuclear-free world.

In coming out fundamentally against the USSR's proposed program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, discarding the 1972 Interim Agreement (SALT I) and the SALT II treaty, and calling for the "revision" of the ABM Treaty, right-wing conservative forces in the United States and some of their NATO allies seek not to curb the arms race but to eliminate obstacles to the implementation of their own military programs. On the pretext of the need to eliminate the "imbalance" which supposedly exists in arms, the United States intends to significantly increase its nuclear arsenal by the end of the eighties. Everything is being done to wreck the military equilibrium between the USSR and the United States which was established between the Warsaw Pact and NATO which became established in the seventies.

The attainment of this equilibrium was an historic gain for socialism. Let us remember that in the early sixties the U.S. nuclear potential considerably exceeded the level of our nuclear arms. The Soviet Union never sought military superiority. But nor could it forgo its own security. That is why the USSR, in the conditions of a growing threat from the United States, took appropriate measures to strengthen its defense capability, which enabled it by the beginning of the seventies to achieve approximate equality with the United States in the strategic arms sphere. "Today neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a clear nuclear superiority," the American President admitted in February 1971.

However, military equilibrium does not suit the nuclear manufacturers and their political placemen, who dream of world domination. In order to disguise and conceal from the peoples their course of achieving military superiority for themselves, they slander the Soviet Union. For this purpose they created and utilize the myth of the "Soviet military threat." "In order to force the country to bear the burden of maintaining a big war machine," J.F. Dulles, U.S. secretary of state and one of the fathers of the "cold war," once wrote in the book "War, Peace, and Change," "It is necessary to create an emotional atmosphere equivalent to the psychology of war. It is necessary to paint a picture of an external threat..."

Renewing this threadbare formula, the present Washington administration places particular emphasis on inventing more and more new accusations against the Soviet Union of "aggressiveness" and of violating international treaties and agreements.

For many years, Washington officials and their yes-men in Western Europe have been poisoning the international atmosphere with fabrications about the USSR's "dishonesty" in fulfilling treaty commitments. These have been intended for people who are ignorant of the true state of affairs and are unacquainted with the content of the Soviet-U.S. treaties during the arms race. Lacking any plausible facts, the malevolent anti-Soviets are trying to reinforce their fictions with sham arguments. On the one hand, they claim that it is apparently impossible to monitor [kontrolirovat] Soviet treaty observance using U.S. national technical means, then, contradicting themselves, they produce the lie about "violations by the Soviet side," recorded by those selfsame national technical means.

The flimsiness of the claims about the impossibility of verification [kontrol] using national technical means was convincingly refuted [as published] by, in particular, former CIA Director W. Colby. He was asked by the newspaper USA TODAY: "If the United States is unable to check [proverit] what weapons the USSR has, then should it conclude any arms agreement with the Soviet Union?" The reply was: "It should not, unless we are capable of verifying [proverit] fulfillment of the agreement. But we can do this."

U.S. national verification [kontrol] means have never indicated any violations of any international agreements by the USSR. Back in 1985 a U.S. spokesman on the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission on verification [proverka] of the observance of concluded agreements confirmed in Congress that the USSR was strictly fulfilling all its commitments. In 1986 the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff committee came to the same conclusion on the basis of an "evaluation of U.S. intelligence data." In the report "The Military Status of the United States", submitted to Congress, the committee plainly stated: The Soviet Union is completely abiding by its commitments.

Contrary to the facts, Pentagon spokesmen and other "hawks" are claiming the opposite. Apparently, the "truth" that the Soviet Union, in modernizing strategic offensive armaments, is not dismantling its old nuclear weapons, as the United States "invariably does," is available only to them and only from "sources" known to them. According to them, the United States, by destroying its old armaments and replacing them with the same number of up-to-date weapons, is "disarming" in the face of a "Soviet military threat." This and certain "other violations" by the USSR -- they claim -- prompted the United States to abandon the SALT II treaty, as well as the 1972 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I).

However, the facts, real facts rather than fabrications, speak differently. Since the signing of the Soviet-U.S. SALT I and SALT II agreements, the USSR, fulfilling its treaty commitments, has dismantled more than twice as many strategic arms as the United States has (see table 1 below). So the SALT II treaty and the 1972 Interim Agreement by no means diminished the security of the United States.

Overall, as is evident from table 2, by 1 January 1987 the Soviet Union had a few more strategic delivery vehicles than the United States, but the United States had an advantage in the total number of nuclear charges. As a result there is evidence of approximate equilibrium.

These data convincingly refute the lie about the USSR's alleged aggressive intentions and about its violations of international commitments. The lies and fabrications about the Soviet Union's alleged violations of treaties and agreements it has concluded remain lies and fabrications no matter who repeats them.

The facts bear out that our country has always advocated and continues to advocate strict observance of the concluded agreements and the preservation of everything positive so far achieved in the field of strategic arms limitation with such difficulty and effort. Fidelity to international commitments on the part of the United States and its renouncement of the course toward undermining the military-strategic parity would be of great importance for the consolidation of world peace and for ensuring favorable conditions for new Soviet-U.S. accords on arms limitation and reduction. Only through joint efforts, and weighing once again all the responsibility which falls on the USSR and the United States in the present extraordinarily complex international situation, is it possible to achieve the aim defined in the Soviet-U.S. Joint Statement adopted in Geneva in 1985, namely to avert any war between our countries, nuclear or conventional.

Table 1

Figures for Dismantling Soviet and U.S. Delivery Vehicles Under SALT I and II

	USSR	United States
ICBM Launchers	293	37
including:		
under SALT I	209	37
under SALT II	84	nil
SLBM Launchers	287	176
Heavy Bombers	36	77
Total Delivery Vehicles	616	290

Table 2

Figures for Soviet and U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (as of 1 Jan 1987)

	USSR	United States
ICBM Launchers	1398	1016
including ICBM launchers		
with MIRVED warheads	820	550

SLBM Launchers	922	672
including SLBM launchers		
with MIRVED warheads	352	640
Total ICBM and SLBM Launchers	2320	1688
including ICBM and SLBM launchers		
with MIRVED warheads	1172	1190
Heavy Bombers	164	522
including heavy bombers		
armed with cruise missiles	56	132
Total ICBM, SLBM, and		
heavy bomber launchers	2484	2210
including those equipped with		
MIRVED warheads and cruise missiles	1228	1322
Total charges on strategic		
carrier vehicles	approx 10000	approx 15000

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CSO: 5200/1369

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS LINKS U.S. EUROMISSILES, NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

LD040658 Moscow TASS in English 0640 GMT 4 Mar 87

["He Who Has Eyes Shall See"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow March 3 (TASS)--The U.S. Administration has been increasingly criticized of late for its decision to repudiate a number of arms control agreements, says a commentary signed by "Observer" and distributed by NOVOSTI press agency.

At the same time, there is reportedly one agreement that so fully accords with U.S. interests that Washington will never try to undermine it. This view is being persistently cultivated by NATO countries.

This agreement could have been called the most immutable if it had not been repeatedly violated. I mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The proof of the West's failure to comply with this agreement is not hard to find. It is Israel's nuclear weapons programme. It is well known from where Israel receives fissionable materials and components for the development of nuclear warheads.

Articles One and Two are fundamental to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was signed on July 1, 1968. They say that the nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the treaty undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over them to anyone, while the other signatories of the treaty undertake not to accept such weapons or control over them, directly or indirectly.

If we consider these provisions against the background of the nuclear decision-making practice in NATO, some very disquieting facts will come up to the surface. Every NATO government, for example, has the right to decide whether to use NATO's nuclear forces in an attack or not. And this applies to both "limited" and "all-out" nuclear wars. In accordance with the official NATO concept, the nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe are under "dual control," that is, under the control of the U.S. Government and the government of the country where they are deployed. A special NATO document envisages preservation, under any circumstances, of full sovereignty of the member countries and active consultations between governments before decisions affecting them directly or indirectly are taken. In other words, the United States cannot decide to use nuclear weapons without agreement of an ally who has allowed it to deploy them on its territory.

However, the NATO leaders have very broad interpretation of the "dual key" provision and the system of "political consultations." And their interpretation depends on the situation. In 1979 when NATO's "double-track decision" about the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in some West European countries was debated, the NATO leaders constantly emphasized the "hosts" role in deciding to use nuclear weapons. However, whenever the Non-Proliferation Treaty was mentioned, they said that everything would be under Americans' control. While that beating about the bush continued, many NATO secrets, including those marked "Cosmic", became public knowledge and led to logical conclusions.

As weapons become increasingly sophisticated, NATO's Europe gets more access to nuclear arsenals. Highly accurate and fast medium-range missiles such as Pershing-2 increase the likelihood of badly controlled joint decisions in crisis situations. They also increase the risk of a pre-emptive attack resulting from an uncertain or wrong evaluation of the situation, in which non-nuclear-weapons members of NATO would also be involved.

New questions are arising now that the United States is preparing to deploy nuclear weapons in space and some of its allies are becoming involved in the implementation of the SDI programme. In December 1984 the Western European Union Assembly adopted a document saying that the union should be the "main instrument" in formulating a common policy on the use of space for military purposes and also should maintain "very close relations" with the U.S. Government on the matter.

All the facts cited above and other similar facts serve to show that the United States and its allies tend to reduce the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to strictly technical, formal obligations.

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CSO: 5200/1365

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: U.S. ATTEMPTING 'NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL' IN TURKEY

LD181530 Moscow TASS in English 1432 GMT 18 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 18 TASS — TASS commentator Valeriy Vavilov writes:

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has arrived in Turkey and opened talks with his Turkish counterpart Zaki Yavusturk on broader military cooperation between the two countries.

The United States has been showing heightened interest in Turkey, which is its ally in the North Atlantic Alliance, seeing it as the main strike force on NATO's south eastern flank.

Over the decades of bilateral military cooperation the Pentagon has been able to establish itself firmly on Turkish soil where five major military bases and a multitude of other military facilities have been made available to the U.S. Armed Forces.

The United States has also deployed nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, including missiles, artillery systems and nuclear-capable planes, in Turkey.

The main air base in Incirlik is being enlarged. Building work is proceeding at full tilt on "joint bases" in Mus and Batman near the border with the Soviet Union. Measures are being taken to modernize detection and tracking stations in Sinop and Pirinlik, which are used for the electronic reconnaissance of Soviet territory.

The Pentagon, however, is obviously eager to increase this heavy military presence even further. Taking advantage of Turkey's sharp economic difficulties, including those prompted by the need to maintain an enormous army, Washington has sought to consolidate its military positions in that country and win added privileges.

This was demonstrated recently by the signing in Washington of the letters of exchange to renew a Turkish-American agreement on economic and defense cooperation until December 1990.

Having applied pressure on Istanbul, Washington has secured permission under that agreement to increase its military presence in Turkey even further in return for loans to buy arms and other aid.

The anti-Soviet thrust of American efforts on that NATO flank is apparent. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle explained the aim of those efforts plainly when he said it was only Turkey that could block the straits linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and prevent the Soviet Navy from making its way there.

The Pentagon and NATO are hatching out also other dangerous plans for drawing Turkey even more deeply in nuclear preparations.

There have been plans, for instance, to site an extra number of tactical nuclear arms in Turkey and move "outdated" Pershing-1 and Lance missiles there from West European countries.

There also are plans to modernize "obsolete" nuclear weapons stationed at American bases in Turkey and replace them with more advanced, more powerful and longer-range systems.

So far, however, Washington has not succeeded in this kind of "nuclear blackmail".

Turkey has said in no unclear terms that it is against any new nuclear weapons in its territory, against the deployment of more nuclear warheads and against the modernization of American nuclear arms already on station there.

It is clear that both the visit to Turkey by the Pentagon chief and the extension of the U.S.-Turkish agreement are aimed at prodding Istanbul to step up military preparations and assume a bigger role in shoring up NATO's southern flank.

This is making for higher tension in that region and for a nervous and uneasy atmosphere there.

The latent end of such activities is also plain. It is to hinder the development of goodneighborly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, in which the people of these two countries are definitely interested.

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CSO: 5200/1365

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ANALYST ON 'TACTICAL MISSILES' QUESTION

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 2 Mar 87 pp 1-3

[Article by APN political analyst E. Ryabtsev under the rubric "News and Views": "USSR Offers To Free Europe from All Medium-Range Missiles"]

[Text] The Soviet leadership is confirming its allegiance to the new political mentality by another major foreign-policy initiative. On February 28 Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union offers to single out the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package treatment and to conclude an agreement on this issue without delay.

The Soviet side believes that there is not simply a basis for this but actually a ready-made accord. It was agreed in Reykjavik that within the next five years the Soviet Union and the United States would scrap all their medium-range missiles in Europe. Simultaneously, under the same timetable the number of warheads on Soviet missiles of this class in the Asian part of the USSR is to be reduced to 100. The United States can have the same number of warheads on its national territory.

As soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, Moscow will withdraw its tactical longer-range missiles from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia by arrangement with the governments of these countries. They were deployed there as a counter-measure to the siting of American Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles. As far as other tactical missiles are concerned, the Soviet Union is ready to immediately enter into negotiations with a view to reducing and then eliminating them completely.

Of late the Western side has repeatedly stated that if the Soviet Union singles out the medium-range missile issue from the Reykjavik package their elimination in Europe would be easily agreed upon. The Soviet leadership is ready to meet these wishes half-way. It believes that this step will free Europe from a considerable part of the nuclear load. Moreover, the Soviet leadership considers this step as movement towards an agreement on the radical limitation and then complete elimination of strategic nuclear armaments. Naturally, provided that outer space is not militarized.

I think that the GDR and Czechoslovakia will not raise objections to the withdrawal of Soviet medium-range missiles if the same interest in the complete scale-down of American Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles is displayed by the governments of West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries which have these missiles deployed on their territory. I do not exclude that sticking to the old strategy of "nuclear deterrence", certain Western politicians will try to link the new Soviet step with the alleged conventional superiority of the Warsaw Treaty.

However, at the Moscow forum "For Nuclear-Free World, for Survival of Humanity" Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union is ready to renounce its status of a nuclear power and to reduce all other types of weapons to a reasonable sufficiency minimum. The striving for this is buttressed by the proposals made by the Warsaw Treaty countries to radically cut conventional armaments and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Now the West is to respond. Moscow is prepared to start dismantling medium-range missiles in Europe and Asia. The West European governments have not a chance to prove that they were sincere when they came out for the elimination of nuclear weapons of this class in Europe.

It is evident from the Soviet leader's statement that he stands for finding mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of establishing a nuclear-weapons-free and non-violent world and not only in Europe. The forthcoming talks by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are designed to jointly find the ways of strengthening peace and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that trust in this region and elsewhere will not come by itself. It should be created through joint common deeds. I think Eduard Shevardnadze's efforts will be focused on eliminating tensions in South-East Asia and on scaling down the military-political confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Soviet leadership does not separate the security of the Soviet Union from the security of its neighbors, be it in Europe or Asia. Offering the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and their reduction in Asia, Moscow has as its goal that humanity will be able to enter the 21st century without nuclear arms, being united by the philosophy of a non-violent world and equitable co-operation. The principled course of the Soviet Union is to tirelessly seek solutions opening the road to mutually acceptable accords and equal security.

(APN, March 1. In full)

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET OFFICIALS: AGREEMENT EXPECTED IN 3-4 MONTHS

General Tartarnikov

AU101143 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 10 Mar 87 p 1

["M.s." report: "Treaty Would Be Possible Soon"]

[Text] An agreement on the withdrawal of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe could be ready within 3 or 4 months. This was stated yesterday at a press conference in Vienna by Soviet General Viktor Tartarnikov.

The Geneva proposal on intermediate-range missiles was a response to the wish of the Western negotiating partners, said Tartarnikov, who is staying in Vienna as a member of the Soviet CSCE delegation. If necessary, the Soviet Union will find an answer to SDI which will be cheaper than the "fantastically expensive" U.S. program.

"We would prefer to use the financial means for the economy, culture, and development aid," said Tartarnikov.

Vorontsov Comments

LD111651 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] The Soviet Union and the United States have resumed their talks in Geneva on eliminating their medium-range missiles in Europe. Aleksandr Progodin of Radio Moscow elaborates, and this is what he writes:

On 28th February the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, suggested that the problem of Euromissiles should be singled out from the package of issues connected with strategic strike weapons, space weapons and nuclear tests. He called for signing, without delay, a separate agreement on Euromissiles.

Officially, the United States and its NATO allies in Europe reacted positively, and the talks on Euromissiles, conducted earlier in the framework of general Soviet-American negotiations on a package of nuclear and space weapons, were resumed 10 days after the new Soviet initiative was proclaimed. The rapid transition to the practical implementation of a proposal is a promising fact in itself, the more so as the United States declared more than once that, if

the USSR separated the question of medium-range missiles from its package submitted in Reykjavik, to agree on their elimination in Europe would present no difficulty.

To translate an agreement reached in principle into precise and explicit provisions of a treaty is no simple matter, of course. This will take some time. But what amount of time exactly? Here's how this question was answered by the chief Soviet negotiator at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, Yuliy Vorontsov:

[Begin Vorontsov recording in Russian with superimposed English translation]
I think this will be a matter of months, Yuliy Vorontsov said, evidently no more than 3 or 4 months. I don't see the need to work on this question longer.

A statement made at the Geneva talks by the chief American negotiator, Max Kampelman, has given rise to some anxiety. He stressed that to work out practical provisions of a treaty would be extremely difficult, and named early next spring as the possible time for concluding this work.

What does it signify? Diplomatic caution or symptoms of a striving to delay solution to this essential problem as much as possible? [end recording]

Obukhov in Bonn

LD122032 Hamburg DPA in German 1924 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) -- Aleksey Obukhov, deputy head of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, regards a USSR-U.S. agreement on the elimination of medium-range weapons in Europe within the next "3 to 4 months" as possible. With good will, the still open technical questions could be solved by the summer, Obukhov told journalists in Bonn Today. On the Soviet side, which has shown great readiness to compromise, this will was present.

Obukhov is in Bonn to brief the Federal Government on the Soviet position in Geneva. Today, he met Bonn's disarmament representative, Josef Holik, at the Foreign Ministry. Tomorrow's agenda includes talks with Andreas Meyer-Landrut, state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, and with SPD political Horst Ehmke. On the still open question of the verification mechanism for a medium-range agreement, Obukhov, speaking at a press conference in the Soviet Embassy, said Moscow favors a "very strict and reliable verification system" that could include public destruction of the missiles. He also reaffirmed the Soviet readiness to start without delay negotiations on the removal of the shorter-range missiles following the signing of an INF agreement. He replied evasively to a question on whether negotiating a date for this should be laid down in an INF agreement.

Obukhov criticized the efforts of the U.S. to expand the ABM Treaty on the limitation of missile defense systems. This would mean the "disintegration" of the treaty and is a brake on the negotiations on strategic and space weapons. Obukhov gave the assurance, however, that even in the event of an expanded ABM interpretation by the United States, the USSR is still prepared to sign a separate agreement on medium-range weapons. Speaking on the Federal Government's stance in the disarmament discussion, he said that it is a "positive factor" that Bonn had approved the latest Soviet proposal for the elimination of medium-range weapons. He also noted that the Federal Government had expressed reservations about a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COMMENTATOR: 'NO REAL OBSTACLES' TO ACCORD

PM041601 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[A. Mozogovoy article: "The Soviet Proposals: The Way to a Nuclear-free Europe Is Clear"]

[Text] "Soviet leader Gorbachev has cleared the road toward the achievement of a major arms control agreement," this is how U.S. CBS television network commentator Deborah Parter characterized the 28 February statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Most foreign observers and politicians have expressed a high opinion of the peace-loving new Soviet initiative. And indeed, the Soviet decision to take the question of medium-range missiles out of the package of disarmament proposals discussed in Reykjavik testifies to our country's desire tirelessly to seek solutions which pave the way to mutually acceptable accords and equal security. And the latest Soviet initiative is unquestionably another major step in that direction.

Let me recall: At the meeting in the Icelandic capital the two countries' leaders agreed to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe within the next 5 years (this accords with the U.S. "zero option" which was put forward a few years ago), leaving 100 warheads on such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory. On the same occasion in Reykjavik M.S. Gorbachev announced our country's readiness to freeze the number of missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km and to embark on talks about their future fate without delay. As is known, because of the U.S. administration's unwillingness to strengthen the provisions of the ABM Treaty and to abandon its "star wars" plans, an accord on medium-range missiles was not implemented.

What happened after Reykjavik? Above all, attempts were made to accuse the Soviet Union of allegedly deliberately linking its proposal on medium-range missiles to strategic and space arms issues in order to avoid a specific solution of this problem. This is a malicious distortion of the Soviet position! In Reykjavik our country made a great concession in agreeing to exclude, for the time being, the French and British nuclear potentials and U.S. forward-based means in Europe from the reductions. This is why the proposals on medium-range missiles were presented as part of an overall package.

Since it was extremely awkward for the U.S. Administration to oppose its own "zero option," attacks by ranking NATO military men on a medium-range missile accord were organized. U.S. General B. Rogers, supreme allied commander Europe, described the "zero option" as "senseless." His West German colleague W. Alteburg said that the U.S. medium-range missiles are an "integral part" of NATO defenses and that without them "the NATO strategic concept would collapse." These statements had to be backed up with something. And so the problem of enhanced-range missiles—which is how systems with a range of less than 1,000 km are described—was dragged out. It was claimed that the USSR has superiority in this category. In actual fact there is no such "Soviet superiority." People at the NATO headquarters are deliberately "forgetting" the existence of Pershing-1, Lance, Pluton, and Honest John launchers deployed by the NATO bloc in West Europe.

Although we still believe that the solution of the whole range of nuclear disarmament problems as a "package" is the best way to achieve an accord at the Geneva talks, M.S. Gorbachev's statement makes it possible to break the impasse in the dialogue and unties, once and for all, the propaganda knots which were deliberately created by the West after Reykjavik. This is the reason why the Soviet Union has proposed to take the problem of medium-range missiles out of package of disarmament issues, to conclude a separate agreement on this question, and what is more, to do this without delay. And as soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe is signed, the USSR will, after consultation with the governments of the GDR and the CSSR, withdraw the enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles from those countries. As for other missiles in this category, we are prepared, without delay, to enter into talks with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. Thus a real opportunity has now emerged to rid the edifice of Europe of a substantial proportion of its nuclear burden within a short time. The Soviet proposals are on the negotiating table at the Geneva talks with the United States.

What was Washington's reaction to these proposals? White House spokesman D. Howard stated: "Our reaction is that we are ready, very swiftly, to place a draft treaty on medium-range missiles on the negotiating table in Geneva and we hope to achieve progress." These words inspire hope! However, it would be wrong to believe that people across the ocean are ready to resolve this question swiftly. M. Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva, told an ABC correspondent that "two obstacles are blocking the conclusion of an agreement." What was he referring to? The first obstacle, according to Mr Kampelman, is the problem of "what is to be done about shorter-range Soviet missiles in Europe?" Yet the answer to this question is contained in M.S. Gorbachev's statement. Thus this is clearly a far-fetched "obstacle." And the second thing that is bothering the head of the U.S. delegation is the solution of the problem of verification [kontrol] of the accord. Yet here too the U.S. diplomat is dissembling. The Soviet Union has more than once declared its support for any form of verification which would ensure the sides' complete confidence that agreements are being strictly observed.

In connection with the Soviet initiatives, the opponents of detente are also demanding "clarification of the imbalance in conventional arms which exists in Europe," which allegedly "favors the Soviet Union." Approximate parity exists in the correlation of conventional arms between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This is admitted even by authoritative Western experts. Thus a recent report of the U.S. Brookings Institution which studies arms control questions points out that "the correlation of conventional forces is not just closer to parity, but even favors the West."

Thus there are no real obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles. Washington has now been given an opportunity to prove by action rather than words its commitment to the disarmament process. For our part, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized during his meeting with Prime Minister S. Hermannsson of Iceland, we would like "the agreement on medium-range missiles to act as a stimulus to talks on the reduction of strategic weapons coupled with an undertaking not to back out of the ABM treaty, to advance the opening of talks on conventional arms and armed forces, and to speed up progress in the cause of the elimination of chemical weapons." In our time, security in the world and the survival of mankind must be ensured through joint efforts and political means rather than weapons. The peoples of Europe and the whole world expect concrete actions from the United States.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA ASSESSES MISSILE CURB PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS

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[Boris Kotov "International Review"]

[Excerpt] Has the Ice Begun to Move? [subhead]

Is it possible that the ice has at last begun to move in the question of practical nuclear disarmament? Let us not be too hasty with an unequivocal answer. There are good reasons for asking this question. They are to be found in the uncharacteristically unanimous positive appraisal which M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement has received throughout the world.

The importance of the proposals put forward in this statement is self-evident: The Soviet Union has decided it is now possible to separate the problem of medium-range missiles from the other disarmament issues, to take it out of the Reykjavik "package." It has proposed that a separate agreement be concluded on this problem without delay.

The proposed solution has resulted in a great number of reactions. "A Most Important Peaceful Challenge to the West"; "The Best News Since Reykjavik"; "Remarkable News"; "Europe Applauds Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev" — these are some relatively characteristic headlines from the Western press.

Is this not going too far, is this not excessive optimism, unjustified euphoria? After all, it is well known how difficult and complex the process of achieving fruitful accords in the sphere of disarmament is. However, this gamut of reactions is a reflection of life itself, of the reality of the passionate desire of broad circles of the international public to build a nuclear-free world. Another point: Everyone can see there is not just a basis for such a step, but real accord.

As is known, it was agreed at the USSR-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik in October of last year that the USSR and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe over a period of 5 years. Over the same period the number of Soviet missiles in this category deployed in the Asian part of our territory would be reduced to 100 warheads on the understanding that the United States would be allowed to retain the same number of medium-range missile warheads on its national territory.

It is planned that as soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe is signed, the USSR would, after consultation with the governments of the GDR and the CSSR, withdraw from these countries the

enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles which were deployed there as a countermeasure to the deployment of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe. As for other operational-tactical missiles, the USSR is ready, without delay, to enter into talks about their reduction and complete elimination.

On this occasion the governments of virtually all interested states, including NATO countries, responded to the USSR initiative without delay. Thus, late in the evening of the same day, 28 February, it was officially stated in Bonn that "the FRG Government welcomes the proposal of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, that a separate agreement be concluded with the United States on the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe... The government hopes that the talks between the USSR and the United States will make swift headway."

Apart from the FRG, U.S. medium-range missiles are deployed (or earmarked for deployment) on the territories of Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. All these countries also approved the USSR proposal within the first 2-3 days. The official circles of other NATO countries -- Spain, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Canada also responded in a positive spirit.

Washington's official response was businesslike in form, at least it did not contain any of the tiresome references to the "propaganda nature of the Kremlin initiative." At a White House briefing on Tuesday 3 March U.S. President R. Reagan welcomed the USSR proposals. He announced that the U.S. delegation at the USSR-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space arms had been instructed to submit a draft treaty "on the implementation of the agreed aims and on the basis of the specific formulas which we agreed with Mr Gorbachev at our meeting in Iceland in October last year."

Thus, as a result of the Soviet initiative, the Geneva talks have received a new impetus. New specific Soviet proposals have been submitted and U.S. proposals have also been introduced. In the final stage of the seventh round of the talks, the groundwork has been laid for a practical solution of the medium-range missile problem.

Will the decisive breakthrough be achieved in Geneva? Time will tell. It is obvious the preconditions for this exist. However, another thing is also obvious today. It would be wrong to take too rosy a view of the situation. Not a few obstacles and difficulties are already looming on the path toward an agreement.

What Is Needed Is Political Will [subhead]

It would have been a miracle if the forces of the military-industrial complex and the political "hawks" who are in their service on both sides of the Atlantic had accepted what is happening without lifting a finger. Well, the miracle did not happen. The signal for attack came from the U.S. defense secretary's department. According to the U.S. press, it was from here that a malicious propaganda "canard" was launched: "If all the U.S. missiles were withdrawn from Europe, a number of hidden (?) Soviet SS-20 missiles could be used to blackmail NATO."

This outrageous "handout" was taken up by a number of press organs. One of the contributors to THE NEW YORK TIMES writes about "threatening consequences for Nato," ascribing these fears to "West European leaders." "In Europe the first wave of excitement is giving way to concern that the U.S. missiles might be removed" -- this is the disinformation launched by one of the U.S. television networks. It is echoed by another network, which claims that the Soviet initiative "may throw a lot of light on the existing imbalance in conventional arms in Europe which is in favor of the Soviet Union," and so on and so forth.

The retiring NATO supreme allied commander in Europe, U.S. General B. Rogers, also hastily launched a "rearguard action." "It would be madness for the West," he declared, "to agree to the missile 'zero option.'"

Several French newspapers have joined this chorus. Their "super-cautious" or, more correctly, negative assessment of the Soviet proposals was clearly inspired by French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raimond. It was evident from his hasty statement that Paris is not exactly enthusiastic about a nuclear-free Europe, that it is not pleased at the prospect of the elimination of the Euromissiles which has emerged. [paragraph continues]

A day later President F. Mitterrand of France and Prime Minister J. Chirac made some amends by declaring that "the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe is in keeping with the interests of France and the world." Even though the burden of their own nuclear potential is pulling some Paris politicians backward, we would like to hope that common sense will prevail on the banks of the Seine too.

In addition, other difficulties are beginning to emerge on the path of a USSR-U.S. agreement. Not just the U.S. allies in Europe, but the Washington administration itself is currently being subjected to pressure from extreme right-wing militarist forces. Furthermore, attempts are being made to exploit the difficult situation in which it finds itself as a result of the unabating scandal around the secret arms deliveries to Iran.

This is one interpretation for the "warnings" to the administration offered by certain observers on the pages of THE WASHINGTON POST. Mentioning the "desperately weakened positions" of the White House, they advise "Reagan and his new team of advisers" not to fall into the "trap" which, they claim, the Soviet proposals represent. They also offer a recipe for thwarting the talks, namely the problem of "monitoring and verification" [kontrol i proverka] which has been used for this purpose many times before.

Will the administration give way to this pressure? I do not rule this out. Did not the same thing happen in Reykjavik when the U.S. President proved not to be free to act, to adopt final decisions?

I also believe something else. The pressure from the right is now increasingly being countered by the forces of reason which are concerned about mankind's fate. A clear reflection of this fact is the mood in the U.S. Congress. It was expressed, for instance, by R. Byrd, leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, in a letter to President Reagan. He asked the head of the administration to issue directives to the members of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks with a view to achieving a "fair agreement which would lend itself to verification [proverka].

A bitter struggle is under way. The stakes are high. A real opportunity has emerged for the practical implementation of nuclear disarmament measures, for the reduction and elimination of a substantial proportion, a whole class, of nuclear missiles. The realization of this opportunity could mark the turning point in the cause of creating a nuclear-free world on our planet.

The Soviet Union has again demonstrated its will to resolve the problem of nuclear disarmament despite all the difficulties and artificial obstacles. This calls for reciprocity from the United States. It calls for common sense, determination, and firm political will also on the part of the United States. [passage omitted on International Women's Day and human rights in the West]

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW VIEWS INF'S ROLE IN OVERALL BALANCE

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["International Situation — Questions and Answers" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov, foreign policy commentator of All-Union Radio; with Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev, TASS military affairs observer; Vladimir Dmitriyev, All-Union Radio correspondent in Geneva; Vladimir Fadeyev, All-Union Radio Commentator]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] Hello, comrades! Sorting through the letters received in our program's mailbag, one always discovers that most listeners are mainly interested in issues linked with different aspects of Soviet-American relations. This is quite natural, for it is on the policies of the USSR and the United States that the course of development of international events and the political climate on the planet depend to a considerable, and sometimes decisive extent. The letters that have come in since the date of the previous edition have been no exception. Why didn't the United States agree to join in the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests? How are the talks in Geneva about nuclear and space armaments progressing? What is the reason behind the USSR's recent proposal that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be taken out of the package of issues and that a separate agreement be concluded?

This is a far from complete list of the matters of concern in your letters, comrades: For example, in those from (Yuliya Grigoryevna Yovarovich) from Novokuybyshevsk; (Yefim Nikitovich Skibin) from the village of Ivanovka in the Voronezh oblast; (Pavel Ivanovich Plotnikov) from the town of Balashov in the Saratov oblast, and a number of our other listeners. Over the past few days, our international department has received a particularly large number of letters asking us to talk in greater detail about the last of the issues I enumerated — the new Soviet initiative on medium-range missiles in Europe, contained in the statement made by Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 28 February. We comply with this request with pleasure. And to ensure that you get a qualified and full reply, esteemed comrades, I have invited a specialist in this field — Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev, a TASS observer on military issues — to take part in our program. Vladimir Nikolayevich, could you perhaps remind us of the essence of the new peace initiative announced by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Chernyshev] In his statement, Comrade Gorbachev, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, announced the following proposals: First it was proposed that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be taken out of the package of issues which are being examined at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments in Geneva. It was proposed that a separate agreement be concluded about this, and that this be done

without delay. The agreement would envisage the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe; and a sharp reduction in these -- down to 100 warheads in Soviet Asian territory and 100 in the United States. Second, it was proposed that talks be started immediately on operational-tactical missiles with the clearly defined objective of reducing this class of missiles and of eliminating it completely. In addition, the Soviet Union stated that it will withdraw from the GDR and the CSSR, in agreement with the governments of those countries, enhanced range operational-tactical missiles as soon as an agreement is signed on eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. As it known, the operational-tactical missiles referred to were deployed in countries allied to the USSR as measures in response to the introduction into Western Europe of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.

These proposals have once again demonstrated our country's good will, its constructive approach, and its desire to find solutions with the goal of reaching mutually acceptable accords on problems of nuclear disarmament, of improving relations between states in Europe, and of strengthening security on the continent in a real way.

[Ptashnikov] How did the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons on the Continent of Europe arise in the first place? Western propaganda often accuses our country of being responsible for this problem coming into being? Does that correspond with reality?

[Chernyshev] No, of course it doesn't. The real facts tell of something totally different. Judge for yourself. Immediately after World War II, when the Soviet Union did not yet have atomic weapons, the United States concentrated more than 90 B-29 bombers with nuclear ammunition at bases in Great Britain. These were in effect the world's first medium-range nuclear weapons, targetted against our country from Europe. In 1954-58, the United States went further, deploying Matador, Mace, Thor, and Jupiter medium-range nuclear missiles in a number of NATO countries. And an air armada consisting of many hundreds of U.S. nuclear-weapons-carrying aircraft was permanently stationed in Great Britain, the FRG and other countries. All this was intended for the delivery of strikes against vitally important centers in the USSR and its allies. The U.S. nuclear ammunition delivery means sited close to the borders of the USSR began to be known as forward-based systems. At approximately the same time Britain and France acquired nuclear weapons.

Until the end of the fifties, aircraft provided the USSR with its means of delivering nuclear weapons. At that time it did not have any medium-range missiles. But it could not stand idly by as increasing numbers of missiles with nuclear warheads were being targetted against Soviet cities from different parts of Europe and Asia. As measures in response, it developed the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, which it sited on its own territory during the years 1959-61, in numbers which -- together with the medium-range aircraft means -- balanced the corresponding nuclear armaments of the United States and the other NATO countries in Europe. Their development [sozdaniye] was therefore an imposed response to nuclear blackmail against the countries of the socialist community.

All this is evidence of the fact that it was not the USSR but the United States which created the problem of nuclear confrontation in Europe. Thanks to our country's measures in response, an approximate equilibrium has long been in existence in the field of nuclear armaments in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. If one takes the entire totality of the means that there are here, then the West has an advantage as far as some types of weapons are concerned, while the USSR has some advantage as far as others are concerned. But since the seventies the sides have had approximately 1,000 medium-range delivery vehicles each -- both missiles and aircraft -- in Europe.

[Ptashnikov] However, military equilibrium has never been to the United States's liking. As we know, using the myth of the Soviet military threat, and distorting the real correlation of forces on the continent, in 1979 they managed to get through, in NATO, a decision under which 572 new U.S. medium-range missiles — the Pershing-2 ballistic missiles, and the cruise missiles — were to be sited on the territory of several West European countries which were NATO members.

[Chernyshev] Yes, you are right. As they often say in the West, the grounds for this decision was supposedly the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles, in substitution for the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles.

But the existence of the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles had not given rise to any concern in NATO countries. It is difficult to understand, therefore, why there was a sudden appearance of concern in connection with the SS-20's. The strategic situation in Europe was not changed by the fact that the USSR started to replace missiles which had come to the end of their useful life with more modern ones. For every two SS-20 missiles deployed, the Soviet Union simultaneously took out three old missiles. While the USSR had about 600 ground-based medium-range missiles in the western part before deployment of the SS-20's began, now there are only 355. Furthermore, one-third of these are obsolete SS-4 missiles. The SS-5 missiles have been eliminated completely. Although the number of warheads on the missiles has been increased somewhat, the overall total capacity of Soviet missiles has been reduced over this period by a factor of more than two. All of this is well known, but they persist in remaining silent about it in the West. For its own part, the Soviet Union has undertaken a whole range of measures to prevent the level of military confrontation in Europe from being raised and to prevent any build-up in medium-range nuclear armaments here. One might recall that in March 1982 it introduced, unilaterally, a moratorium on the deployment [razvertyvaniy] of medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe and even carried out a reduction in such means. At the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe, our country did everything possible to find a mutually acceptable way to reduce, rather than increase, the number of medium-range nuclear means on the continent. However, the United States rejected any compromise that we made and went ahead, nevertheless, with the siting [razmeshcheniye] of its new missiles.

[Ptashnikov] What was Washington's real aim?

[Chernyshev] In actual fact deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the new U.S. missiles in Europe pursued the goal of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union, not just in medium-range means, but overall, as a whole, in the military-strategic field, in so far as -- where the Soviet Union is concerned -- these missiles, by virtue of the geographical situation are strategic weapons, and first-nuclear-strike means by virtue of their characteristics. The main Pentagon strategy was to relocate its medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of the West European NATO countries; not out of concern for the security of Europe, as they try to make out in Washington, but from a desire to transform that continent into the main theater of military operations, to reduce the force of any retaliatory strike against U.S. territory in the event of aggression against the Soviet Union, and to ensure the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war in Europe.

[Ptashnikov] What, then, is the situation now in the field of medium-range missiles in Europe? Has the United States succeeded in changing the balance in its own favor?

[Chernyshev] No it hasn't. This, too, can be illustrated by the facts. By the end of 1986 the United States had deployed [razvernut] 364 missiles in Western Europe. These included 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 256 cruise missiles. In all NATO has 542 medium-range missiles in Europe. The United States has 364; Great Britain has 64; and France has 114. The Soviet Union has 343 [figure as heard] medium-range missiles in the European zone: 243 SS-20's; 112 SS-4's; and 18 sea-based missiles -- SS-N-5's. The number of missiles and number of warheads on the missiles of the NATO countries is greater than those of the Soviet Union. If one includes aircraft, then NATO has more medium-range delivery vehicles in Europe and nuclear warheads on them than the Warsaw Pact does. But, taking into account the Soviet Union's measures in response to the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the U.S. missiles, such as siting [razmeshcheniye] of enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles on the territory of the GDR and the CSSR and some other measures, there are complete grounds for asserting that an approximate equilibrium in medium-range nuclear means does exist between the sides here.

[Ptashnikov] Before Reykjavik, at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Iceland, and now, with its new initiative, the Soviet Union has taken a whole series of steps toward meeting the positions of the United States and its allies. In particular it has given up the demand that the aircraft belonging to the forward-based means be taken into account; it has given up taking into account -- and even placing any kind of limitations upon -- the nuclear means of Britain and France; it has agreed to reduce sharply its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country; and now it has also agreed to take the problem of the medium-range missiles out of the Reykjavik package, although -- particularly given the concessions referred to above -- this is linked directly with the other problems which are being discussed at the Geneva talks. So what makes it possible for our country to propose such bold and out-of-the-ordinary solutions to such important questions?

[Chernyshev] First, I would like to say that of course the Soviet Union continues to believe it would be preferable to solve the whole range of questions -- space, strategic offensive armaments, medium-range missiles, ending nuclear tests -- as a set of issues, thereby ensuring a harmonious process of strengthening international security at constantly falling levels of military confrontation. At the same time, understanding that the Geneva talks face the danger of finding themselves in a blind alley once again after Reykjavik, our country decided that the question of medium-range missiles should be solved first, taking into account particularly the fact that today it lends itself most easily of all to a solution.

But now about what it is that enables our leadership to make decisions so boldly, to carry on its constant search and to display tactical flexibility: First and foremost it is the fact that the Soviet Union's stance is the expression of a new approach, of new thinking, which is dictating a truth of exceptional importance: ensuring security in the nuclear-space era is a matter of politics. In our day there can be no national security which is not part and parcel of universal security. Making bold decisions is clearly also encouraged by the fact that a detailed, stage-by-stage plan for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons by the end of the current century has also been worked out in the Soviet Union. This makes it possible to take the long-term view and consequently to display tactical flexibility on the road toward achieving the ultimate strategic goal. I think you will agree with me when I say that the most difficult -- but the most important -- step is the first step. Our country has now chosen the link which, once grasped, will enable the whole chain to be pulled out.

[Ptashnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, in what fields could the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles lead to positive results?

[Chernyshev] I think that on the political level such an agreement would be the first real step in the field of disarmament — and that is very important when the sides started to disarm — taking practical steps. This would create an atmosphere of greater confidence. It would be demonstrated in practice and fixed in a legal form, by means of a treaty, that after Reykjavik the only way to move is to go forward, relying on what has been achieved, continuing the search, finding solutions, and bringing the positions closer together.

On the purely military level this step would play an extremely noticeable role, in so far as a considerable part of a whole class of nuclear weapons would be eliminated and a whole continent would be rid of it. The threat of nuclear war in Europe would fall, whether deliberately or on an unsanctioned, chance basis. Removing the temptation to start a nuclear — to start a limited nuclear war, I would say, planned in the Pentagon, means lowering the threat to our country and to our allies. It means releasing the West European countries from the role of the Pentagon strategists' nuclear hostages.

This means that all European states and the whole world will benefit, because the European fuse will disappear, the fuse of universal nuclear conflagration. In the realm of talks an agreement on medium-range missiles might be capable of stimulating progress toward reaching an accord on reducing strategic weapons, linked to not going beyond the ABM Treaty; it might push the sides toward starting talks on conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and speed up the conclusion of a treaty on eliminating and banning chemical weapons.

On a psychological level these first real measures would serve as a stimulus for optimism in the world. An accord on medium-range missiles would demonstrate that it is possible to make moves in a positive direction and to emerge from the present difficult international situation onto the path of cooperation. So now it is up to our partners in the talks. The very near future will show whether they are capable of understanding the urgency of the hour, of rising above their own egotistical aspirations, and of using the truly historic opportunity offered by the new Soviet initiative.

[Ptashnikov] Thank you very much, Vladimir Nikolayevich.

As I said at the very start of the program, a great many of our listeners are interested in how the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons are going in Geneva. Several days ago the seventh round of these talks was completed. Our Geneva correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev asked Comrade Vorontsov, the head of the Soviet delegation in Geneva and first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, to sum up its results. We present a recording of that interview:

[Begin recording] [Dmitriyev] My first question for you, Yuliy Mikhaylovich: What do you see as the main distinguishing features of the seventh round?

[Vorontsov] I would like to say that from the very outset of this round, 15 January, the Soviet delegation has tried to do everything it can to conduct it in a constructive spirit, in a spirit of elaborating what are already the main provisions of future agreements, always oriented toward those great accords attained in Reykjavik. Of course, the most important thing that has happened at this round is the important statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on intermediate-range missiles, which opened

up for us the opportunity of working with the U.S. delegation on a specific text of a treaty on liquidation of intermediate range missiles in Europe and considerable reduction of them in Asia. This work has started. The U.S. delegation agreed to the elaboration of such a treaty. Of course, there is complex work to come, since this will be the first agreement between the USSR and the United States on the actual destruction of nuclear and missile weapons. Of course this is not a simple matter, it needs great effort and time.

[Dmitriyev] Here in Geneva I personally had the opportunity of talking to many eminent representatives of various European states. In general, their assessments are positive; they welcome the Soviet initiative and appraise it very highly. Yet at the same time certain western press organs assert that these new Soviet proposals are a consequence of the failure of the USSR's attempts to get the United States to renounce the SDI program. What would you say to that?

[Vorontsov] No, I do not think these issues should be linked, as two interlinked issues are really strongly coupled [as heard] -- these are not to permit the arms race in space and to reduce strategic offensive weapons.

There cannot be one without the other. As far as intermediate missiles are concerned, of course these are also important weapons, but this can be resolved separately and, moreover, we consider that resolving the separate issue of intermediate-range weapons will provide impetus for the quickest possible search for solutions to the two other, mutually linked, issues -- space and strategic offensive weapons.

[Dmitriyev] Could we please dwell on one other aspect -- another kind of judgement, so to speak, is, I would say, speculation over the fact that the Warsaw Pact countries allegedly have a lead in conventional weapons.

[Vorontsov] That is an old refrain of the Western powers. There is no advantage for the Warsaw Pact countries over the NATO countries in weapons. If we take all the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces and all the Armed Forces of the NATO countries, overall there is parity. One side or the other has more and the other less of one specific kind of weapon or another, but overall there is parity. So, the far-fetched old refrain about some kind of Soviet superiority is now only being used in order not to reach agreement. The West is not ready, it seems, to move toward making considerable reductions in weapons in Europe as far as conventional weapons are concerned. But those are our proposals, they are the proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries. We call upon the Western countries to sit at the negotiating table at any time to discuss these proposals. However, the West is still looking for various ruses so as not to sit at this negotiating table. It is up to the Western powers.

[Dmitriyev] And the last aspect: Of course it is hard to make predictions, but when might this treaty on intermediate-range missiles in Europe be concluded? In a month, 2 or 3 months, a year?

[Vorontsov] No, a year is too long, and, I repeat, agreement in principle was attained in Reykjavik, and all the main provisions are now prepared for the treaty on intermediate missiles. But what we don't have is a detailed description of precisely which missiles are concerned and where their liquidation will take place, and here, with the U.S. delegation, we have to find answers to these many, various questions, and answers in the language of treaties. It is complicated, but it is possible, and without doubt, essential. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW RADIO DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION ISSUE

LD141354 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 14 Mar 87

["Top Priority" program, hosted by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Prof Radomir Bogdanov and Prof Sergey Plekhanov of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to "Top Priority." I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host, and in the studio with me are our usual panel, Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies in Moscow. A breakthrough on medium-range missiles in Europe continues to top the list of major world developments and, as far as I understand at present, there are two drafts on the negotiating table in Geneva. There is much work ahead, but I would think that agreements on INF arms may not be too far away. A question to you, Prof Bogdanov, in this respect. On the previous...on some of the previous programs you used to strike a somewhat pessimistic chord about the prospects of Soviet-American relations in view of the fact that our partner in the talks is this present Republican Administration. What would you say now? Have you changed your mind or what is your opinion?

[Bogdanov] Well Pavel, unfortunately I haven't changed my mind, because it's a very benign development that we are witnessing now at Geneva but so far we have no result. We have drafts, we have discussions but I'm sorry we have no result. That's on the one side, on the...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] But nobody says we are going to have an agreement, any agreement tomorrow. It'll take some time.

[Bogdanov] Yes, yes, yes. I'm not thinking in terms of days, I'm thinking in terms of months, you know, and what worries me, not, not the drafts on the table at Geneva; the situation within the Administration, that what worries me.

[Kuznetsov] In what sense?

[Bogdanov] You know the political reality is that until the President is not able to strike a deal among his own, you know, collaborators, until they get a common view, a common position on to deal or not to deal with the Soviet Union at all and in what way, what kind of, you know, difficulties to bring to

Geneva's table, then I am sorry I am pessimistic and if you look at the administration and correlation of forces, let me put that way, within the Administration I am still pessimistic, you know, and I expect, maybe I am wrong. By the way, Pavel, you might remember that I've always been telling our listeners over there if I am wrong I will state that publicly I am wrong.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, I know that.

[Bogdanov] So far I have no reason for that and I suspect that every day we may have more and more difficulties from the American side. First of all let's have a look at the verification, the so-called verification.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, we'll be coming to verification. What I wanted to ask you at this point is that you said something about the correlation of forces but as far as I understand some hardliners are leaving this Administration one by one and the recent announcement that Richard Perle is going to resign this spring is an indication that there is some evening out between the two opposing trends in the...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Yes, I object, you know, I object very much to some people's exaggerating or over-exaggerating Perle's role in the Administration. He has a role, if he has some ears which are, you know, willing to hear him and he is not so much important by himself as the, you know, the whole environment within the Administration which is very receptive to his views and I'm not ready to say that this Administration has changed to such an extent that those views are not, you know, any more vocal or visible enough in the administration, so let's wait and see.

[Kuznetsov] OK, OK. Now we've raised this verification problem, and I do agree that it is going to be one of the, perhaps, toughest moments during the talks. On Thursday State Department spokesman Charles Redman announced that the United States had put a package of elaborate verification measures on the negotiating table in Geneva. Well, one of the arguments is that stiff verification measures is imperative because of the mobility of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. I'm not a military expert myself, but as far as I know the American Tomahawk cruise missiles are placed on special vehicles and can be fired from special vehicles which somehow, too, move around. What would you say about this problem of verification? A question to you Prof Plekhanov.

[Plekhanov] Well, the most important thing to emphasize is that the Soviet Union is no less interested in adequate verification of arms control agreements than the United States. We have no reason to take the Americans at their words and we are interested in having treaties which can be adequately verified so we must be reasonably sure that the other side is adhering to the terms of agreement. That applied to the earlier arms control agreements, like SALT I and SALT II, and the ABM treaty and that fully applies also to the agreements on which we are working now. So, the Soviet Union will not...should not be seen as a party which somehow underrates the importance of verification. Secondly, verification has repeatedly been used in the past by diehard opponents of any arms control agreements, because, you know, verification is a tricky thing. We are dealing with strategic forces, with military forces,

on both sides, and when an agreement on arms control is signed that means that both sides are going to be much more open with regard to their military activities than before the agreement was signed and there will be certain procedures for discussing the way the agreements are being complied with. There are certain technical details which involve the military activities of this side or that. For instance, if there is a missile test then what is that test telling the other side about the characteristics of that missile? So these are very, very difficult technical questions and if there is somebody who simply does not want an agreement there are always certain technical details that you can point to and say: You see that there are gray areas there, we cannot be 100 percent certain about the other side and thus we should not rush into this agreement.

Interestingly enough, whenever the Reagan Administration would raise the issue of Soviet alleged noncompliance with the existing arms control treaties, they would always qualify their charges with words like "probably," "possibly," "we are not certain," and so on and so forth. This is very devious, because for the broad public it sounds as if there is something, the Russians may be cheating and in the current climate in the United States, a climate of distrust of the Soviet Union, you know such charges or semi-charges fall on ripe ground. So the issue of verification is easy to be a demagogue about, and that's what worries me.

[Bogdanov] I always thought that verification problem was a rather political than technical one.

[Kusnetsov] You're right.

[Bogdanov] It's a political problem because, from the technical point of view, you have nowadays enough technological, you know, gadgets if you like, to verify what's going on at the other end but you have to have a political decision to do that.

[Kusnetsov] Right.

[Plekhanov] By the way, just one word about history. This problem has an interesting history. In 1955 the Soviet Union proposed a draft treaty for general and complete disarmament which involved very intrusive verification measures: the use of inspectors to watch over the military activities, to visit the plants and so on and so forth, and it was the American administration, the Eisenhower Administration, at the time that balked at it, said: Well, are we going to allow the Soviets to look at our military stuff?

[Kuznetsov] I've recently returned from the United States where I was for 11 days with a group of Soviet journalists and one of the questions concerning the medium-range weapons was the timing. Some people suggested that the Soviet Union could not be oblivious to the domestic situation in the United States and it was a very shrewd move on the part of the Soviets to make their proposal to decouple the package, to break the package, following the Tower Commission report on the Iran-Contra deal which had exposed the

illegal dealings in this arms for hostages affair and diverting funds to the Nicaraguan Contras. So the idea... the suggestion was that perhaps the Soviets chose the time when it would be impossible for the Reagan administration to turn the Soviet offer down. What do you think about that? Would you agree with such a view?

[Plekhanov] I think it's a convoluted argument because what we offered in our last proposal is a concession to the American position.

[Kuznetsov] You mean the zero option, the American Zero Option?

[Plekhanov] Well, I mean decoupling the INF deal from the package at Reykjavik. This is what a lot of Americans urged us to do, and the moment we do that they say: Oh, no; you're exploiting the weakness of this administration. Now, if we are exploiting we are exploiting it by means of offering a concession. Now this is a rather strange way of exploiting.

[Bogdanov] Benign, benign exploitation.

[Plekhanov] Yes, it's like, you know... it would be I think far more logical to charge us with exploiting a weakness of the Reagan administration if we have raised the level of our demands, saying: no since you're weak we're not going to deal.

[Kuznetsov] Or just ignored the Administration completely.

[Plekhanov] Yes, we could, we could have ignored the Administration completely.

But the point is that, no matter what happens inside the United States, the matter of reducing the level of nuclear armaments is so urgent, because the arms race is really getting out of hand, and we are not prepared to wait for another couple of years until the new administration comes to power. And therefore we have stated several times, and will continue to adhere to this line, that we will do everything possible with this administration to reach adequate arms control agreements. And I think we will continue to press for that until the last day Mr Reagan is in the office, or whoever takes his part, takes his place.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you, now last Tuesday President Reagan sent a report to the Congress raising the specter of the increasing Soviet military threat, and he also repeated charges, renewed actually charges of vast Soviet violations of major arms control treaties. My understanding is that perhaps the President was trying to allay some fears in the far right that he is still out of control and by sending this report he wanted to get tough with the Russians.

[Bogdanov] Yes, I tend to agree with you. I tend to agree that's usual weakness, the usual, you know, check and balance within this administration, and that's another, you know, reason for my worry. We have started our conversation about the possibility of INF deal. That belongs to the same

category, you know. If the President has so far to demonstrate all the time to his, you know, supporters, to his rightwing friends, that he is with them, then why at the last moment he will not choose to demonstrate to his supporters that he is not with the Russians, he is with them, and to kill the deal, you know? So that makes you little bit (?ambiguous) about the American intentions, of this Administration's intentions. You never know where is the balance, where is the balance of the common sense and where is the balance of pleasing some people at the extreme end. So far, I am sorry to say, this Administration chose to please the rightwing people, not to please the common sense, I'm sorry to say.

[Kuznetsov] As time is running out on us, I'd like to ask my last, my final question on this program. Some people believe—and I tend to agree with them—that once there are agreements on medium-range weapons there will be more trust between our two nations and more trust might lead on to something more significant in the bilateral relations, and I mean the area of arms control. Would you agree with that, or are we looking too far ahead at this time?

[Plekhanov] I agree with that, and I am hopeful that if the INF agreement is reached and ratified then of course that will open the door to an improvement of Soviet-American relations. But I think that if we concentrate just on an arms control agreement and forget about the rest of the areas of Soviet-American relations, if we don't take steps to bring down the tensions in other areas as well then we might see a repetition of the 1979 situation when the SALT II treaty, pursued in a very hostile atmosphere, in the atmosphere of growing tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, was finally defeated. So this is why I'm very concerned about the Administration's desire to up the ante, so to say, to revive some of its hostile rhetoric in connection with the regional problems, in connection with the alleged Soviet violations, and so on and so forth. When you are trying to balance dialogue, positive dialogue with the Soviet Union with increased hostility in other areas that's a very dangerous game.

You may sink the whole ship by that means.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you very much. Our time is up. I'd like to extend my thanks to our listeners and invite (?them) to join us next time, a week from now on the same wavelength.

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CSO: 5200/1355

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S NOVOSTI SEES UK, FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES AS 'GRAVE THREAT'

AU131339 Paris AFP in English 1335 GMT 13 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, March 13 (AFP)—French and British nuclear missiles aimed at the Soviet Union remain a grave threat, even if the superpowers reach an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, Soviet NOVOSTI news agency said Friday.

NOVOSTI said the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on Euromissiles did not mean "the problem of (British and French) nuclear missiles pointing at the Soviet Union was any less grave."

While the Soviet Union, the agency said, had "accepted momentarily to set aside the French and British nuclear potential" during talks on medium-range weapons, it could not "neglect the fact that London and Paris are carrying out long-term projects to modernize and increase their nuclear forces," and are therefore renouncing their earlier statements about adhering to nuclear disarmament.

The agency said that in the context of "the dismantling of intermediate U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe and an eventual reduction in strategic armaments" the British and French nuclear potential "is even more dangerous, and the Soviet Union has to take that into account."

Quoting U.S. research studies, NOVOSTI said the British nuclear force was "capable of hitting up to 21 million people and destroying 15 percent of the Soviet industrial base."

According to the agency, in the 1990s, the danger could increase to affect 68 million people and half of Soviet industrial plants.

NOVOSTI said the French nuclear arsenal had a current capacity to "exterminate 34 million people and destroy a quarter of Soviet industry. From now till 1995, it could affect up to 81 million people and destroy two-thirds of Soviet industry."

It said the "gratuitous allegations" about Europe's "nuclear vulnerability in the event of the dismantling of intermediate range nuclear forces (INF)" and the linking of an accord to solving of problems on conventional and chemical arms "seek to torpedo an exceptional perspective for disarmament."

Calling an agreement on INF "a practical solution to the problem of U.S. and Soviet strategic arms reductions," NOVOSTI concluded, "No doubt success in the area will depend largely on France and Britain's willingness to adhere to the nuclear disarmament process."

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIETS DISCUSS INF ISSUES WITH WEST EUROPEAN OFFICIALS

Yakovlev Meets Spanish Socialists

LD031233 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT 3 Mar 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 3 Mar (TASS)--Aleksandr Yakovlev, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting today with a delegation of the Spanish Socialist Labour Party [PSOE] which included members of the Executive Commission of the party, secretaries of the Federal Committee of the party, Guillermo Galeote, Elena Flores, F. Marugana and J. Corcuera.

Spanish comrades expressed high appreciation of the new Soviet peace initiative aimed at the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe which had been put forward in the statement of Mikhail Gorbachev of February 28. The Soviet side reiterated the firm intention of the CPSU to work for a radical turn for the better in the world situation and to advance towards a nuclear-free and safe world.

Karpov in UK

LD121726 Moscow TASS in English 1706 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] London March 12 TASS -- Ambassador Viktor Karpov, head of the Department for Arms Limitation and Disarmament of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has held talks here with representatives of the British Government. Specifically, he met Timothy Renton, British minister of state, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. They discussed some problems connected with the prospect of the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, as well as other problems which are of interest to the USSR and Britain.

Viktor Karpov held a press conference for British and foreign journalists.

Discusses Inspectors for Greenham Common

LD121622 London Press Association in English 1551 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Soviet inspectors could be based at Greenham Common where U.S. cruise missiles are deployed if there is an agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union for the removal of medium range nuclear weapons from Europe, Mr Victor Karpov, a top Soviet official said in London today.

Mr Karpov, a former chief negotiator at Geneva and now head of the Arms Control Directorate at the Soviet Foreign Ministry told a press conference at the Soviet Embassy: "This would be the first agreement that provides for the elimination of nuclear missiles. We feel it is important that the first agreement should be verified as quickly as possible so there is not cheating. There could be provision for on-site inspection. We would like to have inspectors at Greenham Common. We would allow inspectors at our bases where the SS-20's would be dismantled and destroyed."

Mr Karpov insisted that verification should be adequate, whether this was by challenge inspection to check that the agreement was being observed, or by on-site inspection. He estimated that an agreement with the U.S. could be reached at Geneva within six months.

Obukhov in Bonn

LD132137 AM TASS in English 2115 GMT 13 Mar 87

[Text] Bonn Mar. 13 TASS -- Deputy head of the USSR delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms Aleksey Obukhov, staying in Bonn, had conversations with the FRG Government's spokesman on disarmament matters Joseph Holik and in the FRG Foreign Ministry. During these conversations he set out the Soviet appraisal of the state of affairs at the Geneva talks after the conclusion of their seventh round. Aleksey Obukhov met in the USSR Embassy with representatives of the mass media of the FRG and a number of other countries and answered numerous questions of reporters about the new Soviet peace initiative, which envisages the elimination in Europe of medium-range missiles of the United States and the USSR.

Demichev Meets Portuguese Delegation

PM161433 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Portuguese Parliamentarians Received"]

[Text] P.N. Demichev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, received a delegation of the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic headed by its president Fernando Monteiro do Amaral in the Kremlin 13 March.

P.N. Demichev told them about the new stage of development the USSR has entered. He emphasized that the aim of restructuring is to make fuller use of the potential inherent in the very nature of Soviet society. The USSR, he said, is filled with a sense of responsibility for the fate of civilization. This is clearly reflected in its constructive comprehensive approach to the solution of problems pertaining to international security and in its peace initiatives, in particular its new proposal to achieve an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe without delay.

F. Monteiro do Amaral declared that he favors the Soviet efforts aimed at eradicating nuclear missiles from the continent of Europe and creating a nuclear-free world.

Both sides reaffirmed the expediency of new steps to further develop relations between the USSR and Portugal and to raise the level and expand the range of the problems discussed in the course of the Soviet-Portuguese political dialogue.

The talk, which passed in a frank and friendly atmosphere, was attended by A.E. Voss, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities; T.N. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; Ye.I. Perventsev, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy; other officials; and also Sergio de Sacadura-Cabral, Portuguese ambassador to the USSR.

The delegation had a conversation with A.E. Voss and chairmen and members of USSR Supreme Soviet standing commissions.

The meeting participants briefed each other on the activities of their respective parliaments. The guests showed lively interest in many aspects of restructuring and the process of further democratization of Soviet society. An exchange of views was also held on the prospects for the development and deepening of contacts between the two parliaments and on certain international problems.

Do Amaral News Conference

PM161225 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Mar Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Press Conference Held"]

[Text] Fernando Monteiro do Amaral, president of the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic (parliament), gave a press conference at the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow 13 March.

The head of the delegation emphasized that progressive public circles in Portugal are following the positive changes which are currently taking place in the Soviet Union with interest and approval.

"As an advocate of peace, I fully support the recent Soviet proposal for the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe and, incidentally, all other initiatives aimed at removing nuclear weapons not just from the face of the earth but also from people's consciousness," the Portuguese parliamentarian said. [Moscow TASS in English at 1839 GMT on 13 March, in a similar report on Do Amaral's new conference, adds at this point: He expressed surprise over his government's instructions saying it was "untimely" that the parliamentary delegation visit the USSR's Baltic republics, specifically Estonia.] "I hope to come back to your hospitable country more than once. Although the weather in Moscow was unusually cold for me, the warm and cordial contacts with Soviet people made up for this relative inconvenience."

European People's Party Group in Moscow

LD171155 Moscow TASS in English 1143 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 17 TASS -- A delegation of the European People's Party group at the Europarlament led by its chairman Egon Klepsch, member of the board of West Germany's Christian Democratic Union, has arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Parliamentary Group and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

They met today with a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation which spelled out the position of the Soviet public on European issues; namely those connected with ensuring stable security on the continent and strengthening mutual advantageous trade and economic cooperation. The attention of the guests was drawn to the Soviet peace initiative aimed at eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

On the same day the delegation met with a group of Soviet experts to discuss safety at nuclear power stations.

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW VIEWS INF OFFER'S EFFECT ON WORLD OPINION

LD221930 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 22 Mar 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh, publicist; Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio; and Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov, political observer of Central Television and All-Union radio]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello, Comrades! I should like to start our conversation by briefing you, colleagues and radio listeners, on the results of two opinion polls conducted in West Germany and Japan, and which seem to me to be interesting. In West Germany, 70 percent of those polled declared that in their opinion the Soviet Union, in putting forward its wide-ranging disarmament proposals, is the most serious in its aim to prevent war and to eliminating weapons of mass destruction. It is interesting that in this opinion poll only 9 percent of those polled think that the United States cares about guaranteeing peace and about disarmament.

A similar poll has been conducted in Japan; this sort of poll is carried out in Japan every spring. The question went as follows: Which country attracts you most? This year, twice as many of those polled included the Soviet Union as one of the attractive countries, compared with last year. Meanwhile, the number of those who previously considered the United States an attractive country declined 8 percent. We can thus see that a new political atmosphere is being created.

[Zorin] Why?

[Tsvetov] This is why.

[Zorin] Let's try and sort out what has happened and why this new political atmosphere is being established.

[Kobyshev] You know, I would like now to go on to cite a few more facts and examples which will lead us to certain generalizations. This week there have been debates in the Bundestag in which Vogel made the following statement -- Vogel you know, is chairman of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] parliamentary faction. He said that the time has now come to continue the policy of relaxation of tension. The changes in the Soviet Union provide an extra opportunity for this. It is in our interest to make use of this opportunity to deepen economic cooperation, expand cultural exchange and step up contacts between people. We have nothing to fear in so doing, Vogel said; on the contrary, giving up the portrayal of the other side as an enemy and engaging in the peaceful competition of social systems will have a beneficial influence on observance of human rights and on the stabilization of the situation in Europe. This is interesting.

[Zorin] Yes.

[Kobysh] It also is interesting that the NATO press service has announced that a 3-day colloquium is to be held on the problems of the Soviet economy. A study will be made of the 12th 5-Year Plan and what it means for business and economic cooperation.

[Tsvetov] A change in the general atmosphere in the world is manifested in this change of attitude toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is ceasing to appear as the evil empire in the consciousness of various strata of the population in Western countries.

Furthermore, these strata are ready to join the Soviet Union in coming out against the universal evil; that is, against the danger of war and nuclear weapons.

[Zorin] I should like us here to discuss the reasons for this change for the better which is taking place before our very eyes. First and foremost is the response to the whole series of the most important Soviet foreign policy initiatives, which are creating a new mood; and not just initiatives -- the 19-month Soviet moratorium when we exploded no nuclear devices and conducted no tests; and the declarations that at any moment we can prolong that moratorium as soon as the Americans take such a step and make such constructive proposals. All this has made a serious change in public opinion in the West and altered and broken down the stereotypes.

The processes taking place inside our country are also very influential. Not only our foreign policy actions, but also the process of restructuring, openness [glasnost], everything that excites you and me so much today, has a great influence on world policy and on the progress of the political process in the international arena. If one is talking about a positive influence, it must be said that since this process cannot be hushed up, the word glasnost, for instance, is now entering the international lexicon, just as the word sputnik did at one time. This cannot be hushed up or hidden from the world public, and, as a result, that image of the evil empire, as you said, which Western propaganda created year in, year out over a lengthy period of time, is being broken down. When the man in the street, brainwashed by the great propaganda machine, had the former image of the Soviet Union, it was easy to arouse fear of our country. Arousing fear means justifying military expenditure, the arms race, and so forth. Now a completely different image of the Soviet Union is emerging, and this has a positive effect.

[Tsvetov] Excuse me, Valentin Sergeyevich, I would just like to make two brief but important comments here. This change toward the Soviet Union, the increased liking for us, has not come about because we have betrayed our ideological positions; it is very important to underline that, on the contrary, everything we are doing now, both inside the Soviet Union and in the world arena, we are doing in order to strengthen socialism. The feelings of affinity we have aroused are dictated by the fact that we are doing this openly, that we are demonstrating a willingness and ability to compromise on the most serious foreign policy issues; that we have become more realistic in our assessments both of what is happening within our own country and of what is taking place beyond our borders. This arouses liking for us.

[Kobyshev] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke about this very pithily in his Kremlin speech to the participants of the forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity." A little over a month has elapsed since this speech, but these words of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee explain a great deal. I shall remind you of them. One of the most weighty consequences of restructuring in the Soviet Union is the strengthening everywhere and by all possible means of trust in our society. This also strengthens our confidence in the possibility of introducing the necessary trust into the sphere of interstate and international relations. We can see this happening now.

[Tsvetov] There is also another aspect. Some people in the United States are trying to prove that the restructuring in our foreign policy and the restructuring within the country are the result of the U.S. policy of strength. Well, I think that this can evoke only an ironic smile, for no one has ever managed to intimidate us, nor will they ever do so. I would like to recall the words of Horace, who said that brute strength falls by its own weight. But if our strength is accompanied by wisdom in the approach to the most diverse matters, then this combination cannot fail, cannot but be victorious.

[Tsvetov] You know what comes to mind in this connection? Wick and other U.S. and Western propagandists, being people capable of thinking, realize that eventually they will lose in the competition between the two systems, that a process has been initiated in our country which will eventually result in their defeat in the competition. An idea occurs to me: What if imperialism dares, at some stage, to take extreme measures to avoid this predictable defeat in the competition between the systems? What if this results, in the end, in imperialism taking a sharply aggressive position to save itself?

[Zorin] Well, possibly there are grounds for such misgivings, but one should not underestimate the positive processes of discovering the truth, the processes connected with the striving to avoid nuclear catastrophe which are taking place in major countries and which are gaining in influence on political development. I would like to direct our listeners' attention to yet another circumstance, to the fact that both the principledness and predictability of our policy are being displayed to the whole world. Let us have a look at the United States. Could one imagine what decision the White House will make tomorrow, in a month, or in a year? Could one foresee, with a certain degree of well-foundedness, the activity of the next president? And all this in a situation when the threat of nuclear death is hovering over the world. However, anyone who would take the trouble to acquaint him or herself with the plans set forth by the 27th congress, with the plans that have been developed and are now being implemented in the Soviet Union, comes to the conclusion that Soviet policy, including foreign policy, may be predicted. That policy may be forecast, and it inspires confidence. This is a very serious component related to the effect of the processes taking place in our country on the development of the international political process.

[Kobyshev] Of course, anyone who can read and think simply must come to the conclusion that the Soviet people are programmed for peace, because we need a strong and stable peace to fulfill all we have mapped out in our programs extending into the coming millenium. That is why the formulation of the question on the predictability of our course and, regrettably, on the complete unpredictability of what has been happening on the other side is very correct, in my opinion. Probably, the most shocking fact of this kind would be the events surrounding the ABM Treaty. The treaty signed in 1972 is now subjected to broad interpretations, to some interpretations suitable to current bosses of the White House. Who gave them the right to make those interpretations? The treaty was signed to benefit decades, if not centuries, in the future, and what will remain of the treaty if each side starts giving it its own interpretation? What will remain of peace?

[Zorin] And what will remain not just of the treaty, but international law in general? As far back as in ancient Rome the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* — treaties must be kept — was formulated as the basis of all international law. If U.S. leaders may act in such an unpredictable manner, then not only are they attacking the most important document of our times, but, in fact, they are undermining international law as such.

[Tsvetov] Taking up your idea of the predictability of our foreign policy and, on the contrary, of the unpredictability — hence, the dangerous character — of U.S. policy, one could come to the following conclusion: The results of the opinion polls I have cited were obtained in Western Europe and Japan. I think this process is going to expand, and, in my opinion, the time is not far away when similar results could also be obtained in the United States.

When it happens in the United States — and I believe that it will happen eventually — then U.S. leaders will simply be powerless to take such a reactionary turn in their course that could cast a slur on or cross out efforts directed toward lessening tension, strengthening peace, and banning nuclear arms. That is why one can look to the future with fairly strong optimism.

[Zorin] The more so if we take into account that the latest events have been showing that not only negative phenomena have been taking place in the international arena; the things that are happening now in connection with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's 1 March proposal on removing the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from launch positions in Europe and the response to this proposal provide certain grounds for optimistic evaluations.

[Kobysh] Yes, this is the beginning of something weighty and serious. It is interesting that there is already a practical response to this serious dialogue that has been started. After talks with French President Mitterrand, Belgian Prime Minister Martens said that in light of the new Soviet proposals on liquidating nuclear medium-range missiles, Belgium has developed a procedure prohibiting the deployment of 32 U.S. missiles not yet installed in its territory. By this, according to Martens, a kind of moratorium is being introduced that is intended to contribute to the signing of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on liquidating nuclear missiles of this type. In other words, there are already some specific practical results of the proposal we have put forward.

[Zorin] But we cannot fail to see that certain, very influential forces in the United States are far from giving up their positions so easily; particularly in Washington a very serious struggle is mounting around this issue.

While being aware of positive components of the response to the Soviet proposal, we cannot underestimate the strength of opponents to these proposals as well as the fact that, evidently, time, patience, endurance, and great efforts will be needed to make this real step toward disarmament be on a grand scale.

[Tsvetov] Opponents of the Soviet proposal exist not only in the United States; they also exist, of course, in Western Europe. In my view their arguments against the Soviet proposal boil down to three points. First, the Soviet strategic systems that do not come under the agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles are also capable of delivering a strike against the same targets in Western Europe. That's the first

point. The second point is that Soviet shorter-range intermediate-range missiles will continue to be a threat to Western Europe. Finally, there remains the Soviet superiority in conventional armaments. But here there is just one thing that is being forgotten: For the Soviet Union to make a proposal on reducing and eliminating strategic weapons and shorter-range missiles — and there are Soviet proposals on reducing conventional armaments [changes thought]; so in response to our proposal that medium-range missiles be eliminated in Europe, a kind of package is being put forward containing proposals of the greatest variety on extremely complicated disarmament problems. But when we offer a package of solutions, we are told that the West cannot accept a package. We remove one of the proposals from the package, we put it forward for discussion, and again they tell us: No, let's think about a package. The result is a kind of vicious circle. But it is not a vicious circle; it is a circle which has been set up by those who are opposed to nuclear disarmament and of whom — as you have correctly said — there are still quite a lot. What is it, then, that worries those opponents of the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles?

I would like to draw your attention to an article in the U.S. BOSTON GLOBE newspaper. It reads as follows: Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, assistant to the secretary — now, of course, as we know, he is the former assistant — do not want to sign any agreement with the Soviet Union because a return of warm relations between the superpowers will undermine support for major military spending by the United States, support which is already weak, and which will undermine the development [sozdaniye] of a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons. As you see, that is how it all can be explained quite simply.

[Zorin] I would like to draw our listeners' attention to the following circumstances which also have a bearing on what we have been talking about: I am referring to the very complex domestic political situation in Washington. Reagan finally gave a news conference this week for the first time in 4 months. Those organizing this news conference were counting on the President's being able to put an end at last to this scandalous Irangate-contras affair. Well, in the view of all leading observers the news conference, generally speaking, was not successful, and the President's position remains politically very vulnerable. More than that, I have the impression that his position is getting increasingly vulnerable. If, say, a month ago I had been asked whether impeachment were possible — that is what happened in the case of Nixon [as heard] — then I would definitely have answered: No, that's impossible; the U.S. ruling class cannot subject itself to such a costly exercise for a second time. But when I ask myself this question today, I can no longer say with the same conviction: No, impeachment is impossible. The external circumstances remain exactly the same. But the internal logic of the development of this scandal, which amounts to this, that more and more new circumstances are becoming known that seriously compromise both the administration and the President personally, are such that the situation might get out of control; today I would not take it upon myself to say with confidence that this crisis of the presidency cannot take on the most acute form.

[Kobysh] Valentin Sergeyevich, I am not inclined to think that Reagan might be subjected to the impeachment procedure. First of all, your own arguments remain valid, as far as I am concerned. I think that the U.S. ruling class, the forces which lead the largest country in the capitalist world, will not allow themselves such a shock again. There is another point which is quite complicated and quite difficult. Because of the shortage of time, I cannot explain in great detail, but there are some circles in the United States which think in a very realistic way — I would call them pragmatists — and they proceed along the lines that Reagan in his present condition, a

weakened Reagan, a Reagan disgraced by Irangate, may well be better than any U.S. President who follows him. This one might still do something good and positive, primarily in the area of international relations and in the area of contacts and talks with the Soviet Union. He might decide to sign some weighty agreement with us. Of course, in this regard we await with great interest the arrival here in April of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, and in general we are proceeding from the view that quite serious and businesslike discussions might take place leading to far-reaching consequences.

[Zorin] In all the circumstances under consideration one ought to bear in mind -- irrespective of whether the administration's position is getting stronger or more stable -- whether the skepticism of some of our listeners who express their views in letters, asking whether it is worth dealing with a president who is now so weakened, is not justified, because today what we are talking about is this: In the first place, we are talking about a situation in which one cannot afford to waste months and days, not to mention years; second, we are not talking about relations with some politician or other; we are talking about relations between states. In these interstate relations there are certain patterns. You mentioned the Shultz visit.

Naturally, when he travels he will have received some kind of mandate, not just from the President, but he will have received a mandate from some very influential circles in the United States. In my view, one of the most interesting processes taking place at the moment in the U.S. political arena is the process of the strengthening of the positions of -- you call them pragmatists -- realistically minded politicians. Just over a year ago their voices were scarcely heard; now they are playing a key role in the U.S. Congress. Their positions and their influence upon the foreign policy course are gaining strength, and under these conditions there is no foundation at all for a slackening of our efforts and thinking that one can just sit and wait without carrying out an active foreign policy of this kind.

[Tavetov] Concluding our conversation today, I would like to say the following: Given that the Soviet domestic and foreign policy is exerting an enormous influence on changes in the political atmosphere in the world, making it more suitable for carrying out specific and substantial measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war breaking out, the situation nevertheless remains serious. This situation requires that great attention be given to the attempts by those in favor of a nuclear arms race to bring to naught the process that is leading toward the rebirth of detente. Nevertheless, changes on the international arena are obvious and they inspire confidence in the ultimate victory of common sense. On that we take our leave of you. All the very best.

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET PAPER BERATES CANADA FOR ALLOWING U.S. MISSILE TESTS

PM051533 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Feb 87 First Edition p 5

[S. Kuznetsov article: "Alleged Threat and Cruise Missiles in Canada's Sky"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction, paragraphs 3 and 4 are boxed off from rest of item under the subhead "'We Don't Want To Be the Pentagon's Testing Range'"]

[Text] A telegram arrived at the editorial office:

The Pentagon has conducted a routine cruise missile flight test over northern Canada. The missile, launched from a B-52 bomber over the Beaufort Sea, flew 2,200 km over Canadian territory and landed by parachute on the border of Alberta and Saskatchewan Provinces. On the approaches to the landing area—the Cold Lake military base test range—U.S. and Canadian fighters staged a mock interception of the missile.

This was the seventh U.S. cruise missile test since a military agreement was concluded in 1983, turning Canadian territory into a Pentagon test range. At the beginning of last year two tests ended unsuccessfully. Halting the tests became one of the main demands of large sections of the country's public.

On the day of the test Canadian peace supporters held a protest demonstration against Ottawa's participation in the U.S. nuclear missile preparations. Demonstrations were held in Edmonton, in front of the Alberta legislative assembly building, outside the U.S. Consulate General building in Toronto, and also in a number of the country's other cities.

Canadians are amazingly carefree people. They sleep peacefully and do not know that a mortal danger is threatening them from the north, that is, from the USSR side. But Canada still has vigilant citizens who cannot be lulled with talk about peace and disarmament. For example, General Paul Manson, chief of the defense staff. Speaking recently at an annual conference of

defense associations, he stated with soldierly directness that "the Soviet Union is a real and direct threat to Canada's peace and security." "Despite Soviet pronouncements about a new era of improving relations between East and West, there are still few signs that Moscow seriously intends to show restraint," the general warned.

Does Canada's highest military officer really not know that the Soviet Union adhered to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions for more than 18 months? Perhaps he is unaware that the USSR announced a decision to adhere to the limits of the 1979 SALT II Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms despite its demonstrative violation by Canada's southern neighbor?

One could assume, of course, that Canadian generals do not read newspapers pay no attention to the chief of the defense staff's conjectures. Except that Perrin Beatty, Canada's minister of national defense, resorted to a similar attack almost simultaneously. Speaking at an Empire Club dinner in Toronto, he stated that "the gigantic Warsaw Pact conventional and nuclear forces in Europe create a real threat to West Europe's democratic ideals." Not troubling himself about any kind of proof, the Canadian minister concluded: "The threat to other Western democratic countries is also a threat to us." It might be thought that he knew nothing about either the Soviet program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the beginning of the next millenium, or the Soviet initiatives in Reykjavik, or the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals on the wide-scale reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, or the fact that it is precisely the United States and its NATO allies which are blocking the implementation of these measures.

It is a striking fact that these unseemly attempts are being undertaken at the very time when an appreciable turn for the better has been observed between our countries. Last fall saw an official visit to Ottawa by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister. Agreements on trade and on the promotion of economic, industrial and scientific-technical cooperation were extended. Canadian External Affairs Secretary Joseph Clark stated the Canadian Government's desire to renew contacts with the Soviet Union in the fields of science, education, and culture. A visit to the USSR by the leader of the foreign policy department is planned for this year.

In these conditions it is becoming increasingly difficult for the champions of Canada's unreserved emulation of Washington to justify involving the country in U.S. militarist preparations. Protests against tests of cruise missiles and other U.S. military technology on Canadian territory are growing in the land of the maple leaf. Demands to leave NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are becoming more and more insistent. Canadians fear, not without foundation, that the widening of NORAD's functions to encompass setting up a new early warning radar line in the Canadian Arctic will involve their country in the implementation of the dangerous "star wars" plans. More than 100 cities and localities in Canada have declared themselves nuclear-free zones.

Washington's obstructionist approach to disarmament questions is causing alarm in a certain section of Canada's ruling circles which can in no way be suspected of harboring sympathies toward the USSR. "Why must the Soviets have the monopoly on all reasonable and attractive initiatives in the arms control sphere?" the CITIZEN newspaper asks. "The Western democracies cannot continue to lose the battle for hearts and minds." The snag is that Washington and other NATO capitals are occupied not with the search for ways to peace but with seeking out possibilities for achieving military superiority over the USSR and whipping up the arms race. So the Canadian apologists for U.S. policy are having to resort to the worn-out device of intimidating people with the "Soviet military threat." This is a thankless task.

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CSO: 5200/1355

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW RADIO EVALUATES WESTERN STANCE ON VERIFICATION

LD062020 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1715 GMT 6 Mar 87

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Igor Surguchev]

[Text] All sorts of doubts and warnings are being voiced in some places in the West, including broadcasts by Western radio. I asked our Political Observer Aleksandr Zholkver to comment on these utterances:

[Zholkver] Above all, I should note that there are comparatively few of them. Moreover, even those Western politicians who, as a rule, give a hostile reception to all our initiatives, on this occasion have not only kept quiet, but have even become reformed, as it were.

However, at the same time one really cannot but remark that those who only quite recently were indignant at the Soviet package of disarmament measures are now themselves starting earnestly to link one aspect of arms reduction with another. Thus, for example, U.S. General Rogers, NATO Commander-in-Chief, is cautioning against an isolated agreement on medium-range missiles, since in that case West Europe would allegedly be confronted with a Soviet superiority in conventional weapons.

It is notable that Helmut Schmidt, the former chancellor of the FRG, decided to reject these warnings publicly. I should recall that it was precisely he who was once the initiator of the drawing up of the so-called Zero Option on medium-range missiles in Europe. In an interview for West German television, Schmidt stated literally the following: Rogers was cautioning against that as much as 6 years ago. I am deeply convinced that he was wrong then. He is wrong now, too. It is simply that there are always military people who do not have enough weapons and soldiers. I should add that as far as our country is concerned, we think that there are already more than enough soldiers and weapons in Europe. And we are in favor of a reduction in quantity and are ready to deal with that in parallel with the elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe.

In that connection, some people in the West are once again raising the question of verification. But how can one fail to remember in this regard that it is precisely the problem of the complexity of verification that has been used by

the West for many years as the main obstacle at various talks on arms reduction? Yes, the Soviet Union is in favor of the strictest international arms control. And thanks to our constructive proposals, for example, at the Stockholm Conference, several important confidence-building measures have already been agreed in that area. However, is it really possible to allow the problem of disarmament to be prevented from moving from deadlock again, under the pretext of the complexity of verification?

In this connection I would like to say just a little regarding the guesswork of some Western politicians on the question of the reasons which prompted our country to put forward a new initiative on that problem. Some people, even including President Reagan, are now attempting to present all this as some kind of success of the Western policy of force. But after all, that is not only an incorrect, but also a dangerous, interpretation. If it is accepted, one should continue to pursue the policy of force, a policy not of reduction, but of the build-up, of arms. That would mean playing with the fate of all mankind. And it is precisely because our country considers the policy of force to be hopeless and dangerous that we have made a new attempt to secure a serious improvement in the solution of the problem of curbing the arms race--nuclear and conventional, on Earth, and in space.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET PRESS CRITICIZES FRENCH RESPONSE TO INF PROPOSAL

'Discordant' Note in France

PM051503 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by unnamed own correspondent: "The Voice of Paris Sounds a Discordant Note"]

[Text] Paris -- A few hours after the Soviet Union proposed concluding an agreement to eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the French Foreign Ministry published a communique, whose essence boils down to the following: 1. The French Government's position on this question has not changed; 2. In view of the existing imbalance in conventional and chemical types of weapons in Europe, it is necessary to avoid the removal of nuclear weapons from West Europe.

We will leave on the communique writers' conscience the allegation of an imaginary imbalance of forces in the Warsaw Pact countries' favor and point out that the voice of official Paris has sounded a plainly discordant note among the positive responses to the new Soviet initiative in West European capitals. It has now become the norm that, whenever the Soviet Union advances a proposal aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, France at once demonstrates its allegiance to the bomb.

In his 16 February statement at the Moscow forum, M.S. Gorbachev showed the complete groundlessness of the nuclear deterrence doctrine, which is essentially a policy of threats. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference 2 days later, French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raimond declared that there is no alternative to the nuclear deterrence doctrine and again advocated keeping American Pershing and cruise missiles in West Europe.

In the early eighties, the slogan "Neither SS-20's nor Pershings" was taken up on the banks of the Seine. But now that Moscow is proposing the elimination of Soviet and American missiles, this initiative has been given an almost hostile reception in Paris.

At first, French official circles were opposed to the French nuclear forces' being taken into account in the general reckoning. The Soviet Union, as is known, made concessions on that issue. Now France does not want its neighbors to be delivered from transatlantic missiles. According to LE FIGARO, at the recent NATO meeting in Brussels, it was Paris that warned its allies of the "danger" posed by the Soviet "peace strategy" and the total disappearance of nuclear weapons.

To be fair, we will point out that a number of statesmen, including President Mitterrand, have repeatedly made statements in favor of reducing nuclear arsenals and achieving equilibrium at the lowest possible level. But here words have been and still are plainly at variance with deeds. Here is further confirmation of this: The draft of France's new military program for 1987-1991, which places chief emphasis on modernizing the nuclear triad, will be discussed at the spring session of parliament, which opens in early April. In short, the country is preparing to enter the third millennium fully armed with nuclear weapons.

To this end, Paris is continuing nuclear explosions at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific in defiance of protests from states in that region.

The times when the majority of French people supported the authorities on the issue of nuclear weapons are long gone. More and more French people now advocate their abandonment, consider it necessary to reduce spending on military purposes, and condemn the decision to deploy cruise missiles and Pershings in West Europe. According to a poll conducted by the newspaper LIBERATION, the majority of West Europeans, including French people, seek independence from the United States and NATO in the military respect and are certain that they themselves will be able to ensure their own defense, and do so by using conventional, not nuclear, arms. Only one French person in four considers it expedient to maintain military ties with the United States. "Uncle Sam's nuclear umbrella has lost its charm," LIBERATION concludes.

"The 'nuclear safe-conduct' is not infallible or endless," M.S. Gorbachev declared at the Moscow forum. "It could at any moment turn into a death sentence on mankind." It is precisely this that Paris stubbornly refuses to understand.

Mitterrand: French Deterrent

PM091153 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch under the general heading "Realism Should Triumph" and the headline: "In Accordance with French Interests"]

[Text] Paris -- "I familiarized myself with genuine interest with M.S. Gorbachev's recent proposals on U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles," French President F. Mitterrand has stated, addressing a cabinet session. "The prospect of scrapping these weapons accords with French interests and the cause of peace."

"As for France," the President continued, "it maintains its position: Its nuclear forces guarantee its security through deterrence and cannot be included in medium-range nuclear weapons or taken into account at the talks between the U.S. and Soviet sides."

At the same cabinet session, Prime Minister J. Chirac noted the coincidence of views on this question between the president and the government. France, he said, does not participate in the talks, since its deterrence forces are different in character from medium-range nuclear missiles.

According to AFP, F. Mitterrand's statement was aimed at amending the initial French reaction to the Soviet proposal, which was negative and discordant. [paragraph continues]

F. Mitterrand, an AFP telegram quoting the president's entourage stated, would not have had to amend Paris' reaction if the Foreign Ministry had consulted the Elysee Palace before issuing the communique. In the president's opinion, the position of the West European states with regard to the recent Soviet proposal should be coordinated.

Despite the fact that after a certain hesitation heads of state and government made a positive assessment of the Soviet initiative, a number of leaders of right-wing parties and the Socialist Party attacked the proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles and demonstrated their unshakable adherence to nuclear thinking.

Mitterrand Clarifies Stand

LD102306 Moscow TASS in English 2222 GMT 10 Mar 87

[Text] Paris March 10 TASS — President Francois Mitterrand of France reaffirmed that his country looked with approval at the Soviet-American talks on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, as proposed by the Soviet Union. President Mitterrand said so in his remarks in the French Diplomatic Press Association today.

Precisely Western countries, the French president went on, proposed the "zero option" in relation to the medium-range missiles in Europe and it would be wrong if they renounce their former stand only because it was the Soviet Union which advanced the idea that time.

"We are saying 'yes' to the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but I am happy that France is not taking part in them because they are dealing with the types of armaments we do not have," the French president said. This is why neither France nor Britain will have to give up their forces.

France, the president emphasized, will not hold talks on its strategic nuclear forces, because, in his words, they ensured deterrence and because the "security of France rests" precisely on them.

Given the current situation, he said, no one can demand a reduction in the French nuclear forces the nature of which is strategic.

Touching on the French tactical missiles with a small range (Hades and Pluton types) the president admitted that at a certain stage of Soviet-American talks concerning the comparable class of missiles the question of counting the French systems could arise. "When that problem emerges it will have to be discussed," Francois Mitterrand said.

The president said that France agreed with balanced disarmament in all fields and believed that it should be verifiable. He added that the security of France rested both on its deterrence forces and on the North Atlantic Alliance.

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET PRESS ON BRITISH RESPONSE TO INF OFFER

Thatcher Remarks Criticized

PM091239 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Krivopalov report under the general heading "Realism Should Triumph" and the headline: "Westminster on Moscow's Step"]

[Text] London -- Discussions in the House of Commons have shown that the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has aroused profound interest.

Naturally, it was no accident that the first question was asked by the Conservative P. Lilley, who asked the prime minister to confirm that without the West's firm stance this proposal would not have been made by the USSR.

M. Thatcher: Yes, the agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles was singled out as providing for progress in this area when I met with President Reagan last November [sentence as published]. The fact that Mr Gorbachev accepts this without linking it to SDI is a useful step forward. There is still a great deal of work to be done. I absolutely agree that the West's firm resolve was a decisive factor in our nearing this stage.

N. Kinnock. Labour Party leader: Assuming that the prime minister welcomes M.S. Gorbachev's proposal and the positive U.S. reaction to it, does she not agree that it would now be wrong to link the elimination of medium-range missiles with the reduction of operational and tactical forces as a precondition?

M. Thatcher: After meeting with President R. Reagan at Camp David, we agreed that priority should be given to medium-range missiles -- particularly in the light of operational and tactical systems, in which the USSR has an advantage, in order to deal with both at the same time.

Praising the West's "firm stance" as being virtually an incentive to progress at the talks on disarmament -- primarily nuclear disarmament -- means essentially turning everything upside down. How forgetful the prime minister is or how inefficient her advisers are in failing to remind M. Thatcher that it has long been established (including by London's Institute of Strategic Studies) that in terms of conventional arms, approximate equality of military forces exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Public Opinion 'Positive'

PM101651 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 87 First Edition p 1

[Own correspondent A. Maslennikov dispatch under the general heading "International Public Sees the New Peace Initiative as Realistic Path to Disarmament"]

[Text] London [subhead]

London's Chatham House, home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, has been host to the latest Soviet-British roundtable discussions involving political scientists and military strategy specialists from both countries.

Our meeting took place hot on the heels of M.S. Gorbachev's statement putting forward a Soviet proposal on signing an agreement on medium-range missiles, Academician Ye. Primakov, Soviet delegation leader, said. If you speak about our British colleagues' reaction to the Soviet proposal -- and it reflects the stance not only of Britain itself but, to a considerable extent, the whole of West Europe -- it has to be said that it is on the whole highly favorable. Our partners spoke about the fact that the Soviet Union has taken a major step toward the West, and one which will help bring their positions closer.

However, there is another trend present, whose representatives either through lack of information or deliberately, are attaching various kinds of conditions and "linkages" essentially designed to hamper the achievement of agreement.

On the whole, the roundtable discussions and numerous meetings we had in London show that public opinion in the country is albeit slowly, undergoing positive shifts and that the whole series of recent peace initiatives by the Soviet Union is having an impact.

J. Eberle, director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, said for his part that the meeting gave the opportunity to exchange opinions on important international security questions, particularly European ones. M.S. Gorbachev's new proposals were the main item on our agenda. The proposals undoubtedly have attracted enormous attention. There is a strong positive current in existence whose supporters consider that the ideas put forward by the Soviet leadership should lead to positive results. An agreement on medium-range missiles is in accord with both sides' interests. I think that such an agreement would constitute a first practical step in the attempts to reduce the hitherto absurdly high level of nuclear arms.

UK Seeks 'Obstacles' To Agreement

LD102036 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 10 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 10 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

Several years ago London in every way advertized the "zero option" proposed for resolving the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe and used it to justify the siting of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

Thanks to the new Soviet initiative, a realistic opportunity appeared for making that option a reality. Naturally enough the Tory government will find it embarrassing to protest against it, considering its past statements. But at the same time any amount of progress in nuclear disarmament plainly does not suit it. Hence, the choice of some other ways for putting up obstacles on the road toward a nuclear-free Europe.

One example of such an approach is the interview granted by the British secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to the ITV Television Company.

One can see in it the entire, if your permit, "gentleman's" set of arguments used by London to demonstrate how "complex" the process of elimination of medium range missiles in Europe is and how important it is to accompany it with a series of reservations and conditions.

First of all, in the opinion of the British secretary, an indispensable condition for an agreement on medium-range missiles is its linkage with the guarantee of the possibility for the U.S. to build up tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, because, as he views it, here lies the Soviet threat to Western Europe. But the British nuclear forces in any case remain "untouchable". Moreover, the British Government repeatedly stated that the country's nuclear forces should be modernized (in practice this means a more than ten-fold increase in their destructive power). It is not accidental that such a stand was described even in Great Britain as devoid of all logic.

Sir Geoffrey Howe makes accent on the "factor" of conventional armaments as the main trump card among all kinds of reservations. Things are pictured in such a way that without American missiles Western Europe may fall victim to the Soviet Union's "superiority" in conventional armaments and armed forces.

Nothing could be further from reality. In fact, there exists a rough balance in that sphere. The rt. hon. secretary of state would be well advised to study reports of the London Institute for Strategic Studies and the Brookings Institution (USA).

The latter said in its report that the correlation of conventional forces was not only closer to parity, but rather in the West's favor.

If we assess the correlation of conventional armaments and armed forces objectively, looking at facts, the picture would be as follows as regards the basic parameters: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have an approximately equal overall personnel strength and roughly equal amounts of artillery. The Warsaw Treaty is slightly superior in armor. NATO has an edge in the number of divisions ready for combat, in anti-tank systems, in fighter-bombers which is set off on the Warsaw Treaty's side by a somewhat bigger number of air defense interceptor-fighters. In general, there exists a rough balance of conventional armaments.

So why did the British secretary find it necessary to take into the light the obsolete bugbear of the "Soviet military threat"? The answer to this question is found in his own pronouncement to the effect that the Tory government remained committed to the idea of maintaining nuclear defense, including independent British nuclear deterrent.

Sir Geoffrey Howe is concerned over the possibility that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. may make the first step toward a nuclear-free Europe. And this indeed poses a threat to the British nuclear forces, to Britain's "nuclear status". London is clearly unwilling to give up its membership in the nuclear club of the "chosen ones".

Seeks To Keep Own Deterrent

LD131428 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1350 GMT 13 Mar 87

["Liquidate the Nuclear 'Swords' and 'Daggers' -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Mar (TASS) — TASS military affairs observer Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The possibility of making major decisions in the disarmament field has arisen thanks to the initiative of the Soviet Union. It is precisely in this favorable atmosphere that the official visit to the USSR of the head of the British Government, Margaret Thatcher, is to take place. In this connection, the statement by Geoffrey Howe, the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs of Great Britain, assuring that "Britain will play its role" at the talks between the USSR and the United States in Geneva, including during the prime minister's visit to Moscow, is most indicative. Without doubt, many British people are now pondering the question: How can their country help the process of nuclear disarmament, and is the British Government ready to undertake such an important mission?

The questions are not simple, and the complexity of the reply to them is connected with the policy of the present British leadership. Mrs Thatcher has called the Soviet proposal to destroy medium-range missiles in Europe "a good step forward". But concerning the final goal, the positions of the Soviet and British Governments clearly diverge. The USSR considers solving the problem of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles as the first step on the road to a nuclear-free Europe, completely freeing the world from nuclear weapons. The prime minister of Great Britain has more than once declared that Great Britain cannot build its defense only on conventional weapons. According to the philosophy being preached by her, nuclear weapons are almost a boon, and there is no alternative to nuclear strategy.

Let us recall that immediately after the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, Mrs Thatcher immediately went to Washington where she passionately sought to convince President Ronald Reagan not to cross the 50 percent line in reductions in strategic offensive armaments and to give up a commitment to eliminate them in a 10-year period. What aim then was she pursuing in this? It is quite clear that the aim is to defend the British nuclear potential and to preserve the privileged "nuclear club" and one's own place in it in order to be somehow different from other Western states. After all, London had at one time been promising "with time to join" the USSR and the United States, if they should agree to a substantial reduction in their nuclear forces. Now that real possibilities are appearing for beginning the process of nuclear disarmament and a real threat has arisen to the imaginary privileges accorded by Britain's nuclear status, the promise once given has become quite undesirable, and has become a burden for the Tory government.

Mrs Thatcher is trying not to destroy British nuclear weapons, but to increase them. For according to plans, the British Navy alone will step up the quantity of nuclear warheads from 64 to 512 units, and the overall nuclear potential of Great Britain will be increased to 1,088 charges.

Even after Reykjavik, statements about the continuity of British plans to improve and build up the nuclear forces repeatedly came from the banks of the Thames. The prime minister herself pointed out in answer to a question in Parliament that even in the event of substantial cuts in Soviet and U.S. strategic potential, Great Britain does not intend to abandon modernization through purchase of the "Trident" missile systems. Official circles in London certainly do not want to reject participation in the SDI program, although it is well understood there that this program hinders the conclusion of agreement on cutting strategic arms.

I am sure that Moscow will always share the concern of any guest for the security of the latter's country and will strive together with them to find the shortest possible road to the liquidation of nuclear weapons and reduction of conventional weapons to the minimum that would ensure mutual security. This is all founded on an essential condition, that of concern for mutual and universal security. At the same time, it is hardly likely that people in our capital will understand the desire to keep the nuclear "swords" and "daggers" and the desire to be content with the "balance of terror." In the nuclear-space age all this threatens both our common European home and the whole of mankind.

Other UK Reaction Noted

PM181204 Moscow KONSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA In Russian 18 Mar 87 p 1

[Own correspondent Yu. Sagaydak report under the rubric "Notes Apropos": "Looking Over your Shoulder?..."]

[Text] London — The new Soviet peace initiative on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe was greeted in the British Isles both with approval and with understanding. It won the support of representatives of the country's biggest mass antiwar organization — the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The British Peace Assembly appealed to M. Thatcher's government "speedily to make use of the opportunities available." Labor Party leader Neil Kinnock stated that the USSR's major new foreign policy initiatives make it possible to take a step forward in the cause of nuclear arms reduction. Social Democratic Party leader David Owen described the report from Moscow as "remarkable news." David Steel, head of the Liberal Party, for his part described the Soviet initiatives as "very serious" and stressed that it is incumbent on the British Government to give an "immediate and positive response."

And what do they think about it in the Tory camp, at Number 10 Downing Street? Noting that the proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles is a "good step forward," the head of the ruling Cabinet at once stipulated that Britain cannot accept it forthwith. The reasons? None were given. But there was heartfelt talk of the "Soviet military threat," the West's defenselessness, the idea that "it is dangerous to trust the Russians. A strange view. Strange, since the Soviet proposals largely correspond to the so-called "zero option" which the West once upheld so zealously.

And what about the increased range operational and tactical missiles stationed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union since the start of the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe, government spokesmen are asking in Parliament. And what about on-site inspection [proverka]? After all, the Russians could practice deception if you do not keep an eye on them, prominent politicians say, "sounding the alarm" in the press.

Excuse me, but all this is clearly and specifically dealt with in M.S. Gorbachev's statement. The document says unequivocally that in the event an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles is signed with the United States, the Soviet Union will immediately begin to withdraw increased range operational and tactical missiles. It could not be clearer. But no, those who like to muddy the waters continue to go on about these operational and tactical missiles as if they had not read the Soviet proposal carefully. One sometimes has the impression that they are breaking down open doors....

As for on-site inspection, the Soviet Union is in favor of carrying out such inspections where necessary, along with the use of national means of verification, as the Soviet leadership has stressed repeatedly. All the same, the word "inspection" ["proverka"] is repeated again and again in any commentary by British officials.

Incidentally, there was nearly embarrassment over this on-site inspection. At the beginning of last week an emergency conference of NATO representatives was convened in the Pentagon, at which, as THE GUARDIAN'S correspondent reports, there was energetic discussion of the question of... how to avoid on-site inspection. The Soviet Union's readiness to carry out such inspections, which the West has been going on about insistently for many years, caught the NATO bloc military experts unaware, so to speak. [paragraph continues]

"Nobody wanted Russians at the Greenham Common base," THE GUARDIAN says, quoting a remark by a West European representative. The Russians cannot be allowed onto our facilities, where important secrets are concentrated, another echoes him. And therefore they come to the conclusion that in the event of an agreement being concluded on medium-range missiles, they should confine themselves "basically" to technical means of verification [proverka], allowing on-site verification [kontrol] only in exceptional cases. So there.

"In my view there are several reasons why the head of the ruling cabinet has taken this position," A. Long, secretary of the British National Union of Students, said in a conversation with our correspondent. "The first is that on the eve of parliamentary elections, she believes the Conservative government should take a tough line on defense so as to win popularity among the Britons. In fact, I do not believe that is so -- many people in Britain want the government to take a responsible line on the question of disarmament. I am convinced that the attitude to this problem will be reflected in the general election. The second element is that London cannot now pursue a fully independent course on questions of world policy. But these tactics of looking over your shoulder at 'uncle' will do Britain no good, and many Britons are against allowing our foreign policy to be formed across the ocean."

Howe Brussels Speech Hit

LD181123 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 18 May 87

[Igor Surguchev commentary]

[Text] [Announcer] British Foreign Secretary Howe, speaking at the Belgian Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels, welcomed the proposal from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to get rid of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In Howe's words this proposal for the first time opens up real prospects for a tangible cut in nuclear weapons. At the same time the British minister called on West European countries of NATO to build up their military might. Here is a Mayak commentary, with Igor Surguchev at the microphone:

[Surguchev] Naturally it is delightful that the Foreign Office chief supports the idea of removing U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe and, if we are to judge by the AFP dispatch, without any reservations or links with other disarmament problems in its implementation. This can only be welcomed, bearing in mind that some in the West are hurrying to pile up artificial obstacles on the road to implementing the Soviet proposal. However, you will agree that a positive approach to resolving the problem of medium-range weapons is scarcely compatible with appeals to build up the so-called defense efforts of the European members of NATO. Mr Howe, as the saying goes, began cheerily and ended sadly.

It follows from his logic that while the USSR and the United States are ready to undertake a substantial cut in their armaments, Western European must intensively arm itself. It is obvious that this is the logic of militarism, and not disarmament for which mankind thirsts. It looks especially strange against the background of the Soviet Union's readiness to eliminate medium-range missiles on its European territory, which, as people were stating even recently in the West, create a serious threat to the security of Western Europe. If this threat is removed, then why do West European states have to strengthen their so-called military might? I will point out, incidentally, that the theory used by the British foreign secretary -- and not by him alone -- of the need for defense against the Soviet threat was always and remains a (?thoroughly) false one insofar as the USSR has never shown aggressiveness toward Western Europe or other countries.

Thus, Howe and those who think like him, are not concerned about defense in calling on European members of NATO to step up the arms race. They are moved by the aspiration to keep Western Europe outside the process of disarmament, and through an insane build-up of military might among the European countries of NATO to win military advantage for that bloc in the event of equal cuts in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Moreover, in a similar way, they want to gain advantage in nuclear weapons since Britain and France are continuing to accumulate and perfect them at an intensified pace.

Between the declarations from London and Paris in support of disarmament measures and their actions in practice there is still a gap. But it is time for them to show restraint in the military field and thus to promote the process of disarmament, primarily nuclear.

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: BELGIUM RECONSIDERS MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

LD191829 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 19 Mar 87

[Text] Paris March 19 TASS -- In view of the latest Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, Belgium has drawn up a procedure making it possible not to deploy those 32 American missiles which have not yet been introduced in its territory. This announcement has been made here by Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens after his talks with French President Francois Mitterrand. This moratorium of a sort, as the Belgian Government characterizes it, should contribute to the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement to eliminate nuclear missiles of this type in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FRG RESPONSE TO INF PROPOSAL VIEWED

CDU/CSU Position Criticized

FM100921 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Yakhontov dispatch: "Common Sense Gaining Ground; FRG Politicians and Press on New Soviet Initiatives"]

[Text] Bonn, 6 Mar -- "In separating the problem of medium-range missiles from the entire range of arms, M.S. Gorbachev has removed the most difficult of all the obstacles before the decisive phase of the East-West talks. It is essentially a proposal to break through the deeply echeloned walls of mutual distrust.... This means that the arms race can be halted," the Bonn newspaper GENERAL ANZEIGER editorialized. The newspaper published the full text of the Soviet document, allowing its readers to judge for themselves about the essence of the proposals contained in it.

Even the FRG Government has reacted unusually swiftly -- no more than an hour after the radio and TV brought to the banks of the Rhine the news from the banks of the Moscow River, an official Bonn spokesman already was stating that the cabinet welcomed the Soviet proposals and hoped that the USSR and the United States would soon hold talks. True, Federal Chancellor H. Kohl is still silent. Local observers believe that he will not speak out on the subject before 17 March, when he will issue the new cabinet's program statement.

As for Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher, he has recently been in great demand. All the mass media wanted to know what the world's longest-serving foreign minister would say about the Soviet proposals. H.-D. Genscher's first statement was published back on 2 March. Since then the minister has had to give repeated interviews, supplementing and developing what he said.

What ideas in his recent statements attract attention? In particular, the minister recalled that the "zero option" was originally a Western demand. Now it can be implemented thanks to the USSR's realistic position. In the West, the minister said, the opinion is gaining ground that the "zero option" and the talks that would follow it in order to establish equal ceilings for operational-tactical missiles are in line with European interests. As for the difficulties of monitoring (kontrol) or verification (proverka), they are entirely soluble. FRG Economics Minister M. Bangemann, chairman of the free Democratic Party -- to which Genscher belongs -- was also positive. He warned against any attempts to hedge the Soviet proposals around with additional conditions.

V. Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] faction in the Bundestag, told this PRAVDA correspondent:

"The faction welcomes the fact that, in making its new disarmament proposals, the Soviet Union has cleared away one of the main obstacles preventing the conclusion of an agreement to implement the 'zero option.' It is now a matter of ensuring that the Geneva talks are held rapidly and are geared to reaching a result which could ultimately resolve outstanding difficult issues."

It is a question, for instance, of ensuring that an agreement on a zero option for medium-range missiles (SS-20, Pershing-2, and cruise missiles) contains a specific commitment that further talks will be held in order to ensure that the next step concerns the reduction of operational-tactical missiles and that both sides are entitled to equal ceilings. In other words, Ruche believes, the Soviet Union should give West Europeans the same right of security that it enjoys itself. Finally — the "zero option" must be reliably verifiable (kontroll), which also envisages on-site inspection (provorka). Judging by our conversation, roughly the same viewpoint is held by another person in the Bonn Defense Ministry — State Secretary L. Ruche.

On the whole, these figures stand by the government position, although Mr Ruche, if one ponders his words, demands the "right" to "arms upgrading" — only now in the shape of small missiles. I do not think that it would be sensible to scrap one class of nuclear missile arms and simultaneously build up another. But there are figures in Bonn who go much further in their stipulations. For instance, A. Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU faction, and other like-minded people on the extreme right wing of this bloc are trying to state their maximum program, whose aim is to block any agreement. Discussing these in the FRG who cannot imagine a world without missiles, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU raises confusion and panic in their ranks. They had thought, the newspaper writes, that the "zero option" was a toy that could be given to stupid people advocating peace, since you could be completely sure that the Soviet Union would be intransigent. But Gorbachev has ruined their entire game."

DIE WELT — that mouthpiece of the FRG's most reactionary forces — rumbles and thunders. It is angry at the positive reaction in the world to the USSR's proposals. The newspaper roundly attacked W. Altenburg, formerly general inspector of the Bundeswehr and now chairman of NATO's Military Committee. This by no means left-wing military man "went so far" as to react positively to the USSR's initiative, stating that it "will make the United States act" and "takes NATO's interests into account."

To put it in a nutshell, the Soviet Union no sooner clears away one impediment to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and achieving disarmament than volunteers immediately come forward to erect another. But can such a thing really go on forever under present conditions?

The overwhelming majority of the West German population, a major party such as the Social Democratic Party, as well as the "Green" Party and the German Communist Party [DKP], the antiwar movement, and many trade union and other organizations actively support the USSR's 28 February proposal. They are demanding that the FRG Government finally heed the voice of the country's public and use its influence on the White House to urge it to not miss this historic chance leading to nuclear disarmament. DKP Chairman H. Mies sent a telegram to the Bundestag chairman, all its factions, and the chancellor urging them to hold a special parliamentary session to debate the Soviet initiative and support it in the interests of creating a Europe free from the nuclear threat.

Genscher, Woerner Differ

LD122155 Moscow TASS in English 2138 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Bonn March 12 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov reports:

An agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe would be an unprecedented epoch-making step whose implementation would ensure security for Europe and would positively influence East-West relations.

This has been stated by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, minister of foreign affairs of West Germany, who spoke today in Bundestag during a debate held on the demand of the Greens Party that dealt with the recent Soviet peace initiative.

Alfred Mechterheimer, deputy of Bundestag from the Greens Party, said that all the groups in Bundestag should support the proposal on concluding a separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. He pointed out that the immediate discontinuation of the deployment of cruise missiles in Western Europe, including West Germany, would be a concrete contribution to disarmament. Waltraud Schoppe, another deputy from the Greens Party, pointed out that the agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles would pave the way to other disarmament agreements. Karsten Voigt, expert of the Social Democratic Group for Foreign Policy Problems who also took part in the debate, urged to conclude an agreement on intermediate-range missiles as soon as possible and without any reservations.

A speech of Manfred Woerner, FRG defense minister and representative of the right wing of the Christian Democratic Union struck a different note. Although he did not turn down point-blank the "zero option" on intermediate-range missiles, he again spoke at length about the alleged 'superiority' of the Soviet Union in conventional armaments and stated that Europe could not give up nuclear weapons altogether.

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: EAST, WEST GERMANS DISCUSS MISSILE WITHDRAWALS

Honecker, Lafontaine

LD122127 Moscow TASS in English 2007 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Berlin March 12 TASS -- The consolidations of peace is the main task of the present. This was declared by the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, chairman of the GDR Council of State Erich Honecker and Minister-President of the Government of Saar Land, the FRG, Oskar Lafontaine.

During a conversation held here today they emphasized great importance of the initiative of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev for an immediate conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the USA on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. The GDR leader said in this connection that the aim of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons is feasible. An important initial step in this direction would be taken with the removal of medium-range missiles from Europe. Erich Honecker pointed to the need of stepping up efforts in conditions of a tense international situation in order to remove the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik showed that practical steps toward disarmament are not just necessary but possible. This chance must not be sacrificed to the U.S. plans of Star Wars. The plans of the militarisation of outer space will open a new phase of the arms race, will enhance the danger for all peoples. It was deplored that the United States had not joined in the Soviet Union's moratorium in any nuclear explosions.

The sides emphasised great political importance of the joint initiatives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany which show that both German states can contribute to the ensurance of peace in Europe. In this connection Oskar Lafontaine went along with Erich Honecker's statement that the ensurance of peace remains a key issue also in relations between the GDR and the FRG.

Honecker, Spaeth

LD162253 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Text] Berlin March 16 TASS -- Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and chairman of the Council of State of the GDR, received Lothar Spaeth, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union of the FRG and Baden-Wuerttemberg minister-president, here today.

During the talk held in a businesslike and frank atmosphere both sides stated that the prime goal of modern politics was to secure and strengthen peace. This was the key issue in relations between the GDR and the FRG.

Erich Honecker emphasised that the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik had confirmed the possibility of reaching practical agreements in the sphere of disarmament. The chances that have emerged should not be sacrificed to the U.S. "Star Wars" programme.

The GDR hails and supports the proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to conclude a treaty on the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The GDR leader said that as the issue of missiles concerned both the GDR and the FRG, he had called on Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the FRG to support the Soviet initiative and to positively influence the United States.

Lothar Spaeth expressed his approval of the appraisal that viewed the Soviet proposal as creating the possibility to begin curbing the arms race and to start disarmament in Europe. He said the FRG favoured ridding Europe of the medium-range missiles.

Both sides stated that relations between the GDR and the FRG were an important element of European cooperation. If they are guided by their duty in securing peace, they will be able to favourably influence the international climate.

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CSO: 5200/1372

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET PRESS ON BLOC SUPPORT FOR INF PROPOSAL

Mongolian Leader

LD032259 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT 3 Mar 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar March 3 TASS — The Mongolian people fully support and approve of the proposal of the Soviet leadership contained in the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the set of questions at the talks and concluding a separate agreement on it with the USA, said Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Addressing here today a meeting of senior officials of the party and the government, he described the fresh Soviet initiative as a major step directed at the implementation of the comprehensive programme for ridding mankind from nuclear weapons. Its implementation would contribute to strengthening the fundamentals of peace and security in Europe and all over the world. The international community has every right to expect from the USA a positive attitude to the fresh Soviet proposal.

The initiatives contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement, Jambyn Batmonh noted, are a convincing and graphic example of new political thinking and a constructive approach to the resolution of the most important international issues.

PRAVDA Cites Zhivkov Endorsement

PM091253 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar First Edition p 1

[From roundup of PRAVDA own correspondent and TASS reports under the general heading: "For Europe's Peaceful Future. Foreign Responses to M.S. Gorbachev's Statement"]

[Text] Sofia, 5 Mar — The people and government of Bulgaria warmly hail and support the initiative advance in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which is further proof of the sincere, farsighted, and dynamic nature of Soviet foreign policy and a model of the new political thinking and the new approach to international affairs. This is stated in the reply published today of T. Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, to a RABOTNICHESKO DELO question.

The Soviet initiative, the Bulgarian leader pointed out, is an inalienable part of the historic program of the USSR and its allies to create an all-embracing system of international security. There is no doubt that, in advancing the noble new initiative, the Soviet Union is guided by the desire to revive the spirit of Reykjavik and give a strong boost to the USSR-U.S. talks on ending the arms race and on the final and irrevocable elimination of mass destruction weapons in the name of the most lofty and humane goal of saving civilization and life on the planet.

The Soviet leader's proposal is well founded and timely: The process of nuclear disarmament must begin in European territory -- the area of the planet most saturated with this kind of weapon.

We believe that an improvement in the international situation demands indefatigable efforts not only on the part of militarily powerful states but also by medium and small countries. Guided by this understanding, the BCP and the Bulgarian Government are implementing a consistent and principled policy of peace and equitable international cooperation. As we have repeatedly declared, there are no nuclear weapons on Bulgarian territory. The Bulgarian people have a profound interest in reducing arms and in strengthening peace and the security of all states.

Bulgaria is doing and will do everything in its power to develop fruitful cooperation and good-neighborliness in the Balkans and in Europe. Its efforts in creating a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons on the Balkan Peninsula are also aimed at this.

I am profoundly convinced, T. Zhivkov pointed out, that the new Soviet proposal will be supported by the broadest public circles in all countries. We continue to be ready to cooperate actively with governments, political parties, organizations, and movements which are waging a struggle for a nuclear-free world, for a world without wars or weapons.

Atanasov Welcomes Proposal

LD071351 Moscow TASS in English 1325 GMT 7 Mar 87

[Text] Sofia March 7 TASS -- Georgi Atanasov, chairman of Bulgaria's Council of Ministers, has pointed out a great importance of the new Soviet initiative which was proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), on February 28. "We fully support the proposal on immediate conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe," Georgi Atanasov said when speaking at a meeting with Taha Yasin Ramadan, first deputy prime minister of Iraq, visiting here.

Honecker Reiterates Support

LD081942 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 8 Mar 87

[Text] Berlin March 8 TASS -- "The German Democratic Republic (GDR) supports the Soviet Union's new important initiative concerning the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. The initiative gives an opportunity really to make the European Continent a zone free from nuclear weapons," Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG), chairman of the State Council of the GDR, stated today at a reception given by the SUPG Central Committee on the occasion of the International Women's Day.

"We are for the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe because it is essential to fight for peace in practice, not in words," the GDR's leader emphasized.

"If medium-range missiles disappear from the territory of Europe, there will be no need any longer for shorter-range theatre missiles either. It will be possible to solve these issues through talks, too."

Polish Sejm Supports Proposal

LD190047 Moscow TASS in English 2151 GMT 18 Mar 87

[Text] Warsaw March 18 TASS -- The Sejm of the Polish People's Republic has met with special interest and support the proposal of the Soviet Union on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, which creates in this continent a situation promoting a new approach of European countries to the overcoming of existing barriers.

Poland will actively support the Soviet proposal. This has been pointed out in a resolution adopted today by a session of the Sejm that deals with the foreign policy of Poland. The Sejm recognizes and fully supports the Soviet proposals aimed at ridding the earth of nuclear weapons by the end of the current century.

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CSO: 5200/1372

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV 'OPTIMISTIC' ON CSCE TALKS

AU070525 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 3 Mar 87 p 4

[Interview with Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna CSCE meeting, by Tsocho Kumanov, SOFIA PRESS correspondent in Vienna — date of interview not given]

[Text] [Kumanov] General Tatarnikov, the problems of security play the most important role in the debates at the Vienna CSCE meeting. [paragraph continues]

Can you describe the conclusions that can be drawn from the present stage of the discussions?

[Tatarnikov] The Vienna forum entered the decisive stage of discussion and of editing the proposals submitted on the subjects of security and cooperation in Europe, including the military aspects. However, if we consider the work in our group, which is discussing the military questions, I must admit that the situation is very strange. On the one hand, we have the proposals of the socialist countries -- Poland's proposal on a second stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and on Disarmament in Europe; the proposals of the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR, and the CSSR on the development of military detente on the continent. Numerous proposals on disarmament were also submitted by Romania and proposals on cooperation were submitted by Yugoslavia. We think these are important questions, directly linked to security. On the other hand, we regret the total absence of NATO proposals in this context. The work is proceeding toward its conclusion and we still cannot find any indications of agreement between the proposals submitted by NATO and the Warsaw Pact member countries. Nevertheless, certain optimistic notes can be heard in the course of discussion -- the idea of greater security, of the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe is breaking through.

[Kumanov] Can you support this statement by specific examples?

[Tatarnikov] At the meeting in the French Embassy between representatives of socialist and Western countries, which was devoted to organizational questions, we agreed when, how, and where to hold the next meeting and who should chair it. The debates on disarmament will continue at this next meeting. I would like to stress at the same time, however, that despite this meeting, not everything is resolved as it should be in the military sector. NATO did not invite the nonaligned and neutral countries to the meeting at the French Embassy. We declared that these countries are playing an important role in the process of disarmament and their absence is against the rules.

[Kumanov] Why does the West obstruct the achievements of specific steps in the direction of disarmament? Why does it try to direct the discussion into the channels of secondary questions?

[Tatarnikov] When we declare that the disarmament questions are very important, we mean that this applies to the same extent both to the Soviet Union and the socialist community and to the NATO member-countries. The West, however, adopted the following stand at a certain point: The most important thing is to solve the question of conventional weapons. Let us begin by reducing them, then we will deal with nuclear arms. When we proposed the program on nuclear disarmament, the West began talking about some kind of imbalance, claiming conventional and nuclear arms should be simultaneously reduced. Why is this? It is because the data with which the West is speculating is provided by the CIA and propaganda centers. We declared that we cannot conduct serious talks on this basis. Our stand is: Let us discuss things, clarify the questions, and not invent arguments about some kind of alleged lack of balance.

Why is the West trying to avoid this approach? Because it is in contradiction with NATO doctrine, with the myth about the alleged Soviet "military threat;" hence, the difficulties facing the Western representatives who are forced to prove the existence of a tremendous power which allegedly threatens Western Europe. This is why we raised the issue of a transition from the doctrine of threat to the doctrine of defense. I will tell you we intend to submit such a proposal to the forum. Only through a transition to the defense doctrine can we save Europe and mankind from annihilation. It is quite ridiculous to presume that the Soviet Union might be threatened with military strength.

[Kumanov] Do you think the new way of thinking is making a breakthrough in the sphere of security?

[Tatarnikov] We submitted a proposal on this subject at the Vienna meeting. To put it briefly, we must find a way out of the vicious circle caused by long years of fruitless talks. We must apply a new approach and a new way of thinking to these debates. Stockholm is an example for the new way of thinking. As a result of dynamic talks and bold proposals on our part, an important document on confidence building and security measures was adopted at the Stockholm meeting. As a military expert, I can say it is particularly important today to transfer the new way of thinking to the military sector and, in first place, to the sphere of security because, as M.S. Gorbachev declared at the Moscow peace forum, either the political way of thinking will be restructured in conformity with the requirements of our epoch, or civilization and life on earth will disappear forever. The U.S. concept that the outpost [predniya kray] of U.S. defense must go through Europe, for example, belongs to the outdated way of thinking.

At the same time, according to the new way of thinking, the West must renounce its aggressive concepts about the nuclear first strike. Military doctrines must be based on defense principles. We propose to break with the old way of thinking and to renounce the striving to safeguard one's own security at the expense of the security of other countries. This is the only method of eliminating the remnants of distrust, confrontation, and enmity and of guaranteeing a lasting peace.

Regardless of how complicated the questions discussed at the Vienna meeting might be, we are optimistic and we expect a constructive conclusion.

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CSO: 5200/1362

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: CSCE REPRESENTATIVES MEET VIENNA PEACE ACTIVISTS

Helsinki Accords Implementation Stressed

LD161843 Moscow TASS in English 1827 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 16 TASS -- Ways and methods of accelerating the all-European process for promoting international mutual understanding and cooperation were central to the discussions held here today between the participants in the current meeting of representatives of the states participants in the meeting on security and cooperation in Europe and the fourth Vienna dialogue on detente and disarmament.

The heads and members of the delegations of a number of countries at the meeting of representatives of the states participants in the conference on European security and cooperation spelled out the stands of their countries on the all-European process. Special attention was devoted to the role of the public in implementing the Helsinki accords.

Nuclear-Free Europe Urged

Moscow TASS in English 20001 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 16 TASS -- The 4th Vienna Meeting-Dialogue for Disarmament and Detente ended here today. It was attended by representatives of political and parliamentary circles, anti-war, trade union and women's organizations from more than 60 countries of all continents.

A statement "For a Europe Free of Medium-Range Missiles, for a Nuclear-Free Europe, for a Nuclear-Free World" was published on the last day of the conference. It was sponsored by representatives of Belgium, Britain, the GDR, Italy, Holland, the United States, the Soviet Union, the FRG and Czechoslovakia. They welcomed the proposals made by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to fully eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe.

Also adopted was an open letter to the Vienna meeting of representatives of the member states of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. The letter stressed the vital need of taking urgent and effective steps in the interests of eliminating nuclear arms and ensuring mutual trust and equal security for all.

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CSO: 5200/1362

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

KASHLEV SPEAKS AT PACT-NATO CONSULTATIONS—TASS—During scheduled consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries here today, the Soviet representative, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev, expounded the Soviet Union's approach to the objectives and mandate of the proposed new talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It was noted that a wide-scale program on that score had been set forth in the Budapest message adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member-countries in June 1986. The latest consultations between representatives of Warsaw Pact countries and those of NATO in Vienna have ended. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1930 GMT 16 Mar 87 LD]

MBFR SESSION ENDS 19 MARCH—Vienna March 19 TASS—A concluding full-delegation session of the regular round of the talks on mutual reductions in the armed forces and armaments in central Europe was held at Vienna's international centre, the Hofburg Palace, today. Those present were addressed on behalf of the Warsaw Treaty member states by Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak, the leader of the Polish delegation, and on behalf of NATO by Ambassador Rober Blackwill, the leader of the U.S. delegation. Next round of the talks is scheduled for mid-May. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1132 GMT 19 Mar 87 LD]

PACT MBFR EXPERTS MEET 11 MARCH—Sofia March 12 TASS—The working group of the experts of the Warsaw Treaty countries on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe had a regular meeting in Sofia on March 11. The experts reviewed progress in work on the Budapest address in the context of unofficial consultations which had began at the Vienna meeting between CSCE delegates on the mandate and forum of talks on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments on a European scale. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1805 GMT 12 Mar 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1362

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW ON RESUMPTION OF SOVIET-U.S. TEST BAN TALKS IN GENEVA

Petrosyants, Barker Head Delegations

LD161310 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1250 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva, 16 Mar (TASS) -- The Soviet-U.S. talks between experts on ending nuclear tests resumed here today.

At the talks the USSR delegation is continuing to try to reach accord on starting full-scale negotiations on a full ban on nuclear tests.

The Soviet delegation is headed by A.M. Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy. The head of the U.S. delegation is R. Barker, assistant to the secretary of defense (atomic energy).

U.S. Line Criticized

PM161142 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Article by A. Petrosyants, leader of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American talks on the problem of ending nuclear tests and chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, under the rubric "The United States and Nuclear Explosions": "Acting in the Spirit of the Times"]

[Text] The Soviet-American talks on questions of ending nuclear tests are resuming in Geneva. They are taking place in line with the accord reached by M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan during their first meeting. The USSR and U.S. delegations have met four times at the conference table in Geneva since July of last year.

It should be noted that from the first, the talks have taken place in a difficult and complex atmosphere. In the first two rounds the American delegation stated that it does not regard the talks as full-blown and described them as simple meetings to clarify the situation for future talks. Only during the third round -- after Reykjavik -- did the United States decide that it had at last embarked on talks.

In February of this year R. Barker, leader of the U.S. delegation, stated at one session that the American side is "prepared to take the first step toward a gradual process of limiting and ending nuclear tests in conjunction with a program for the reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear arms." But he did not back up the readiness to end tests with anything concrete. On the contrary, all of the American delegation's proposals on ending nuclear tests, however shrouded in a verbal fog, have been aimed at postponing the resolution of this problem until the distant future.

The United States, in continuing its tests, is deliberately tying the problem of ending nuclear tests into a single tight knot with the nuclear arms reduction program. Moreover it is linking it ultimately to the elimination of all nuclear arms. Only on this condition, they say, is a total end to nuclear tests possible. One wonders: When all nuclear arms have been eliminated, why carry out tests? In that event, the question of ending tests will disappear of its own accord.

Trying to justify the U.S. stance at all costs, the American representative claimed that "the United States remains loyal to the ultimate goal -- the total ending of nuclear tests." But he at once stipulated that the United States will make this move only "when it is no longer necessary to depend on the nuclear deterrent to maintain international security, international stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms, a significant improvement in the verification potential, broad confidence-building measures, and greater equilibrium in conventional arms."

Not only did this statement fail to clarify the substance of the matter, but its accumulation of new "linkages" basically discarded even the semblance of U.S. readiness to resolve the question of ending nuclear tests.

We regard talks on banning nuclear explosions as an interconnected process: There are the questions of "thresholds" for the yield of nuclear explosions, the number of nuclear explosions a year, and the fate of the 1974-1976 treaties. In a word, the talks should lead to the elaboration of a full-scale treaty on a complete and final ban on nuclear explosions.

The U.S. delegation has thus far been oriented only toward bringing the 1974 and 1976 treaties to ratification by means of revising the quality of monitoring of nuclear explosions. Thus in effect it sought consent to a revision of treaties signed earlier, with no linkage to the process of preparing a treaty on a complete end to nuclear weapon tests. After, and only after, ratification, the U.S. delegation stated, would it be possible to begin considering questions connected with ending and banning nuclear explosions.

It was obvious to the Soviet delegation that examining the "threshold" treaties in close linkage with the question of ending nuclear tests does not suit the U.S. delegation. But agreeing to examine only the question of the above treaties would mean postponing indefinitely the resolution of the problem of ending tests, and even, in a way, legitimizing them. We cannot accept that, and insist on the immediate examination of these questions.

On observing the American side's conduct at the talks and analyzing its proposals, you form the impression that if the American scenario were followed, it is not at all clear whether the talks would continue after the review of the question of verification of the "threshold treaties."

But the American delegation cannot easily evade the need to hold talks on ending nuclear weapon tests. The United States is one of the depositories of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. This treaty has already been in force for nearly 25 years. It makes it incumbent on the parties to seek to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear

weapons for all time," and speaks of their being "determined to continue negotiations to this end." The treaty stresses the readiness of the signatory countries to end all nuclear tests forever.

An end must be put to nuclear tests. The Soviet delegation expects the United States to heed the voice of reason, show a sense of realism, and begin full-scale talks in parallel with the drafting of a treaty on the complete and final banning of nuclear explosions.

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS MILITARY WRITERS: USSR READY FOR TESTS BAN

'Absurdity' of U.S. Logic

LD171838 Moscow TASS in English 1825 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 17 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

Experts justly hold that the attitude to the problem of banning nuclear explosions is indicative of a real attitude of the sides to the entire range of arms control questions. The side that refuses to take such a simple, extremely effective and easily verifiable measure can hardly be expected to agree to an arrangement on limitation and reduction of weapons arsenals at all. Assertions of representatives of the U.S. Administration that the continuation of testing and upgrading of nuclear weapons is the best way of making nuclear weapons "obsolete and impotent" could make one merely shrug one's shoulders if the vital problems of mankind's survival were not involved.

Also justifiable is the conclusion that the approach of some or other country to talks on ending nuclear weapon tests is indicative of what is the attitude of a given country to the very idea of the quest for mutually acceptable solutions to disarmament problems.

The U.S. side announced at the USSR-U.S. talks on nuclear testing that were resumed in Geneva that it still views the test ban as its long-term goal which, however, can be achieved only after all nuclear arms have been eliminated. Thus Washington will be prepared to ban nuclear testing, but only when nothing will remain to be tested. And such an attitude is not funny. For the U.S. side proposed to approach the elimination of nuclear arsenals through their preliminary build-up by the United States.

Following such logic one might arrive at the conclusion that a mine field is the safest place for the rest of people, while to fill one's house with petrol and powder is the best way of preventing a fire.

Realizing the utter absurdity of its "reasoning" in favor of the continuation of nuclear testing, Washington now tries to pass itself off as a supporter of arrangements and even comes out with its own "initiatives" for the ratification of the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty and the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. These are all grounds to believe that by these proposals the United States aims to give up the solution of the question of ending tests and even to "legalize" nuclear explosions in some way.

Washington has no wish to end tests and tries to replace the solution to this extremely important question with half-way measures. The U.S. delegation in Geneva is unhappy about "threshold" treaties closely linked with the question of ending tests. One gets the impression that Washington is now looking for a pretext to disrupt the talks on banning explosions.

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that an end to nuclear explosions would halt the arms race, would make it possible to embark on the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union kept from nuclear explosions for 19 months, thus giving a chance to the U.S. Administration to ponder on the consequences of acute destabilisation of the situation as a result of the arms build-up.

The USSR is prepared for any form of talks with the USA on nuclear explosions, for any version of arrangement on this question is the matters are really carried to the achievement of an agreement on a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests.

U.S. 'Illusion'

PM081739 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[Military observer V. Chernyshev "TASS commentary for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "A Warning to the Lovers of Nuclear Adventures"]

[Text] For more than 18 months silence reigned at Soviet nuclear test sites. Then, suddenly, a nuclear explosion rang out in the USSR. This did not, of course, come as a surprise to anyone in the world. On 18 December last year, the Soviet Government, extending its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for the fifth time and again offering to enter into full-scale talks on a total nuclear test ban, warned the United States that the Soviet Union would resume nuclear tests after the first U.S. explosion in the new year.

However, the present U.S. Administration failed to respond in a positive manner to the USSR's appeal to join its peace initiative and did not turn the moratorium into a bilateral one. Proceeding with its nuclear test program, Washington has already conducted two nuclear explosions in the current year. In all, 26 nuclear explosions rang out at the U.S. test site in Nevada while the Soviet moratorium was in force. Each one of them provided new evidence of the R. Reagan administration's total disregard for the demands of the world community contained in UN General Assembly resolutions, for the appeals of the Nonaligned Movement, for the proposals of the Delhi Six, and for the views of parliaments and the international public.

At the same time, as commentaries in the foreign news media indicate, people in the world understand the explosion of the nuclear device conducted in the Soviet Union was a step forced upon us, a consequence of the irresponsible U.S. policy. In conditions where the United States is proceeding with the implementation of its nuclear test program with the aim of developing fundamentally new kinds and types of arms and building up nuclear arsenals, the Soviet Union could not, of course, indefinitely display unilateral restraint. Otherwise a situation might arise where the continuation of the unilateral moratorium could inflict serious damage on the Soviet Union and its allies. After all, in rejecting the moratorium, Washington is clearly gambling on obtaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

Through the implementation of the "comprehensive program for rearming America" the Pentagon intends to increase the U.S. offensive potential to 20,000 nuclear charges by the early nineties. In 1986-1989 alone it is planned to produce more than 17,000 new nuclear munitions of varying yield and purpose. The creation of "third generation" nuclear weapons is being forced and space strike arms including nuclear-pumped x-ray lasers are being developed under the SDI program. R. Bowman, director of the Institute for Space and Security Studies, stated frankly: "We are tired of parity. The only way to regain political leverage is to obtain absolute military superiority."

What an illusion! Yet for the sake of this illusion nuclear explosions are reverberating in Nevada, for the sake of this illusion the U.S. Administration is planning to spend another 325 billion dollars on the production of nuclear arms alone over the next 5 years.

To prevent Washington officialdom from realizing this aim, to maintain the strategic balance of forces and to ensure security, our country was forced to end its unilateral moratorium.

However, as the USSR Defense Ministry spokesman emphasized at the briefing, the Soviet Union will, in its test program, proceed exclusively from the minimum necessary for fundamental research, national economic purposes, and testing of hardware and arms for resistance to the destructive forces of a nuclear explosion including resistance to the means currently being developed under the U.S. SDI program. Yet the Soviet Union does not intend to copy the U.S. nuclear program; only a minimum of tests will be conducted for the purpose of testing charges to maintain the strategic parity with the United States in terms of nuclear charges.

At the same time the resumption of nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union by no means signifies that we are abandoning our resolute struggle for a total test ban. All Soviet proposals for ending nuclear explosions remain in force. "If the United States decides to end nuclear tests," the 18 December 1986 Soviet Government statement said, "the USSR is ready, on any day or month, to suspend, on the basis of reciprocity, the implementation of its test program."

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA: U.S. CONDUCTED TESTS DURING 1960-1961 MORATORIUM

PM091809 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[V. Viktorov article under the rubric "The United States and Nuclear Explosions": "An Instructive Episode"]

[Text] A few days ago the Soviet side sent the U.S. Embassy in Moscow a note drawing attention to stories appearing in the U.S. press, citing a report by the Los Alamos national laboratory, to the effect that the United States conducted secret nuclear tests starting in January 1960 and for 18 months thereafter.

This period falls within the time period when the trilateral moratorium on nuclear tests by the USSR, the United States and Britain was in effect. U.S. President D. Eisenhower declared in this context that the U.S. side would not resume nuclear weapon tests without prior notification of its intention. Following this, the U.S. authorities issued no notification of tests in the United States for 18 months. On the contrary, the United States officially claimed that it had unconditionally observed the moratorium throughout that period. Whereas the accounts now being published indicate that, despite its assurances, the United States secretly carried out a large number of nuclear tests involving explosions (it is reported that the Los Alamos laboratory conducted 35 such tests during the 18 months, and the Livermore laboratory slightly fewer).

Thus, it must be asserted that there were repeated violations of the nuclear tests moratorium by the United States in 1960-1961. This episode shows the measures to which the United States resorts to evade restrictions in the area of refining [otrabotka] and improving [sovershenstvovaniye] nuclear weapons. The Soviet side declared that it would like to receive additional official explanations on this account.

The United States, especially in recent times, has been earnestly posing as a champion of the observance of international agreements. But no matter what ruses and diplomatic catches may be used by those trying to justify the U.S. behavior, it is impossible to pass over in silence the fact that the instances of U.S. nuclear testing in the early sixties are not simply something past. They constitute a fact which casts light on the U.S. attitude to pledges on curbing the arms race, especially in the nuclear sphere.

The United States is stubbornly pursuing a course of continuing nuclear explosions. When the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was concluded in 1963, specialists from Los Alamos and Livermore had to bury the nuclear devices and explode them underground. U.S. diplomacy has resorted to all sorts of maneuvers since that time to prevent an accord on the universal and complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

For several decades the United States has blocked the path to agreement by means of its demands in the verification [kontrol] sphere, even though science long ago presented governments with reliable means to detect and identify nuclear explosions, adequate for confident monitoring of the fulfillment of agreements. Ambassador Wadsworth, who headed the U.S. delegation to the nuclear test ban talks for a long time and knew his administration's stance well, wrote as early as 1971: "For our Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the question of effective inspection [inspektsiya] was always just a smoke screen, while the continuation of an intensive test program was the real goal. Ultimately, the Chiefs of Staff prevailed."

Now that the Soviet Union has proposed reaching agreement on the strictest and most comprehensive means and methods of verification, right up to on-site inspection [inspektsiya na mestakh], and has allowed U.S. specialists with their own apparatus onto the Soviet nuclear test range to observe how the unilateral moratorium it proclaimed was being observed, any arguments about verification [kontrol] difficulties have finally been refuted. Under these circumstances, the United States has been forced to admit frankly that it will not embark on ending nuclear explosions because it does not wish to do so. "The moratorium is not in the interests of the security of the United States and its allies and friends," President Reagan declared last year, once again using a number of conditions to justify the refusal to ban nuclear explosions.

By continuing its nuclear tests, the United States is not only wrecking the possibility of reaching an accord on halting all nuclear explosions, but is directly engaged in covert and overt violations of accords limiting the parameters of such tests.

The Soviet side has repeatedly appealed to the United States in connection with instances of the discharge of radioactive substances beyond the bounds of its national territory as a result of its underground nuclear explosions--which is a gross violation of the 1963 Treaty.

Devices yielding in excess of the 150-kiloton limit established by the 1974 Treaty have also been set off on more than one occasion at test sites in Nevada. During a U.S. test in fall 1975 an explosion with a yield of between 200 kilotons and 1 megaton caused a 6-point earthquake in the vicinity of Las Vegas. Despite assurances that the United States intends to observe the 150-kiloton limit, the violations continue.

Moreover, now that the Soviet and U.S. delegations in Geneva are considering the question of how to start large-scale talks on halting nuclear tests and, in accordance with what was discussed in Reykjavik, approach this ultimate goal by means of an accord on reducing the yield and number of nuclear

explosions, official U.S. spokesmen are increasingly saying that in the future they will need explosions which exceed the 1974 Treaty limits. Addressing the Senate Armed Services Committee at the end of February, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Barker (he is also head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on halting nuclear weapon tests) and leader of the Energy Department's military nuclear program Foley made a direct request: In the next few years the United States will need--in order to create new types of nuclear warheads--to exceed the 150-kiloton ceiling during testing.

The makers of the unseemly policy often resort to base methods of justifying it. People from the Pentagon have tried on more than one occasion to accuse the Soviet Union of alleged violations of the 1974 Treaty. But eminent U.S. specialists have authoritatively denied this. In an article "The Power of Soviet Strategic Armaments," published in the January 1987 issue of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, the scientists (L. Sayks) and (D. Devis) wrote: "Our calculations show very definitely that, contrary to the administration's conclusions, none of the underground tests carried out by the Soviet Union in recent years exceeded the previously agreed yield calling for nuclear tests." The Soviet Union's observance of the 1974 Treaty was acknowledged at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings by Livermore Laboratory director (R. Battsel). So the Pentagon's attempt to blame the Soviet Union for the violations of the agreement did not stand up to criticism.

One of the main aims of the U.S. nuclear test program is to develop devices for the space ABM system in the context of the SDI program, and in particular a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser. Work connected with this device is being carried out in contravention of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits tests for ABM purpose anywhere except at previously agreed, stated test sites. As far as the United States is concerned the test sites are Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific and the White Sands area in New Mexico. But the conduct of tests for ABM purpose at the Nevada test site can definitely be regarded as not being in line with the U.S. commitments under the aforementioned treaty.

Recent history and current facts convincingly indicates that U.S. militarist plans connected with the course of creating and improving nuclear armaments and implementing the SDI program are undermining the legal-treaty foundation for curbing and winding down the arms race. Halting this dangerous process is the paramount condition which must be secured in order to facilitate progress toward a nuclear-free world that is safe for everyone.

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR REJECTS U.S. COMPLAINT ON TEST FALL-OUT

LD121413 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 12 Mar 87

["Fabricated Complaints From Washington" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Mar (TASS) -- TASS observer on military matters Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The U.S. State Department today presented an aide-memoire to the USSR ambassador in Washington, setting out complaints about "nonobservance" by the Soviet side of the ban on nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in space, and under water which came into force in 1963. In particular, the U.S. refers to an alleged emission into the atmosphere of "radioactive fragments which reached regions beyond the limits of the USSR" during an underground nuclear test conducted in the USSR in February this year.

It is officially stated by the USSR Ministry of Defense that during the conducting in the Soviet Union on 26 February this year of the first underground explosion after a moratorium of a year and a half, all necessary safety measures were taken and conditions were observed with respect to the depth at which the charge was placed, and other technical measures, which totally excluded the possibility of the escape and fall-out of radioactive particles beyond the territorial limits of the USSR. In this respect, there are no grounds, nor can there be any, for the concern expressed by the U.S. with regard to a breach of the 1963 treaty. By addressing such fabricated complaints to the Soviet Union, the United States obviously wishes to somehow cover up its own practice of breaking international agreements.

The USSR Government attaches great importance to strict and unswerving observation of all international agreements, including the 1963 treaty. It considers them an important means of limiting the arms race and maintaining strategic stability.

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA: U.S. TESTS UNDERMINING ARMS TREATIES

LD130856 Moscow TASS in English 0815 GMT 13 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 13 TASS--"After the Soviet Union suggested coming in terms on the most strict and all-embracing means and methods of verification, right up to on-site inspections, and allowed U.S. specialists with their own equipment to come to the Soviet nuclear test range to monitor the observance of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium, any arguments about verification difficulties proved finally refuted," Vladimir Viktorov writes in today's PRAVDA.

"In these conditions the United States frankly had to admit that it would not agree to stop nuclear explosions because it did not want to do that."

"The United States, by going ahead with its nuclear tests, not only frustrates a possibility to reach agreement on cessation of all nuclear explosions but also directly resorts to covert and overt violations of the accords which limit the parameters of such tests."

"Thus, the Soviet side has repeatedly drawn the United States' attention to instances of the blowing of radioactive substances beyond the boundaries of U.S. national territory as a result of underground nuclear explosions conducted by the United States, which is a flagrant violation of the 1963 treaty."

"Devices they yield of which exceeded the limit of 150 kilotons set by the 1974 treaty have been detonated at nuclear test ranges in Nevada more than once."

"One of the principal goals of the U.S. nuclear tests' programme is to try out devices for a space-based anti-missile defence system under the SDI programme, an X-ray nuclear-pumped laser, in particular."

"The work connected with such a device is being conducted in breach of the ABM Treaty which bans tests of ABM systems outside the previously announced and fixed test ranges," Vladimir Viktorov writes.

"Atoll Kwajalein in the Pacific Ocean and White Sands area in New Mexico are such test ranges for the United States. The conduct of tests for an anti-missile defence system at the test range in Nevada can be with good reason viewed as not corresponding to U.S. obligations under the above-mentioned treaty."

"The recent history and these facts convincingly indicate that U.S. militarist plans connected with the course towards the development and upgrading of nuclear arms, and towards the realisation of the SDI programme are leading to an undermining of the legal treaty foundation for curbing and curtailing the arms race. To stop this dangerous process is the indispensable condition which must be guaranteed in order to secure a successive advance to a nuclear-free world safe for everyone."

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TEST IN SEMIPALATINSK 12 MARCH

20 Kiloton Explosion

LD120450 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 12 Mar (TASS) -- On 12 March 1987 at 0500 Moscow time [0200 GMT] an underground nuclear explosion with a power of 20 kilotons was conducted in the USSR at the testing ground in the region of Semipalatinsk.

This test was carried out with the aim of improving military equipment.

U.S. 'Responsible' for Test

LD121223 Moscow TASS in English 1218 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS -- TASS news analyst Yuriy Kornilov writes:

The Soviet Union was compelled to set off a nuclear test blast, the second one in the last eighteen months. This explosion, as the first one made in February, was no surprise because our country had stated openly more than once that it could not display unilateral restraint on this matter. Had it not been for the reckless militaristic position of Washington, which responded with ever new nuclear tests in Nevada to all Soviet calls for ending them, all would have been quiet today in the Soviet nuclear testing ranges. While the Soviet moratorium was in force the United States exploded over 25 nuclear devices over eighteen months.

It is Washington alone that is responsible for the fact that our country had to resume tests. One thing appears especially shocking in this connection. Certain circles of the USA, while spurring the arms race, fostering militarism and building up tension, have the audacity to accuse others and ascribe their own sins to them. Thus the U.S. State Department came up today with a false story alleging that the Soviet nuclear test, held in February, caused a radioactive fallout which reached areas beyond the Soviet Union.

Commenting on this allegation, Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said to me: "There is not a grain of truth in the State Department's assertions. What it says is a gross falsification and lie. The explosion set off in the Soviet Union in February was made with the observance of all safety requirements.

This invention by the State Department is a helpless attempt to quench the intensity of public anger with the American policy of active war preparations, a policy which has brought the Soviet moratorium to an end."

So, if we are to speak of a "fallout," there is only one fallout, the fallout of misinformation and new lies from Washington. Its purpose is to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union and its policy. But lies do not live long...

In conclusion I should like to remind all that the Soviet proposals for ending nuclear tests remain in force. The USSR is prepared to resume its moratorium on nuclear tests any day, any month, as soon as the United States announces the termination of its nuclear tests. Unfortunately, Washington seems to be moving in a diametrically opposite direction.

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA REPORTAGE FROM SEMIPALATINSK TEST SITE

PM121221 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 87 Second Edition p 6

[Special correspondent Aleksandr Prokhanov report: "Explosion: Reportage From the Soviet Nuclear Test Range"]

[Text] The Semipalatinsk Region---...I am flying by helicopter over a flat, snow-covered plain. Down there, below the rotor blades, below the white snow cover with the fox and wolf tracks are the old trenches, the broken concrete walls, the bridges moved from their supports, the wrecked aircraft, and the rusty tanks.

Here, above the steppe, the first Soviet atomic bomb was dropped from an aircraft in 1949. The shock wave, light radiation, and penetrating radiation were tested on combat hardware, fortifications, and houses... I am now flying over the "battlefield" of World War III, which fortunately did not take place but which was ready to erupt immediately after World War II when the Flying Fortresses--the atomic bomb carriers--were already in Britain and Soviet cities were marked as targets on the U.S. pilots' maps.

Our atomic explosion 40 years ago stopped the warmongers. It prevented them from dealing with Kiev, Moscow, and Leningrad the way they had dealt with Hiroshima. The defense workers of the forties--the scientists, engineers, and soldiers--accomplished a feat for the defense of the state. The atomic program was carried out and the motherland was protected by a nuclear shield. The peace of the fatherland and the survival of world civilization were ensured.

Here today, at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range, the successors of those people are at work.

The granite mountains have been pulverized by explosions. Here there are concrete roads, high voltage pylons, and settlements. Here you will see physicists studying the theory of nuclear explosions. Metallurgists testing armor plate in the furnace of a superhot blast. Ecologists studying flora and fauna subjected to radiation. And, of course, military men, the soldiers, front-line commanders, and testers who have come to this remote semidesert zone to perform the awesome task imposed on them by the age.

I am standing on the edge of a huge 0.5-km crater. Beneath my feet there is black pumice. It is as though a meteorite has crashed into the planet, carving

a charred hole out of it and causing the rock to seethe and boil. Hills, black as pitch, have been thrown up around it. Boulders and other debris have been flung far across the steppe.

It was here, about 30 years ago, at the confluence of two steppe streams that an underground charge was tested, a small, "tactical" charge as the military men say. And this 0.5-km lake set between grassless shores is the result of the blast. Water has accumulated in the crater in the years since then and carp have been introduced. Ecologists are carrying out painstaking observations of the rare white grass that has taken root in the pumice. The explosion was for peaceful purposes, part of the construction of reservoirs and canals.

I am looking at the remains of this "modest" explosion. The thought occurs to me: If mankind were to use up its nuclear missile stockpile in a single hour this is how the world would look, black and pitted with huge pock marks. These charred craters would swallow up forever St. Basil's and Cologne cathedrals, the Bible and Hiawatha, and the future vision of Vernadskiy and Le Corbusier. Here, on the edge of this crater, NATO's generals, the creators of "limited" or "total" war and of the "first strike" or the "defense initiative," the architect of the End of the World, the vision of the Day of Judgment, seem loathsome and alien to the human race. No, they will not win a nuclear war. The winners would be the dead, covered with the rock and ash of the crater...

Our UAZ truck pulls over, into the snow, and makes way for the convoy. Heavy green and silver trucks. They sway from side to side pressing heavily on the road. The "Ural" trucks roar. The signals flash. Perhaps here, among the trucks, crammed with instruments, an unseen container with a "special charge" is hidden. Slowly, belching smoke, the convoy disappears into the foothills, the distant, snow-covered ridges.

The test range, which has lain silent for 18 months, "subdued" by the moratorium, has come to life, has begun to stir, the engines have begun to roar, and its huge mechanism has begun to move out in the vast open spaces.

For 18 months the military test ranges have been paying close attention to the world's weather. There have been talks in Geneva and Reykjavik. Peace-making formulas. Television linkups and discussions. Meetings between politicians and representatives of world culture. The motherland's colossal efforts aimed at dialogue, compromise, new formulas of cooperation, a new philosophy of coexistence. Five times we extended the moratorium. But as though scorning the words of the doctors and writers, the speeches of the peace-makers, and people's prayers and hopes, America's generals, militarist politicians, and arms builders continued to detonate their charges in Nevada, "pump" their X-ray lasers, increase the squadrons of B-1 strategic bombers, test the "invisible" Stealth aircraft, install MX missiles in their silos, launch Trident submarines, break the SALT II Treaty, produce a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, step up the pace of SDI, and prepare to hang their lethal laser chandeliers in space.

Twenty-six times the echo of the explosions in Nevada reached our silent test range. The military personnel at the range counted these explosions, realizing that each one was driving forward the other side's juggernaut in the pursuit of military-strategic superiority. In recent weeks, for example, the moratorium has been on the minds not only of the military but also of workers, housewives, artists, and plowmen. And the termination of the Soviet moratorium aroused complex, mixed feelings. Grief and pain: Once again the people across the ocean had not listened to us. Once again history, held in check for a moment, had set off on its somber path created by the tank tracks and the slipstream of combat missiles. But the motherland's security will be preserved, the parity will not be broken, the sense of being a citizen of a great power will not be disturbed.

The gallery in the mountain, the site of the future explosion--the "experiment," as it is called at the test range. This tunnel, which is almost ready, has been deserted and silent for 18 months. Now there is work going on in it again. The pneumatic drills are hammering. The miners' lamps are glowing. Small, rock-filled trucks are moving along rails. Mine workers in respirators are hacking at the granite layers.

I went deep into the mountain. Many long meters. There were high ceilings. Rock fragments. Finally, at the end of the tunnel people could be seen using blow torches where cross-pieces had been erected against the soot-stained wall. This is where the charge will be installed. The atomic explosion will be detonated. It will try to raise the mountain on its back. I was standing at the center of the site of the future explosion. I thought of the fabulous price we are paying for our defense, for our security. Mankind's countless riches are being burned up in the crucible of confrontation. We, who are engaged in restructuring and acceleration, need every worker, every creative idea, every kopek to be spent on creation. But we are forced to spend it on these tunnels, these somber galleries, and the explosion that will thunder out here will burn up pictures as yet unpainted, crops unharvested, palaces and power stations not built. For the sake of conserving that which has already been built, painted, and grown. We are paying the unavoidable price for our defense and we are paying it voluntarily. And we shall pay it so long as our children's cradles, our shrines, and our assets are in the sights of MIRVED MX missiles or, by all accounts, the laser cannons of SDI.

There was another shaft where an experiment was carried out several years ago. A slit disappearing into the mountain, scarred by the marks of scorched cables and steel torn to shreds. The whole mountain is full of fissures like an earthenware pot. The summit is a heap of loose black rubble. The explosion rocked the mountain, breaking its spine in many places. The devastated mountain, rent from within, subsided again, diminished in size. Other mountains nearby, riddled with old shafts, were shaken and passed through the stone crusher which, instead of cobbles or blocks of stones, reduces whole ridges to fine gravel. Momentarily the thought occurs to me: Will mankind really achieve such cyclopean strength that he will be able to hurl whole planets into his atomic coffee grinder, transforming them into asteroid belts and clouds of cosmic dust?!

I climbed into the shaft. Small stones rattled against my plastic helmet. In the light of my lamp I could see twisted rails and flattened plugs. At the end of the tunnel there was a huge hall. The cavity where the explosion took place. A multicolored glass sphere, formed in microseconds by the nuclear explosion. Solidified glass icicles. Accumulations and streams of glass. In red, green, and blue. There was a vase created by some hideous glassblower. And another momentary thought occurred to me: Was I really standing in that place where a thermonuclear explosion had erupted? This subterranean kingdom created not by the cosmos or by geological processes taking billions of years but by man, in other words, by me. What kind of man am I who has been given the ability by civilization to move planets out of their orbit but who cannot come to terms with my neighbors or with myself? Why does technology intensify billions of times over our surviving instincts of fear, suspicion, and aggression instead of love, humanism, and trust?

No, it is not I, not my party, not my people who are to blame. The culprits are those dark imperialist forces who are striving to fashion the whole world in their own image, the industrialists of war raking in billions from the weapons banks.

Those were my thoughts as I gazed at the stained glass windows created by the explosion in the center of the mountain. The stones rained down, clattering against my plastic helmet...

Then there was the third shaft, prepared for the experiment. Sleet fell on the iron doors, the sentries in their sheepskin coats, and the serpentine tangle of cables disappearing into the bowels of the mountain. That is where the charge was installed. Down there, surrounding the charge, nestled many sensors, ready in that split second before destruction to absorb information about the explosion and instantaneously to convey out a "portrait" of it. The entire deep shaft has been sealed many times over, capped, and plugged—with steel, concrete, and rocks to prevent the explosion from breaking the gag over the rock mouth and to prevent the nuclear hell from blazing into the atmosphere. The nuclear genie has been trapped in a granite bottle. And only the sensors, the cables, and the trucks with the receivers grouped together in the distance will obtain an image of the explosion and instant oscillograms of the eruption will be recorded on hundreds of films. A precious and terrible result obtained by scientists for the sake of the motherland's security.

This is our first explosion in response to the 26 explosions in Nevada.

How can you talk to the U.S. military-industrial complex? To politicians who only see us as an "empire of evil"? To the marines who trampled over Lebanon and tiny Grenada? To the pilots who destroyed the hospital in Tripoli? Do you tell them how much we value peace? Or show them Novgorod's Spass-nereditaa, rebuilt from the ashes? Or the list of those who died at Stalingrad? Or do you send them one of our schoolgirls as a herald of peace?

No, the militarists will not understand or listen to any of this. They only understand explosions. This explosion will be heard by submarine captains with their megatons targeted on us. It will be heard by the businessmen who allocate billions to binary munitions and bacteriological bombs.

We are not utopians, we do not indulge in groundless fantasies. In continuing the dialogue begun with the Western world and urging its sensible representatives to engage in cooperation and joint cooperation on earth we are aware of the difficulty of the path toward achieving a harmonious and united mankind which has discarded its weapons. This explosion is a demonstration of the agonizing dialectic of today's divided world.

I left the loaded shaft at dusk. The beams of the headlights picked out the rapidly moving forms of the wild sheep. The animals are also leaving, as though sensing the forthcoming earthquake.

...It is late, it is midnight. A government commission is in session. Tense faces are illuminated by the lamplight. There are people in military uniform and civilian clothes. Specialists are delivering reports. The information--military and technical--is concise and precise. Beyond the businesslike information I perceive another situation, other words unspoken. Tomorrow will be more than just an explosion, more than just an experiment. The country has been forced to abandon the moratorium. The state, having exhausted all its reserves of patience, having studied the problems of its own security and its national independence, and having listened to the thoughts of its citizens, not just the strategist and the politician but also the schoolchild--that state is taking the difficult decision imposed on it by the West: to demonstrate a device at the nuclear test range.

Those people--the military, the engineers, the scientists, the commanders--are at the same time men of the state. I looked at their faces. I know the responsible, difficult work done by our army, our soldiers today, sometimes at the very limits of life. Their labor is often unseen: Sometimes it is in the depths of the ocean, in the boundless skies, in mines, or in far-off garrisons in the forests. But the people know and love them. The people pay tribute to their defenders.

It is a bright blue morning. It hurts to look at the white brilliance of the mountains. There is a command center, trucks, communications lines. Military and civilian personnel. The theoretical physicists, studying the dynamics of the explosion in their scientific centers, have made their prediction and the most complex machine calculation. They brought this calculation to the test range and locked it up inside the mountain. Now they await the experiment to see whether their prediction is borne out. And they will take back to their centers the information gained from the shattered mountain.

The test range chief is Lieutenant General Arkadiy Danilovich Ilyenko. I learned of his life and his fate in snatches, on the move, in brief minutes, in the general round of the test range's concerns. I recalled his story of how the fascists passed through his native village when he was a child. They burned down the houses with flamethrowers and machine-gunned the cows and those women who got in the way of the bullets. From his own garden he watched his home, his village, his native steppe, and his motherland being turned into a scorched ruin. This image has remained with him his whole life. Perhaps this image flashed before him momentarily even now, before this test designed for defensive purposes.

Helicopters are airborne. They are inspecting the area to make sure that no herd of horses or flock of sheep has strayed in. The radiation-monitoring aircraft are circling. All the explosions are underground, they do not affect the atmosphere, and they are extinguished in the surrounding rock. But the measurement and testing of the air goes on constantly.

I am looking at the distant mountain loaded with a nuclear charge. I can sense the excitement increasing all around... Ten minutes to go until the explosion... Five minutes... One minute... The countdown is down to seconds now. By my watch it is 0800 hours, Moscow time.

..The mountain ridges heaved awesomely. Not just the ground, not just the steppe, but the planet itself moved. The mountain rose, then subsided. The peak emitted a stream of rocks, like a huge shotgun. The road spread across the region, reaching my eyes and my heart. It penetrated the earth's crust and went round the planet, passing through mountains, the foundations of skyscrapers and temples, newborn babes, and the bones of our decomposed forefathers.

So the explosion had taken place. Unfortunately, because of Washington's stance, another opportunity to achieve a nuclear-free world had been missed. But our will for peace is indomitable. We continue to call for dialogue and the ending of nuclear tests on any day and at any hour. If the globalists across the ocean agree to this.

I am watching the mustard-colored dust slowly escaping from the mountain. I can hear the steady hum of the radiation reconnaissance aircraft over my head...

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST SITE COMMANDER INTERVIEWED

PM251521 Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 6, 9-15 Feb 87 (signed to press 11 Feb 87) pp 1, 13

[Interview with Lieutenant General Arkadiy Danilovich Ilyenko, chief of the Soviet nuclear test site, by special correspondent Yuriy Ivashchenko: "After the Explosion in Nevada"; date and place of interview not specified; first two paragraphs are NEDELYA introduction]

[Excerpts] Another nuclear explosion was carried out in the state of Nevada 3 February—the 25th since the moratorium unilaterally announced by the Soviet Union came into effect. In its statement of 18 December 1986 the Soviet Government warned that the USSR would be forced to resume nuclear tests after the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987.

The United States refused to support the Soviet peace initiatives or take a real step toward lessening the nuclear threat.

[Ivashchenko] Arkadiy Danilovich, how are nuclear test explosions carried out on your site?

[Ilyenko] Miners tunnel deep into a natural eminence. We use the tunnel to place a nuclear device in the heart of the hill. We connect it to a control desk. After this we withdraw from the tunnel and carefully fill it up with rock, so that radiation does not escape into the atmosphere. At the appointed time scientists and engineers—the entire collective working at the test site—take up their positions. The operator presses a button. Yes, a red one. There is an explosion. Instruments record the results.

[Ivashchenko] When the U.S. test site is shown on television, you can see the ground shudder over a vast area when the explosion happens. Do your explosions appear equally menacing?

[Ilyenko] Not outwardly. The thing is that the Americans sink a vertical shaft to house the device, with a flat desert surface, while we, as I have already said, detonate a nuclear device under the mighty heel of a hill. But the /PHYSICAL/ [capitalized word between slantlines published in boldface] essence of what happens during tests is the same in both places. The planet is "battered" during nuclear explosions in identical fashion in Nevada or here.

[Ivashchenio] What a graphic word--"battered."

[Ilyenko] But that really is so. It is battered in the literal sense of the word. Seismic waves from explosions spread all over the planet. It is also "battered" in the sense of being made "feverish." For it is no secret why all nuclear powers conduct tests: They are developing [otrabatyvat] new models of arms.

[Ivashchenko] There are medicines for fever. But what about for the arms race? The Manhattan project--the U.S. project to create the atom bomb--"devoured" 14 billion dollars. According to specialists' estimates, it will take trillions to realize SDI.

[Ilyenko] The medicine, if I may call it that, is well known. The United States and its partners must show political will, overcome the resistance of the military-industrial complex, and support the Soviet Union's efforts in curbing the arms race. Moscow issued the order, and we stopped testing. But Nevada thundered. Washington shook the planet 25 times, I repeat, during the unilateral Soviet moratorium. The U.S. Administration does not wish to end the nuclear arms race. That is the crux of the matter.

[Ivashchenko] However, no one in his right mind would try to demonstrate that nuclear war is a suitable means of resolving political disputes. The Soviet moratorium received a high evaluation in the international arena. True, in making it, certain Western leaders declared that our country's prestige and confidence in it would be still better founded if the USSR refrained from nuclear tests even after the explosion just conducted by the Americans. That is, they proposed that we continue in a state of noble openness and defenselessness. But we have shown concern for our security. Will they understand us?

[Ilyenko] I think they must understand. For the ending of the moratorium is a forced measure dictated exclusively by the security interests of the USSR and its allies.

I am convinced that no nobility will have any effect on aggressors who grow impertinent as their arsenals are filled. People in our country know this better than anywhere else. Europe, too, probably has not forgotten the horrors of the Hitlerite invasion. Nevertheless, from positions of new political thinking our country leaves open the ways to mutual rejection of nuclear tests. As we know, the Soviet Union is ready to resume the moratorium if the United States stops and ends the implementation of nuclear test programs.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA CITES FOREIGN REACTIONS TO END OF MORATORIUM

PM021252 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 87 First Edition 87 p 5

[TASS 27 February press roundup: "Enforced Measures"]

[Excerpt] Warsaw--The detonation of a nuclear device in the Soviet Union was an enforced move in a situation where the United States has several times refused to stop its own nuclear tests, the newspaper ZYCIE WARSZAWY writes. The silence on the Soviet nuclear test sites, the newspaper points out, lasted more than 18 months while Washington continued carrying out its own nuclear test program despite the protests of the world public. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with the banning of nuclear tests being an important element of this, and its proposals in this sphere remain relevant, ZYCIE WARSZAWY stresses.

Beijing--Urging the United States to join the moratorium, the USSR has repeatedly extended it, pointing to the need to discuss the question of completely ending nuclear tests, the newspaper CHINA DAILY writes. This proposal was, however, rejected by the American administration, the newspaper observes.

Washington--The Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear tests after an 18-month-long unilateral moratorium on them is a "logical consequence of the erroneous foreign policy" pursued by America, Congressman Les Aucoin stated. Addressing the House Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, he stressed that the "Reagan administration's hostile attitude to arms control" is undermining U.S. security.

Washington officialdom meanwhile confirmed that it has no intention of abandoning its course of fueling the nuclear arms race. "Our stance on nuclear test explosions has not changed," U.S. Navy Secretary John Lehman stated. According to him, "the nuclear test moratorium does not accord with U.S. security interests...and threatens our allies."

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

YUGOSLAV PAPER ON SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST RESUMPTION

AU090930 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb-1 Mar 87 p 13

[Vlado Teslic "The Week in the World" column: "Even Without a Moratorium"]

[Excerpts] In addition to all the troubles that press mankind to the utmost limits of endurance, we have now been without a moratorium on nuclear tests proclaimed unilaterally by the USSR 570 days ago expecting that other nuclear powers will follow.

The resumption of tests has been expected, but it is easier to understand this step than it is to accept it as something rational or even unavoidable. The resumption of the tests has certainly been forced upon them, as it is stressed in Moscow, and it will probably contribute to greater security for the USSR, although that, too, is disputable. It is much less disputable that the nuclear experiments now being carried out by the United States, the USSR, France, and Britain, will endanger the security of mankind in general and will probably open a new cycle of the arms race with all the consequences that this entails.

The hope remains that the Soviets will continue with their proposals in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

It cannot be denied that Moscow's room for maneuver in such proposals has now been considerably reduced. The peace-loving world public could perhaps have exerted more influence on the nuclear powers and had perhaps not made the best assessment of the Soviet Union's good will. This does not mean that anti-nuclear feelings will not strengthen and will not influence the disarmament process and international relations in general.

In fact, many saw the Soviet moratorium as sheer propaganda, but it is difficult to overlook the fact that it is propaganda that contains its own logic, that works successfully, and that leads to an ultimate goal.

Despite his personal disappointment because he did not succeed in Reykjavik--and a nuclear test ban agreement was a minimum--Gorbachev did a great deal to make the Soviet positions more convincing all over the world, including in the West.

The question remains to what extent the change of the Soviet position on nuclear tests is a result of pressure by those forces at home which attach priority to their own security, being led by the same principle of "realpolitik" as the leading forces in the West. The so-called realpolitik, however, is one thing, and a change in reality another. Real politicians comprehend this and take it for their guidance. This, in fact, is the difference between Gorbachev and Reagan.

What Does the West Offer?

The U.S. President may now find himself very quickly in the position that the Soviet nuclear experiments, which he forced, will make his policy of intensive rearmament even more vulnerable. It was relatively easy to insist on American tests and armaments as "realpolitik" which strengthen American military and other positions in the world at a time when the other side adhered to its moratorium. This could be comprehended, as it was interpreted in the White House, as a weakness of the other side. However, how is one to parry the Soviet Union when it takes the same road of intensive rearmament?

It will very quickly be shown that it was more easy to parry "Soviet propaganda" than the Soviet version of "realpolitik" in its approach to rearmament.

A joint moratorium is now much further away than ever before. Therefore one can understand regret at the Soviet step expressed by many world statesmen. It is difficult, however, to see any logic in the positions of some Western countries which did not follow the Soviet moratorium and which now declare that this is not the right way to achieve serious progress in disarmament. Any progress must start somewhere. What does the West offer, except the arms race? This is the proper cause for regret as well as for concern.

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